Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

On Christmas night 2011, Coil and Starcher were walking home in Brilliant, Ohio. They stopped to rest along the road. Officer Kamerer approached in his cruiser and asked if anything was wrong. According to Starcher, the two stated that nothing was wrong. Kamerer asked for their names, but Coil got up and walked away. That caused Kamerer to “go[] off on [them] like a crazy person.” The parties disagree about the details, but ultimately both Coil and Kamerer were struck by a car. The crash caused Coil severe traumatic brain injury, requiring around-the-clock care. Kamerer broke his shoulder and leg and spent 30 days in a hospital. Coil’s legal guardian filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court denied Kamerer’s motion for qualified immunity, stating that a reasonable jury could find that Kamerer seized Coil without reasonable suspicion and was deliberately indifferent to Coil’s safety, based on Starcher’s account and the length of time Kamerer left Coil handcuffed, face-down in the road. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Kamerer exposed himself to danger when he raced into the road to try to save Coil from the approaching car, it is possible that he behaved recklessly, rather than negligently, in handcuffing Coil in the street. That is a jury question. View "Family Serv. Ass'n v. Wells Twp" on Justia Law

Bohr Farms owned and operated a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) that accommodated more than 4,000 hogs. Cargill Pork, LLC owned the hogs. Appellants, several landowners and other individuals, brought this action against Cargill and Bohr Farms (together, Respondents), alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy due to alleged offensive odors that emanated from the CAFO. Appellants did not claim damages for diminution in rental value or documented medical costs as authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.296.2, but, rather, alleged that their damages for temporary nuisance consisted solely of the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding, inter alia, that section 537.296 was constitutional and did not authorize an award of damages for Appellants’ alleged loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 537.296 is constitutional; and (2) Appellants’ nuisance, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims are inseparable from the nuisance allegations and are therefore barred by section 537.296.6(1). View "Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

Doe, a minor female, was drinking in a group at an apartment complex in Arlington Heights and Mount Prospect. A site manager called 911. Three males began moving Doe to a secluded area. She was so intoxicated that they had to hold her up. Arlington Heights Officer Del Boccio arrived, talked to the males, allowed them to leave with Doe without asking for identification, and left the scene. One of the three, Balodimas, was on probation for armed robbery; Doe and the other males were minors. Del Boccio reported that the subjects were gone on arrival. The three males then carried Doe into a laundry room. When the site manager observed this, he again called 911. Mount Prospect police responded and caught Balodimas sexually assaulting Doe. Doe sued Del Boccio and Arlington Heights, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state claims. The district court dismissed and denied Doe’s motion to amend her complaint to allege that Del Boccio was a racist who wanted harm to come to her because she was a white girl socializing with African-Americans. Doe referred to an incident when Del Boccio, operating an unmarked police car, ran over and killed an eight-year-old African-American boy and lied to cover it up. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Del Boccio did not create the danger, nor did he do anything to make the danger to Doe worse. View "Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Town of Middletown issued an invitation for bids on a drainage improvement project. Two contractors submitted bids, including HK&S Construction Holding Corp., which provided the lowest bid. Woodard & Curran, Inc. recommended against awarding HK&S the project and in favor of negotiating a contract with the second bidder. The town counsel concluded that HK&S’s bid was non-responsive and awarded the contract to the second bidder. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town and Woodard & Curran alleging, among other claims, that the Town violated state and local law when it denied the contract award for the project. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in disposing of HK&S’s claims against the Town in summary judgment where HK&S failed to submit a responsive bid; and (2) HK&S’s claim of negligence against Woodard & Curran also failed. View "HK&S Constr. Holding Corp. v. Dible" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, her former employer, alleging harassment, emotional stress, personal injury, loss of income, and age discrimination. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s discrimination and harassment claims where she not only failed to allege timely satisfaction of the statutory jurisdictional conditions precedent but failed to timely comply with the jurisdictional conditions precedent; and (2) the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s state law tort claims. View "Apodaca v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the fatal shooting of Manuel Espina by Prince George’s County police officer Steven Jackson. Petitioners, Espina’s estate and family, filed suit against Respondents, Jackson and the County, alleging survival and wrongful death claims, as well as a claim on behalf of Espina’s son for a violation of his constitutional rights arising out of his treatment and arrest following Espina’s death. A jury returned a verdict against Respondents in the amount of $11,505,000. The trial court, looking to the Local Government Tort Claims Act’s (LGTCA) limits on liability, reduced the judgment entered against the County to $405,000 but left intact the full jury award as to Jackson. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in part and reduced the award entered against the County to $400,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the LGTCA, where applicable, limits the damages recoverable against a local government for violations of the state constitution; (2) applying the LGTCA damages cap to Petitioners’ constitutional tort claims violated neither Article 19 nor the supremacy of the state Constitution; and (3) the Court of Appeals correctly reduced Petitioners’ wrongful death and survivorship actions to an “individual claim” under the LGTCA. View "Espina v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed for and obtained an ex parte temporary protection order against Defendant, a former social acquaintance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the protection order; (3) Defendant received the notice that due process requires; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting “other acts” evidence; (5) S.D. Codified Laws 22-19A-1, as applied in this case, was not unconstitutionally vague; and (6) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in crafting the protection order. View "Donat v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Professional Massage Training Center (PMTC) filed suit against the Accreditation Alliance of Career Schools and Colleges (ACCSC) after ACCSC denied PMTC’s application for re-accreditation. The district court entered judgment in favor of PMTC, finding that ACCSC had violated the school’s due process rights. The court awarded the school more than $400,000 in damages and ordered ACCSC to fully reinstate its accreditation. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in conducting a de novo approach to the accreditation process; (2) judged by the correct standard of review, the accreditation decision was well supported and not arbitrary or capricious; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed PMTC’s state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, and tortious interference. Remanded. View "Prof’l Massage Training v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schs." on Justia Law

Cowper’s sentencing judgment provided that he was to receive 275 days’ credit for time served. He was transported to prison on June 2. On June 23, Cowper filed a “Motion to Recalculate Time Served.” On October 16, 2011, he was released. On November 22, the state responded, conceding that he had not been given credit for time served between January 8, 2008, and February 2, 2008, and between November 29, 2010, and May 11, 2011. The court entered an amended judgment that included all of the good time credits. Cowper sued the sheriff of Saline County and the circuit clerk, alleging negligence in compliance with the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(e)(4)). The trial court dismissed, noting that the statute requires the clerk to forward the information received from the sheriff; there was no allegation that the clerk failed to do so. As to the sheriff, the court found that the statute did not expressly grant a private right of action and none could be implied. The appellate court reversed, finding that Cowper was in the class of persons for whom the statute was enacted; that implying a private cause of action was consistent with the purpose to restore the offender to useful citizenship; that the injury is one that the law was designed to prevent; and that implying a private cause of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the complaint alleged negligence, so the court erred in analyzing whether there was a statutory right of action. Clerks may be liable for negligence. The court agreed that Cowper had stated a claim as to the sheriff. View "Cowper v. Nyberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Officer R.R. Ray, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force and a state-law claim for assault and battery. Ray filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that Ray employed excessive force in detaining Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment concerning the excessive-force claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Ray’s summary judgment motion because Ray was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation. View "Smith v. Ray" on Justia Law