Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of first-degree in murder in 2005. In 2009, Appellant filed an application for postconviction relief alleging his trial was ineffective for (1) failing to raise the defense of temporary insanity or diminished capacity, and (2) failing to adequately support the request for bifurcation of his trial. Appellant also asserted his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his request for bifurcation. The postconviction court denied Appellant's application. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the postconviction court did not rule on Appellant's specific claims, and Appellant failed to preserve error by filing a subsequent motion under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Appellant's application for postconviction relief, holding (1) the postconviction court did rule on Appellant's claims, and the claims were properly preserved for appeal; but (2) Appellant's claims lacked merit. View "Lamasters v. State" on Justia Law

The operator of an establishment offering nude and seminude dance performances sought an injunction restraining a city from enforcing its ordinance regulating nude and seminude dancing. The district court found that state law did not preempt the ordinance and that the ordinance was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that state law preempts enforcement of the ordinance because the ordinance attempts to regulate nude dancing, and therefore, the ordinance is unenforceable against the establishment. Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order enjoining the city from enforcing its ordinance against the establishment.

Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree. Defendant provided notice he would be relying on the defense of insanity to the charge. The jury rejected the insanity defense and found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole and ordered him to pay restitution for his attorney and expert witness fees. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and restitution orders. Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the instructions given by the district court did not accurately define insanity, and (2) his own instruction should have been given. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the instructions given by the district court, when read as a whole, fairly and accurately advised the jury of the legal standard it was to apply to Defendant's insanity defense; and (2) due process under the Iowa Constitution does not require the district court to inform the jury of the consequences of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict under the facts of this case.

Tenant brought claims against her landlord, the City of Dubuque, and a City official (Defendants), asserting that they unlawfully caused her eviction from her apartment. Tenant alleged, among other things, that the conduct of Defendants violated a number of her statutory rights under the Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (IURLTA). To the extent the Dubuque ordinance authorized the action of Defendants, Tenant argued the ordinance was preempted by the IURLTA. The district court concluded that Tenant was entitled to the return of her security deposit but denied all other relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the IURLTA and there was no violation of federal law in this case; (2) the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and any procedural due process claim was moot; (3) the landlord violated the IURLTA when he removed the belongings of Tenant from the apartment, and landlord's withholding of Tenant's security deposit was a bad faith violation of IURLTA. Remanded.

Following his sentencing to consecutive prison terms totaling thirty-five years, Defendant asked the Supreme Court to review the district court's determinations that the written entry of the verdict was proper, that a fork is a dangerous weapon, and that the State did not commit a Brady violation or fail to disclose newly discovered evidence, among others. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals, holding (1) the State did not commit a Brady violation; and (2) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(2) requires a trial court to announce the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court following a bench trial, and the district court in this case erred by not announcing the verdict in a recorded proceeding in open court. The Court found, however, that the district court cured its error and substantially complied with Rule 2.17(2) such that no remand was required.

Defendant Dontay Sanford was convicted for first-degree burglary for entering the car of a victim who later died from injuries received during the encounter. Sanford was sentenced to an indeterminate term in prison not to exceed twenty-five years. Sanford appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence that the victim's automobile was an "occupied structure," which is one of the elements of burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the State produced sufficient evidence that the victim's vehicle, under the facts of this case, was an occupied structure as that term is defined under the burglary statute; and (2) Sanford's pro se claims on appeal failed.

A juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to his two children. Father appealed, arguing, among other things, that the juvenile court violated his due process rights when it ordered him to provide a fingernail drug test after his termination trial. The court of appeals reversed, principally on the basis that there was no evidence in the record as to the reliability or the accuracy of the fingernail drug test, and that the record, including the fingernail test, lacked clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination of Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment and order of the trial court, holding (1) the test did not violate Father's due process rights; (2) the evidence including the fingernail test was sufficient to warrant termination; and (3) termination was in the children's best interests.

After the State filed a child in need of assistance (CINA) petition, the juvenile court issued a temporary removal order removing Child from Mother's custody and placing her in foster care. Once the CINA proceeding was dismissed, Mother sued the State and two employees of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the DHS social workers wrongfully removed Child from her custody and negligently failed to protect Child from abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a social worker is entitled to absolute immunity when the social worker functions in the role of a prosecutor or ordinary witness; (2) a social worker is entitled to qualified immunity when acting in the role of a complaining witness, and for his or her investigatory acts; (3) alleged injured parties cannot maintain an action against a social worker under the ITCA where the alleged parties fail to exhaust the available administrative remedy prior to filing an action in court and where the basis of the complaint is that the social worker engaged in conduct functionally equivalent to misrepresentation or deceit.

Peter Long was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. Based on two prior convictions for lascivious acts with a child, the district court found that Long had committed a class A felony and sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Long appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen the record after the State had rested and after the defense had made a motion for judgment of acquittal during the enhancement trial. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to render a verdict on the enhancement based solely on the evidence introduced prior to the reopening of the record. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the record under the circumstances of this case.

Donald Clark was convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree for molesting a fifth-grade student while employed as a guidance counselor at the elementary school. Clark appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were violated when the trial court failed to grant his request for a continuance and to allow the retaking of depositions based on the late disclosure of an e-mail written by the student. The Supreme Court affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence, holding that the district court did not violate Clark's constitutional rights or abuse its discretion when it refused to allow redepositions or grant a continuance.