Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

An off-duty police officer, Glover, shot and killed Prado during a late-night road incident. Glover claimed that Prado had tried to run him over and had a gun, which was not found. He claimed he was complying with a department rule, requiring officers to act even when off duty. Glover was placed on desk duty. An inquest jury found justification, but a year later Glover was charged with homicide and perjury and suspended from the force. He committed suicide. Prado's estate brought excessive-force and loss-of-life claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and named the city a defendant under a statute that requires the city to pay judgments assessed against employees for acts committed within the scope of employment. The jury found that Glover used unreasonable force under color of law, but found that he was not within the scope of employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because of the risk that jurors would mistakenly intuit that if the officer used excessive force, he must have acted outside the scope of employment so that refusal to give the modified scope-of-employment instruction was prejudicial error. Under Wisconsin law an employer who retains an employee after he commits a tort does not ratify his conduct.

County sheriff deputies responded to a call indicating that Marc had left the home he shared with his parents and was possibly a danger to himself and others. Officers located Marc and determined that he should be involuntarily committed. During initial evaluation at a hospital, officers discovered Marc's wallet, but their search was not thorough enough to discover that the wallet contained a razor blade. Later, still in police custody, Marc regained possession of the razor blade during transport to a mental health facility. He used the blade to commit suicide in the back of a squad car. His father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Marc's risk of suicide. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the officers' actions did not indicate deliberate indifference.

Decedent Charles Gray sought treatment for epilepsy at Defendant University of Colorado Hospital. In the course of his withdrawal from medication, hospital staff left Decedent unattended and he died after suffering a seizure. Plaintiffs, decedent’s estate and family members, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that the hospital (and affiliated doctors, nurses, and staff) deprived Decedent of life without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a constitutional claim. Plaintiffs appealed. Applying the appropriate legal standards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but for reasons somewhat different than those of the district court: "The state actor’s affirmative act creating the danger or rendering the victim more vulnerable to it does not constitute a constitutional deprivation."

Plaintiff Donna Morris brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband, William Morris III, against Defendants Officer Jaime Noe and the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. She alleged Defendants violated her husband's rights when Noe forceably arrested him and caused him injury. Defendant Noe moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Defendant Noe then appealed. Finding that Mr. Morris "posed no threat to Noe or others," and that the officer had reason to believe Mr. Morris was "at most, a misdemeanant," the Tenth Circuit held Defendant was not entitled to qualified to immunity on either of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court.

Appellees, Shari and Steve Skaj, brought suit against Appellant Vincent Rosty to recover damages caused when an idling dump truck that had been driven by Appellant was knocked into gear, pinning Shari against a motor home. Appellant failed to plead or otherwise defend against the allegations in the complaint. The district court subsequently entered default judgment against Appellant and awarded damages to Appellees. The court then denied Appellant's motion to set aside entry of default or for relief from default judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellant's appeal was timely; (2) the district court did not violate Appellant's due process rights, as Appellant had adequate notice of the default judgment hearing and thus had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the hearing; (3) Appellant was properly served with the summons and complaint; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in awarding punitive damages, as Appellees failed to produce sufficient evidence of Appellant's wealth or financial condition to support an award of punitive damages. Remanded.

Plaintiff Steven Romero brought suit against Defendants Jeremy Story, Manuel Frias, and Vincent Shadd, Las Cruces, New Mexico law enforcement officers, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Defendants' claim to qualified immunity in the context of summary judgment, and Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to excessive force, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants alleging, among other claims, that officers used excessive force against her in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Justin Hooper. Officer Hooper performed a "leg sweep" on plaintiff while trying to stop her from striking her boyfriend. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Officer Hooper used excessive force against plaintiff based on the physical distance between plaintiff and her boyfriend at the time of the incident, the nature of the crime at issue (disorderly conduct), and the degree of the injury suffered. The court also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where the right Officer Hooper allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant Ralph Burnell petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its 2011 order that denied his motion to dismiss claims Plaintiff Christi Burry Kelley filed against him. In 2007 while she was an inmate at the Bibb County jail, Plaintiff slipped in the shower and was injured. Petitioner was the warden of the jail at the time. Plaintiff sued the warden, the jail, the sheriff's department, and the sheriff, alleging negligence and wantonness. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims against them under state immunity. The trial court dismissed as to the County, the jail and the sheriff's department and sheriff, but denied the motion as to Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to State immunity because he was being sued for money damages for actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff. Finding that Defendant established a clear legal right to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against him, the Supreme Court issued the writ.

Pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 2000e-5 and 1983, Appellee Shirley Johnson brought suit against Defendants the City of Belzoni, Police Chief Mickey Foxworth, and Officer David James. Appellee claimed she was sexually harassed at work by James for approximately a year. She reported the harassment to her supervisor Foxworth, but claimed insufficient action was taken to remedy the situation. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $150,000–$50,000 against each Defendant, in favor of Appellee. Aggrieved, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied and the defendants appealed. Finding that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.