Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that recent amendments to Minnesota's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. 65B.41-71, violated the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the new provisions. The court concluded that the "inherently misleading" standard was broad enough in application to encompass 411-Pain's references to the $40,000 in potential insurance benefits. As such, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(5). The court concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits in the ultimate litigation because the ads at issue were "inherently misleading" where 411-Pain's use of actors posing as persons of authority to sell its business extended a misleading aura of authorized approval to the services in question and where the disclaimer "PAID ACTOR" did not disclaim endorsement by the actors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 6(d)(6). Finally, the court concluded that the requirements at issue in subsections 6(d)(1), 6(d)(2), and 6(d)(3) were constitutional and the court rejected plaintiffs' claims to the contrary. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "1-800-411-Pain Referral, et al. v. Leroy Otto, D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff formed a contract with Imperial Premium Finance with regard to a financing arrangement for life insurance. Imperial later assigned its interest in the arrangement to Defendant, a limited partnership with its principal place of business in California. Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Iowa, claiming that the contract was not valid. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that that contacts of Imperial, the assignor, did not impute to Defendant, the assignee. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an assignor’s contacts with Iowa are not automatically imputed to the assignee for purposes of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the assignee, but this assignee is subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa based on its own contacts with this forum through the contractual relationships it assumed by the assignment; and (2) Defendant in this case did have the required minimum contacts to subject Defendant to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. Remanded. View "Ostrem v. PrideCo Secure Loan Fund, LP" on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Puerto Rico law operated to cause hundreds of thousands of motor vehicle owners to pay twice for liability insurance. Commonwealth law declared motor vehicle owners to be entitled to a refund of the excess premiums paid, but large amounts of unclaimed refunds accumulated. The Commonwealth subsequently placed the unclaimed refunds with its Treasury Secretary with the condition that, if not claimed within five years, the funds escheated to the Commonwealth without notice to the vehicle owners. In Garcia-Rubiera II, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Commonwealth's failure to notify vehicle owners of their reimbursement rights violated their procedural due process rights. On remand, the district court ordered the Commonwealth to notify vehicle owners of their reimbursement rights, to publish notices in two newspapers alerting the owners of their rights, and to give owners a 120-day grace period for them to claim reimbursement. The First Circuit again remanded for the district court to craft with "the benefit of further guidance" an injunction that more fittingly remedied the Commonwealth's constitutional violations and ordered no duplicate premiums to escheat to the Commonwealth until it established and complied with a reimbursement procedure meeting the requirements of due process. View "Garcia-Rubiera v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cynthia Pfeifer filed suit against Defendant-Appellee Federal Express Corporation in the District of Kansas, alleging that the company fired her in retaliation for receiving workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed suit fifteen months following the termination within the applicable state statute of limitations, but outside the limit of six months enumerated in her employment agreement. The district court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract clause was reasonable and was not a violation of public policy. Because no Kansas law appeared to control the outcome of the case, the Tenth Circuit certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the ability of parties to shorten the applicable statute of limitations by contract, and if not, then was the six-month limitation unreasonable in this case? The Kansas Court responded that the contract clause in question here did violate public policy. Because of that answer, the Court did not respond to the Tenth Circuit's second question. In light of these answers, the federal district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

USCA is a non-profit national civic league with approximately 27,000 members that devotes itself to conservative values and opposes efforts of the federal government to interfere with market processes. Some of USCA’s uninsured members object to the purchase of private health insurance because they do not believe in the effectiveness of traditional medicine, prefer alternative and integrative medicine, or prefer to focus on preventative care that is not covered by traditional health insurance policies. Two individual plaintiffs do not have, nor do they wish to acquire, health insurance, but they are not exempt from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. 5000A. They challenged the mandate as violating the Commerce Clause, rights to freedom of expressive and intimate association, rights to liberty, and rights to privacy. The district court dismissed in part, without substantive analysis, holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “plausibility standard” and entered summary judgment on the Commerce Clause challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius controls the outcome on the Commerce Clause count and the remaining constitutional claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim. View "U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges of sexual harassment brought by a former employee (Employee) against the one-time president (President) of Jasmine Company, Inc. After President filed an action against Jasmine's liability insurance provider (Insurer), seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges, Insurer filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself, requesting a declaratory judgment that it had not duty to defend or indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine, holding that Insurer had to defend and indemnify Jasmine. At issue on appeal was whether a finder of fact must conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges did or did not begin before Jasmine's insurance policy took effect. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment, as the question of when the harassing conduct that gave rise to Employee's claims began was a quintessential question for a factfinder. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law