Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Paul Sykes was convicted of burglary and aggravated sexual battery. Prior to the expiration of his sentence, the State filed a petition seeking to have Sykes adjudicated a sexually violent predator. Although Sykes was found incompetent to assist in his own defense, the district court ultimately ruled Sykes was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The court of appeals affirmed. Sykes appealed, arguing that due process requires that a respondent be mentally competent to assist in his or her own defense in order to be civilly adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication, holding that a respondent need not be competent to be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, and therefore, Sykes did not suffer a violation of his due process rights. View "In re Care & Treatment of Sykes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error by the district court in answering a jury question with a written response in violation of Defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of his trial was harmless; (2) Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that the submission of a written answer to the jury question violated his right to an impartial judge and public trial; and (3) the district court did not commit clear error in failing to give a jury instruction on a lesser included severity level for the crime of aggravated battery. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

While Defendant was serving a nonprison sentence of probation with community corrections supervision in three cases, the State filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s probation. After a hearing, the district court stated that it would reinstate Defendant on probation with a ninety-day sanction. The court, however, reopened the completed probation revocation hearing based upon Defendant’s subsequent contemptuous act, found Defendant in direct contempt of court, and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation was based on a ground for which Defendant was not provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard in violation of Defendant’s due process rights. Remanded for a new probation revocation hearing. View "State v. Hurley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant’s lawyer subsequently filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial judge denied. Defendant also filed a pro se motion, which the district judge construed as a motion for new trial. In his motion, Defendant argued, in relevant part, that his lawyer had failed to put on evidence in Defendant’s defense. Characterizing Defendant’s arguments as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district judge concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the court of appeals said that Defendant could challenge his trial counsel’s effectiveness through a later motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. Defendant subsequently filed a section 60-1507 motion, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective in several respects. After an evidentiary hearing, the district judge denied Defendant relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) conflict existed between Defendant and his lawyer at the hearing on the motion for new trial; and (2) Defendant’s remaining allegations were without merit. View "Fuller v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to a hard fifty sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding (1) the sentencing scheme under which Defendant was sentenced has been declared to be unconstitutional, and therefore, Defendant must be resentenced; (2) this was not a multiple acts case requiring a unanimity instruction; (3) the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument were in error, but the error was harmless; (5) Defendant was not convicted in violation of the corpus delicti rule; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (7) the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a search of Defendant’s outbuilding; and (8) Defendant was not denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. View "State v. Sprague" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellant with multiple offenses related to the murders of six women. The murders constituted parts of a common scheme or course of conduct. Appellant was sentenced to death for his convictions for two counts of capital murder. On appeal, Appellant raised nineteen general claims of reversible error covering the entire trial proceedings, as well as a variety of sub-claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant’s capital murder conviction charged in Count II; (2) reversed Appellant’s capital murder conviction charged in Count III and his first-degree murder conviction charged in Count V as unconstitutionally multiplicitous with the capital murder conviction in Count II; (3) affirmed the remainder of Appellant’s convictions; (4) affirmed Appellant’s sentence of death under his capital murder conviction in Count II; and (5) vacated the portion of Appellant’s sentence designating certain of his crimes sexually motivated and remanded for a correction of the journal entry. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and three counts of criminal sodomy for the sexual abuse of his daughter. The district court imposed a hard twenty-five sentence for the aggravated criminal sodomy count and an additional 118 months’ imprisonment for the remaining counts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a State v. Van Cleave hearing to determine whether Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, either because trial counsel was not constitutionally competent or was not constitutionally conflict-free. View "State v. Moyer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with abuse of a child and felony murder with the underlying felony of child abuse arising from the death of an eleven-month-old child who was in Defendant’s care. The first jury trial resulted in a conviction on the child abuse charge. Because the first jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the felony-murder charge, a second trial was held, after which Defendant was convicted of felony murder. Defendant appealed, raising several issues relating to both trials. The Supreme Court affirmed the felony-murder conviction but reversed the abuse of a child conviction, holding that because Defendant did not present a unified defense to the child abuse charge, the district court’s failure to give a unanimity instruction despite evidence of multiple acts was clearly erroneous. Remanded. View "State v. De La Torre" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery for crimes committed when Defendant was thirteen years old. Defendant was tried as an adult. The district court sentenced Defendant to a hard twenty life sentence for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in waiving juvenile jurisdiction and in authorizing the State to prosecute Defendant as an adult; (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury that a killing in the flight from an attempt to commit an inherently dangerous felony constitutes felony murder; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s aggravated attempted robbery conviction; (4) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument, but there was no reasonable possibility the prosecutor’s improper commentary affected the trial’s outcome; and (5) Defendant’s argument that her mandatory life-with-parole sentence was unconstitutional was without merit. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, the alternative charge of second-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including an allegation that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the withdrawal of his pro se in pro se motion for new counsel without making a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances prompting the motion. The Supreme Court remanded on this issue, holding that the district court erred in not inquiring before allowing the apparently nonconsensual withdrawal of Defendant’s pro se motion for new counsel. The Court also remanded for a nunc pro tunc order correcting the severity level of Defendant’s second-degree murder conviction. The Court rejected Defendant’s remaining claims of error. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law