Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A police sergeant arrested plaintiff without a warrant for running a contest which allegedly violated Minnesota gambling laws. The sergeant later obtained a search warrant and seized several items from the house where plaintiff was running the contest. A reporter broadcasted a news story about the contest and plaintiff's arrest on a local CBS television station. Plaintiff subsequently sued the sergeant and the city of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for civil rights violations for the arrest and search, and the reporter and CBS for defamation. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion for defendants. The court held that because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the sergeant's actions violated a constitutional right, he could not deprive the sergeant of qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. Summary judgment was also proper as to the city because municipalities could not be held liable under Section 1983 where plaintiff had not argued on appeal that any municipal policy or custom led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The court also held that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and it was not reckless disregard for the truth to conclude that plaintiff could face future incarceration related to the contests. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs Osler and Georgia Childress appealed a district court's order that dismissed their 42 U.S.C 1983 medical-indifference case against Defendant Robert Harms. In 2006, Mr. Childress was staying at a hotel in Midvale, Utah when a motel clerk saw him staggering around his room and running into things. She called police and reported that an intoxicated guest was causing a commotion. Police arrived on the scene and arrested him. Upon Mr. Childress's arrival at the jail, nurses Robert Harms and Joel Smith examined him while he was handcuffed to a gurney. Mr. Childress denied drinking and answered questions about his military duties without difficulty, although his speech was slightly slurred. Authorities would later learn that Mr. Childress has suffered a cerebellar stroke while in custody which was originally dismissed as intoxication. The district court determined that Nurse Harms merely misdiagnosed Mr. Childress and dismissed his claims by summary judgment. On appeal, Mr. Childress argued that the district court "confuse[d] knowledge of harm with knowledge of the risk of harm." The Tenth Circuit concluded that Mr. Childress failed to establish the subjective component of "deliberate indifference," and as such, summary judgment was appropriately entered on his claim.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded.

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

Appellant filed suit against four Minneapolis police officers and the City of Minneapolis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive, unreasonable force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claim and held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force against appellant. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 1983 claims against Officer Carroll because appellant admitted that he did not use excessive force against her. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that because appellant did not allege any damages, she failed to state a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 1. The court held, however, that the district court failed to consider whether appellant could recover her costs and disbursements in her December 19, 2008 action to compel compliance under Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 4. Therefore, the court remanded for a ruling on whether appellant was entitled to costs or disbursements under that section of the statute. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed appellant's common law battery claims against officers as untimely because the two-year statute of limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the basis of official immunity on the alleged state tort claims.

Plaintiff, a mail processing clerk, was injured on-duty in 2005 and received workers' compensation. She partially recovered and, in 2008, the Postal Service provided a modified light duty assignment. In June 2010, pursuant to the National Reassessment Process, the Postal Service informed plaintiff that work within her medical restrictions was no longer available in her commuting area. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed her claim under 5 C.F.R. 353.304(c)) of wrongful denial of restoration following partial recovery from a compensable injury. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board applied the correct standard in determining its jurisdiction, and its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff did not identify any vacant position available within her commuting area that she was able to perform. Plaintiff did not make a non-frivolous allegation that the Service acted arbitrarily in not restoring her, even after the Board ordered her make such a showing and afforded her time to do so.

The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act provides that individuals adjudged to be sexually violent predators due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder shall be committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. Appellant Timothy Burch was a sexually violent predator committed to the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) at Larned State Hospital. He and other Larned residents initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to challenge the adequacy of the SPTP provided at Larned. The other residents voluntarily dismissed their claims, but Appellant filed an amended complaint, insisting the SPTP is inadequate to treat his condition and provide a realistic opportunity for his release. In addition, Appellant alleged that Defendants improperly punished him by, among other things, interfering with his educational endeavors, revoking his work privileges, and reducing his treatment classification level through manipulation of his treatment progress scores. In a fifty-two page opinion, the court analyzed Appellant's allegations, distilled his claims, and concluded he was not entitled to relief. As is relevant to this appeal, the court determined that most of Appellant's claims failed to adequately allege Defendants' personal participation in the claimed misconduct. As for the rest of his claims, the court discussed the unique principles and standards governing the KSVPA and concluded that Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Regarding the claims of inadequate treatment, the court ruled that Appellant enjoyed no substantive due process right to treatment culminating in his release. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned order. The court accurately analyzed Mr. Burch's claims and correctly determined that he was not entitled to relief."

Plaintiff appealed pro se an order dismissing his complaint against defendants for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that medical care providers, Christopher Aiken and Dr. James Hohensee, at the Niagara County Jail, were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs during his incarceration at the jail. Plaintiff also appealed from a judgment dismissing his claims against the remaining defendants, alleging that excessive force on the part of corrections officers, Paul Curcione, Jeff Chawer, and Sergeant Tammy Williams. The court held that plaintiff's complaint fell short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin and Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend where issues of medical judgment could not be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference was lacking. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Williams for plaintiff's failure to exhaust the requisite administrative review process as to Williams. The court further held that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was satisfied by an untimely filing of a grievance if it was accepted and decided on the merits by the appropriate prison authority. Therefore, plaintiff had met the exhaustion requirement of his original filing and the district court's contrary determination was erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Christie Helm appealed a district courtâs order granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Kansas (the State) on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Helm sued the State after she was allegedly sexually harassed over a period of almost ten years by Judge Frederick Stewart, a State district judge for whom Helm served as an administrative assistant. The district court determined that the State was entitled to summary judgment because Helm fell within the "personal staff" exemption to Title VIIâs definition of "employee" and thus did not qualify for the protections afforded by the statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that summary judgment for the State was proper on the basis of the "Faragher/Ellerth" affirmative defense to employer liability for a supervisorâs sexual harassment of a subordinate. In September 1998, Helm was hired to fill an administrative-assistant position. Judge Stewart began sexually harassing Helm shortly after she was hired. Upon review of the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit held that the "Faragher/Ellerth" defense precluded vicarious liability against the State of Kansas for Judge Stewartâs alleged actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court without reaching the question whether the "personal staff" exemption removed Helm from the purview of Title VII.