Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought several claims against multiple defendants arising out of his incarceration for a probation violation that occurred after his term of probation had expired. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff sought transfer, contending that his claim against four individual probation officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was incorrectly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the individually-named probation officers, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for relief under section 1983 against these defendants. View "Thornton v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for an alleged sexual assault, which allegation turned out to be false. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendants, Polk County and a Polk County investigator, advancing claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest and false imprisonment, and state common law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence, and defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the investigator had arguable probable cause to effect Plaintiff’s arrest and was entitled to qualified immunity and that Polk County could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. The court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the investigator was entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff; (2) there was no dispute as to any material fact with regard to Plaintiff’s Monell claims; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s state law claims; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Burritt v. Ditlefsen" on Justia Law

Sixteen days after Defendant, a dentist, learned Plaintiff, an inmate of Illinois’s Stateville prison, was complaining of a tooth abscess, Defendant diagnosed an abscessed molar, prescribed penicillin to bring the infection under control, and extracted the molar. Plaintiff sued the dentist and a prison guard (together, Defendants), charging them with deliberate indifference to his abscess. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence of deliberate indifference by Defendants to Plaintiff’s serious medical need precluded granting summary judgment in their favor. Remanded. View "Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea" on Justia Law

Valentino Bocanegra claimed that he was arrested on a warrant for a man with a similar (but not identical) name. Bocanegra repeatedly told the authorities that they had the wrong man and noted that his driver’s license, social security number, booking photos, and fingerprints would all prove this, he remained in jail for nine days. While incarcerated, he was forcibly sodomized by another inmate. This appeal centered on one of the multiple defendants who Bocanegra contended were responsible for his plight: Donald Jakubowski, a deputy district attorney who, according to Bocanegra, negligently failed to determine his true identity and tried to prevent him from ultimately being released. The trial court sustained Jakubowski’s demurrer, which was based on several alternative governmental immunity statutes.The Court of Appeal affirmed. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court held that Bocanegra adequately alleged that Jakubowski was liable for false imprisonment; the Court also held that statutory prosecutorial immunity did not apply to the false imprisonment claim. However, the demurrer had to be sustained based on common-law prosecutorial immunity. View "Bocanegra v. Jakubowski" on Justia Law

Juanya, age 15, participated in a mandatory swimming class run by his physical education teacher, Rodgers. Juanya, a non-swimmer, was submerged for a few seconds, possibly inhaling or swallowing water. Juanya exited the pool and told Rodgers that his chest hurt. Rodgers told Juanya to sit on the bleachers. Several minutes later, Rodgers went over to check on Juanya, who requested to remain out of the pool for the rest of class. Rodgers denied the request. Juanya followed instructions and stayed in the shallow end for the remainder of the period. In his next class, nearly an hour and a half after leaving the pool, Juanya fell backward and hit the desk behind him. As he rolled off his chair and onto the floor, he had a seizure. A school nurse attempted to revive Juanya. Paramedics took Juanya by ambulance to a hospital, where he died that day, apparently of a rare form of asphyxiation called “dry” or “secondary drowning.” Juanya’s mother sued Rodgers and the Bethlehem Area School District, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rodgers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, which the court denied. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rodgers’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, View "Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of Curtis Suggs, filed suit against the District, Symbral, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, federal law regulating community residential facilities, and the common law. Suggs died while residing in a group home operated by Symbral, a District contractor. The District appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the section 1983 claims and negligence claims, and against Symbral and Defendants Leon and Yvonne Mohammed, as well as appealed the district court's denial of the District's post-trial motion. After reviewing the record and considering the parties' arguments, the court concluded that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment against the District on plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, and the court affirmed that portion of the decision on review. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on his negligence and statutory claims, concluding that those claims are barred under D.C. Code 12-309. Because the district court abused its discretion by excluding causation evidence, the court vacated the damages and remand for reconsideration. View "Harvey v. Mohammed" on Justia Law

Jane Doe, an eighth-grade student, filed suit against the Board and officials because she was raped in a bathroom after school officials decided to use her as bait in a sting operation to catch another eighth-grade student in the act of sexual harassment. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board on Doe's Title IX claim where, to prevail on a student-on-student sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff must prove the funding recipient had actual knowledge the sexual harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. In this case, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Doe has satisfied all five elements necessary to succeed under Title IX. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board on Doe's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim where the rape-bait scheme was not a known or obvious consequence of the "catch in the act" policy or the Board's allegedly inadequate training policies; reversed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Blair on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim where there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Blair violated Doe’s constitutional right to equal protection by acting with deliberate indifference to the rape of Doe; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Dunaway on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim where Dunaway acquiesced to and ratified the sting operation; affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Terrell on Doe's section 1983 equal protection claim because Terrell is entitled to qualified immunity; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Defendant Simpson for the alleged section 1983 substantive due process violation where Simpson is entitled to qualified immunity. In regard to the state law claims, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Blair for negligence/wantonness because he is entitled to state-agent immunity; affirmed the denial of summary judgment to Dunaway; and reversed the grant of summary judgment to Simpson for the tort of outrage. View "Hill v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking damages from the District, the Family Services Agency, and District employees after plaintiffs' children were removed from their home after they were sexually abused by plaintiffs' other children. The court vacated the dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the District and remanded those claims to the district court to determine whether there is municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the First Amendment, tort, and post-adoption services claims. View "Doe v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Mother was charged with felony child abuse after an investigation by Detective. Mother was ultimately acquitted. Mother subsequently brought this action against Detective for malicious prosecution and for violating 42 U.S.C. 1983. Detective moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The trial court sustained the motion. Mother appealed, arguing that Detective was not entitled to summary judgment because the statements he made in his probable cause affidavit were intentionally false or made with a reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Detective was entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim, where there was no evidence that he acted with malice, and on the section 1983 claim, where there was probable cause to believe that Mother had committed a criminal offense. View "Copeland v. Wicks" on Justia Law