Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Kevin Kichnet was babysitting his young nieces when he met three-year-old Eternity after the Head Start bus dropped her off after school. Kichnet was allegedly holding her hand as they crossed the street when Eternity collapsed. Kitchnet called 9-1-1. After Eternity reached the hospital she was pronounced dead. Kichnet was subsequently arrested for deliberate homicide and jailed. More than six months later, charges against Kichnet were dropped when it was determined that the Head Start school bus had run over Eternity. Kichnet sued (1) Butte-Silver Bow County, claiming County law enforcement officers performed their investigation negligently, resulting in Kichnet's arrest and incarceration; and (2) the State, claiming that the State Medical Examiner performed his duties negligently when he reported Eternity's death as a homicide. The district court granted the County's and State's motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, as (1) the State was immune under the cited statutes from Kichnet's negligence claim; and (2) the court did not err in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of Kichnet, and that the investigation by the County was not negligent.

Plaintiff, a minor, sustained serious injuries at birth due to the negligence of medical professionals who attended her delivery. As a result of plaintiff's injuries, DHHS, through the state Medicaid program, paid more than $1.9 million in medical and health care expenses on her behalf. Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action in state court and eventually settled the action for a lump some of approximately $2.8 million. The settlement agreement did not allocate separate amounts for past medical expenses and other damages. DHHS subsequently asserted a statutory lien on the settlement proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 108A-57 and 59 (third-party liability statues), which asserted that North Carolina had a subrogation right and could assert a lien upon the lesser of its actual medical expenditures or one-third of the medicaid recipient's total recovery. Plaintiff brought the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to forestall payment under federal Medicaid law known as the "anti-lien provision," 42 U.S.C. 1396p. The court was persuaded that the unrebuttable presumption inherent in the one-third cap on the state's recovery imposed by the North Carolina third-party liability statutes was in fatal conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the Secretary and remanded for further proceedings.

Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims.

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

Plaintiff was dismissed from the East Baton Rouge police training program after falling asleep in class and purportedly making inappropriate sexual comments. Plaintiff subsequently demanded a name-clearing hearing from the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff but was denied. Plaintiff then brought federal and state law claims against the Sheriff for his failure to grant the hearing and for potentially defamatory statements made regarding plaintiff's dismissal. Because plaintiff had failed to present competent summary judgment evidence, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff.

Respondent-Appellant John Witzke appealed the district court's order granting a petition by Petitioner-Appellee Ania Gonzalez a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order against him. Witzke and Gonzalez were neighbors with "a long acrimonious history," which resulted in frequent litigation. Finding Gonzalez presented sufficient evidence to support the restraining order, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the order.

Plaintiff began working as a letter carrier in 1980. In 1987, she tripped at work and injured her back. Her workers' compensation claim was allowed and she began to work four hours a day instead of eight. Plaintiff could walk, sit, and stand for up to one hour continuously or up to four hours intermittently. After a 2003 medical exam, plaintiff declined to agree to work five hours and, feeling that her supervisor had bullied her, filed an EEOC complaint. An ALJ ruled in favor of the Postal Service; the EEOC Office of Federal Operations affirmed. In 2008, she sued, alleging: hostile work environment harassment based on disability (Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a)); retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; failure to accommodate a disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; hostile work environment harassment based on gender (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16); and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court entered summary judgment for the Postmaster General. The First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that plaintiff was able to do her job and that she was not regarded as disabled.

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendant Paul Giampa, and his respondeat superior claim against Defendants Strafford County and the Strafford County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff was participating in a work program run by the Corrections Department, under the direct supervision of Giampa. Giampa directed Plaintiff and others to load numerous tables and chairs onto a trailer. The trailer was not yet hitched to another vehicle, and not situated on even ground. Giampa directed Plaintiff and the others to lift the trailer and hitch it to a pickup truck when a weld on the trailer jack/hitch failed, causing the trailer to fall on Plaintiff's left leg and ankle. Plaintiff sustained permanent injury to his leg and ankle. The trial court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the scope of RSA 507-B:2 because the truck and trailer were not being "operated" at the time of the loading/hitching, and declined to find that RSA 507-B:2 was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme held "that the entire range of activities inherent in the loading and unloading process must be considered to determine whether a vehicle was being operated" and that "[o]peration includes participation in loading and unloading activities." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2005, "The Record," a newspaper owned by Defendant North Jersey Media Group, published an article about an SEC complaint. The headline of the article read: "3 N.J. men accused in $9M stock scam." Neither the SEC complaint nor the article suggested that Plaintiffs Ronald Durando and Gustave Dotoli were arrested. The North Jersey Media Group also owns Defendant "The Nutley Sun," which received permission to reprint the Record article about Plaintiffs. In 2008, the Sun prepared the article for publication in its December 8 edition (a promotional issue circulated to 2500 non-subscribers in addition to the weekly's regular subscribers), but wrote a new headline for the article: "Local men charged in stock scheme." The day after publication, Plaintiffs' attorney sent an email to The Sun pointing out that his clients had not been "arrested," and demanded a retraction. The North Jersey Media Group gave approval for the filing of a retraction, and indeed one was published in boldface and large print on the front page of The Nutley Sun's December 22 edition. This edition was not circulated to the 2500 non-subscribers who received the December 8 edition with the erroneous teaser. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging libel against the Sun and North Jersey Media Group. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims and dismissed the complaint. The court determined that there was not "sufficient evidence from which a jury could clearly and convincingly conclude that any . . . of the defendants acted with actual malice." In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no 'clear and convincing' evidence of actual malice to warrant a jury trial on defamation or false light. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough this case unquestionably involves sloppy journalism, the careless acts of a harried editor, the summary-judgment record before the Court cannot support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the editor knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth published the false front-page teaser."

Plaintiff Roland Davis had been a resident of the Devereux New Jersey Center (operated by Defendant Devereux Foundation) since shortly before his twelfth birthday. Plaintiff was diagnosed with autism, mental retardation, pervasive developmental disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had a history of combative and aggressive behavior. Plaintiff's mother (as his guardian) filed a complaint alleging breach of a "non-delegable duty" to protect Plaintiff from harm, negligent care and supervision, and vicarious liability after a counselor assaulted Plaintiff. The trial court granted Devereux's motion for summary judgment, finding that to the extent claims were for negligence, they were barred by the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). The court further concluded that New Jersey law does not compel imposing a "non-delegable duty" upon Devereux. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, also finding no "non-delegable duty," and reversed in part, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the counselor acted in part within the scope of her employment. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether to impose upon an institution that cares for developmentally disabled residents a "non-delegable duty" to protect them from harm caused by employees' intentional acts; and (2) whether the employee in this case could be found to have acted within the scope of her employment when she criminally assaulted the resident, thereby subjecting the non-profit facility to liability pursuant to "respondeat superior." The Court reaffirmed the duty of due care imposed upon caregivers with in loco parentis responsibilities to persons with developmental disabilities. However, applying the analysis set forth and developed by prior opinions, the parties' relationship, the nature of the risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and public policy, the Court concluded the circumstances of this case did not justify imposing on caregivers a "non-delegable duty" to protect residents from harm caused by employees' intentional acts. Furthermore, the Court held that no rational factfinder could find that the Devereux counselor's criminal assault on Plaintiff was conducted within the scope of her employment.