Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a New York Times article about Senator Rand Paul, which briefly quotes Walter Block, an economics professor. Block filed suit against defendants asserting claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Although Block does not dispute that he made the statements at issue, he argues that the article takes the statements so far out of context as to make them untrue and defamatory. The district court granted a special motion to strike under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971 (anti-SLAPP law), dismissed the complaint, and awarded defendants attorney's fees. In Lozovyy v. Kurtz, the court interpreted Louisiana law and concluded that “the Louisiana Supreme Court would recognize that Article 971’s ‘probability of success’ standard does not permit courts to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve disputed issues of material fact.” Because the district court lacked the benefit of the court's recent guidance in Lozovyy, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to apply the standard. On remand, the district court should consider whether Block has established a genuine dispute of material fact on each element of his claims. View "Block v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law

The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (MSD) brought claims of inverse condemnation, trespass, and negligence against the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors for damages caused to MSD sewer lines during the course of a city street improvement project. The City moved to dismiss, alleging that inverse condemnation does not apply to public property and that sovereign immunity applied and had not been waived. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MSD failed to state an inverse condemnation claim, and sovereign immunity barred MSD’s tort claims against the City. View "Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors" on Justia Law

For 20 years Heard has suffered from inguinal hernias in his groin. When Heard’s imprisonment began in 1995, he had been diagnosed with one painful hernia. A second hernia was diagnosed in 2000. Outside physicians concluded that both hernias required surgical repair, but the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford, which provides medical care for inmates stalled until May 2007, when both hernias required emergency surgery. By then Heard had brought his first lawsuit, claiming deliberate indifference in not authorizing surgery sooner. Heard settled with Wexford in 2012 for $273,250, agreeing to release Wexford and the doctors from all claims. After his 2007 surgery, Heard developed a “recurrent” hernia. A second surgery did not occur until 2013. Heard again sued, claiming that Wexford had been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by delaying the second surgery under its policy to classify hernia surgeries as elective, unnecessary procedures. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that Heard’s release, and the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, foreclosed the section 1983 action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The release cannot mean that Wexford was free to ignore the recurrent hernia as it grew increasingly painful over time. View "Heard v. Tilden" on Justia Law

Kent’s parents, Rick and Pamela, were visiting Kent's family. Kent’s father had suffered serious health problems for years; he spent most of his visit in bed. One morning, Kent, a physician, found his father unresponsive, but breathing. Rick had executed a living will and did not want life-sustaining procedures. Kent made his father comfortable. At 7:08 p.m., Kent determined that his father had died. Firefighter-EMT Oryszczak arrived and examined the body. Kent stated that he was a physician and that his father had passed away about 15 minutes earlier. Deputy Lopez arrived. Pamela stated that she did not have power-of-attorney paperwork with her. Oryszczak explained that without paperwork, protocol required them to “do everything.” Kent began yelling and gesturing. Oryszczak asked for assistance, stating that he was afraid of Kent intervening. Kent told deputies that “they were not going to assault my dead father in my home.” Lopez pulled out his taser. Kent undisputedly said, “Go ahead and Taze me” Lopez deployed the taser. The prongs struck Kent and he fell. Kent remained handcuffed, with the taser probes attached, during 15-20 minutes of questioning. Kent sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court denied defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants felt they were faced with an emergency, whether they thought they had a legal obligation to attempt resuscitation, and whether Kent was non-compliant, and that case law clearly established that using a taser on an individual who was not under arrest, posed no safety threat, made no threats, and was not physically resistant, constituted excessive force. View "Kent v. County of Oakland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title IX, and various D.C. tort laws, seeking damages from the District. Plaintiff alleged that, while attending a District school for emotionally disturbed students, she and a teacher had a consensual sexual relationship that led to the birth of a child. In regard to the section 1983 claim, the court concluded that in order for the district court to assess whether plaintiff stated a facially plausible complaint, plaintiff needed to assert the elements of the type of municipal policy that caused her injury. Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court also concluded that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education standard where she has not alleged that anyone - much less an appropriate official - knew of any acts of sexual harassment while the harassment was ongoing. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet the statutory notice requirement for her tort claim and that her alternative claim seeking to discover a police report about the incident is forfeited. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blue v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Ute Tribe member Todd Murray died on April 1, 2007, after a police pursuit. Murray’s parents Debra Jones and Arden Post, on behalf of themselves and Murray’s estate, brought a 13-count complaint in the district court alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985, and state tort claims. Claims were brought in varying permutations against nine individual law enforcement officers, their employers, and a private mortuary (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs also sought sanctions against Defendants for alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment to the mortuary on Plaintiffs’ emotional distress claim, and to all remaining Defendants on all federal claims. The court also dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the status of Indian lands, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law torts after disposing of the emotional distress claim and the federal claims. Plaintiffs appealed all of these rulings in two appeals. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, but dismissed an appeal of the taxation of costs because it lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Jones v. Norton" on Justia Law

Inmate Aleshia Henderson was handcuffed and in leg restraints in a holding cell in the medical unit of the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa. Detention Officers Dalean Johnson and Michael Thomas were on duty at the medical unit, but they left to assist with a medical emergency elsewhere. In their absence, Inmate Jessie Johnson entered Henderson’s unlocked holding cell and allegedly raped her. Henderson sued the officers in their individual capacities and Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz in his individual and official capacities2 (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She alleged an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to the risk of assault. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion because Henderson raised genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendants’ awareness of the risk of assault. Defendants petitioned the Tenth Circuit for interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decision. After review, the Court dismissed the appeals of DO Johnson and Sheriff Glanz for lack of jurisdiction because they asked the Court to resolve issues of fact and did not turn on discrete questions of law. The Court concluded DO Thomas was entitled to qualified immunity because Henderson could not show he violated a clearly established constitutional right. View "Henderson v. Glanz" on Justia Law