Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, David DeSimone was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree. DeSimone's conviction was affirmed on appeal. DeSimone subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief, asserting that the State committed a Brady violation when it failed to turn over a witness's timecard showing that the witness could not possibly have seen the events to which she testified. The district court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that the State's failure to disclose the timecard was a Brady violation because (1) the State suppressed the evidence, (2) DeSimone met his burden of proof that the evidence was favorable to his guilt or innocence, and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt. Remanded.

While investigating a death by shooting, state police spoke with Justin Marshall, whom the police believed to have information relating to the crime. Because of Marshall's apparent plan to leave the area, the State filed a material witness complaint against him and obtained an arrest warrant for him. After Marshall's arrest, another man was charged with murder in connection to the death. Marshall filed a motion to dismiss the material witness complaint, alleging his continued detention violated due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court ordered Marshall's release, concluding that the authority of the State to detain a material witness is extinguished when a trial date is set for the underlying crime and the material witness is served with a subpoena. At issue on review was the proper interpretation of Iowa Code 804.11, which provides for the arrest of a material witness when the witness might be unavailable for service of a subpoena. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court, concluding that section 804.11 authorizes the arrest and detention of material witnesses to felonies only for the purpose of ensuring that a valid subpoena may be served upon the witness.

Daniel Lado pleaded guilty to dependent adult abuse. Later, Lado filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief that contained a request for appointment of counsel. The district court appointed Lado counsel. After no action was taken on Lado's application, the district court dismissed Lado's petition pursuant to Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.944. Lado filed a pro se notice of appeal, alleging dismissal under rule 1.944 resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the dismissal, and (2) found Lado's counsel was ineffective but preserved his claim for postconviction relief because it found the record was insufficient to determine whether the district court would have granted Lado's postconviction relief application if his counsel had acted competently. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding (1) Lado's counsel committed structural error in failing to seek a continuance to prevent dismissal under rule 1.944 or to make application to the court for the reinstatement of his case after it was dismissed by operation of the rule; and (2) the error constructively denied Lado the right to counsel. Remanded to district court for adjudication on the merits.

Alan Watts was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver, drug stamp tax violations, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Watts appealed, contending that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from searching his apartment. The Supreme Court affirmed Watts' convictions and sentence, holding that although the initial warrantless sweep of Watts' apartment was unlawful due to a lack of exigent circumstances, the district court did not err in denying Watts' motion to suppress because (1) the officers later procured a warrant to conduct a full search of the apartment, (2) the evidence in question was located during that search, and (3) the State demonstrated that the warrant would have been sought and granted even without the information from the earlier improper sweep.