Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Willie Dale was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Dale's petition for review on the single issue of whether the district court erred in admitting a slow motion version of a patrol-car video. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the best evidence, namely the original video, had already been admitted at trial, and the modified video was not introduced to prove or disprove the content of the original video, the video's admission did not violate the best evidence rule; and (2) because the video was not unduly repetitious and added something to the State's case, its admission was not cumulative.

Anthony Kidd was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and aggravated battery. Kidd appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, (1) the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; and (2) the prosecutor violated his duty to inform the State that an order in limine prohibited reference to Kidd's prior crimes, but this error and one witness's subsequent violation of that order did not affect the outcome of the trial, and therefore, the error was harmless. The Court rejected Kidd's remaining claims.

Ricky Hyche pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law offense, and received a hard twenty-five sentence with lifetime electronic monitoring. Hyche appealed, arguing (1) he should be eligible for parole after twenty years, not twenty-five, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2); (2) lifetime electronic monitoring was an invalid component of his sentence under State v. Jolly; and (3) his motion for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five sentence should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the balance of Hyche's sentence but vacated the component of his sentence imposing lifetime electronic monitoring, holding that under Jolly, this part of Hyche's sentence was inappropriate.

A jury convicted Christopher Tahah of felony murder and the underlying felony of discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm. During trial, Tahah argued for a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter. The felony-murder rule then in effect provided that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3), requiring instructions on lesser-included offenses where there is evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser-included crime did not apply when murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The district court applied the felony-murder rule and denied Tahah's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction in light of the Court's recent decision in State v. Berry, which held that section 22-3414(3) no longer makes an exception for felony murder.

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.

A jury convicted Michael Tully of one count of rape. The court of appeals affirmed Tully's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Tully's rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona and Doyle v. Ohio were violated by the State's improper comments on Tully's postarrest silence; (2) the district court gave an improper jury instruction on the element of force; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing a State's expert witness to offer an opinion beyond her qualifications, which also invaded the province of the jury; and (4) the cumulative errors denied Tully a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial.

Defendant Anthony Barnes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. Barnes was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole with a consecutive fourteen months for the aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench despite Barnes' difficulty in choosing between jury and bench trial; (2) the district judge did not err in accepting Barnes' knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes.

Lafayette Cosby was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder after a second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, (1) The district court properly excluded evidence of a question Cosby asked police because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) the district judge correctly decided not to include a lesser included offense on voluntary manslaughter in the jury instructions; (3) the evidence of premeditation in this case was plainly sufficient to support Cosby's conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in reversible conduct or improperly shift the burden of proof on the element of premeditation to the defense with a certain comment to the jury because the prosecutor's challenged comment was within the wide latitude allowed the State in discussing the evidence.

After a jury trial, Phouthavy Chanthaseng was convicted for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Chanthaseng argued that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and commenting on the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing the delayed and piecemeal "process of disclosure" of the abuse victim and by using personal experiences of venire panel members as substitute for evidence of disclosure pattern relevant to reliability; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing the abuse victim's credibility because the prosecutor's comments, when viewed in context, where accompanied by a discussion of the evidence presented at trial and merely asked the jury to draw permissible inferences from that evidence; and (3) the prosecutor's "process of disclosure" misconduct did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of Chanthaseng's conviction.

Chester Roberts was arrested for the unlawful possession of prescription drugs after he was found in possession of a tablet of generic Lortab, for which he had no prescription. Roberts was charged with one count of possession of hydrocodone in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4160(a). Roberts filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 56-4160(a) does not include hydrocodone combination products such as generic Lortab. The district court granted Roberts' motion. The State appealed the district court's order of dismissal. In response, Roberts argued that the State could not appeal the dismissal because the court's order was equivalent to a judgment of acquittal from which an appeal is barred both by statute and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case where the order of dismissal was entered before trial, jeopardy had not yet attached, and therefore, the order was not a judgment of acquittal and the State's appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.