Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, enrolled in Marshall University's Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) program, filed suit against defendants raising various claims, including violation of her due process and equal protection rights, after she unsuccessfully pursued reconsideration through Marshall’s internal grade-appeals process. Plaintiff had left her student-teaching post in protest over differences with her supervising teacher. Consequently, plaintiff was not awarded credit and did not receive her MAT nor teaching license. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court properly determined both that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's claims against the Marshall University Board of Governors, and that the allegations in plaintiff's pro se complaint against the other defendants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd." on Justia Law

Inmate Koprowski was cleaning a fry hood in the prison's food-service area when he fell off a ladder and landed on his back. Koprowski lost feeling in his legs for several minutes and experienced severe pain when he stood up. He had difficulty walking for several days; intense pain persisted even while lying down. Koprowski alleges that medical staff treated his injuries as minor and temporary, thereby causing him unnecessary pain and further aggravating his condition, by delaying x-rays and refusing to perform an MRI, which would have shown that he had broken his back. Koprowski also claims that prison staff denied him access to specialized care, surgery, and ambulatory aids. Koprowski brought a “Bivens” suit against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference. The court dismissed, finding that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. 4126(c), a workers’ compensation scheme for federal prisoners injured during the course of their prison employment, is the exclusive vehicle by which a federal inmate may receive compensation for injuries suffered during the course of prison employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The IACA does not displace this otherwise available claim just because the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred in the context of prison employment. View "Koprowski v. Baker" on Justia Law

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law

On June 13, 2011, Sanford was injured when a car driven by 17-year-old Jacy ran a stop sign and struck his motorcycle. The car was owned by Jacy’s father, William. On February 20, 2013, Sanford filed suit against the Rasnicks, alleging vehicular negligence against Jacy and general negligence against both Rasnicks. The Rasnicks made a joint Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer for $130,000. The offer lapsed, the case went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict for less than $130,000. The trial court held the 998 offer valid, and ordered that the Rasnicks could recover some expert witness fees and other costs. The court entered a separate order taxing certain of Sanford’s costs. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the 998 offer was not valid because it improperly contained a request for an undescribed “Settlement Agreement” and the court erred in connection with its rulings on the cost items. View "Sanford v. Rasnick" on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Stansfield sought a harassment prevention order against Van Liew alleging four incidents of harassment. The alleged harassment concerned a local municipal election and general issues of local public concern. The District Court judge denied the request. Van Liew then filed this action against Stansfield in the district court, asserting claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Stansfield filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 238, 59H. The District Court judge allowed the special motion after a hearing. Van Liew appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court Department. The Appellate Division vacated the order of dismissal, concluding that Van Liew had presented sufficient evidence to show that Stansfield lacked any reasonable factual support for her petitioning activity. Stansfield filed an appeal in the Appeals Court from the decision and order of the Appellate Division. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Stansfield’s appeal was properly filed in the Appeals Court; and (2) with one possible exception, the speech at issue in this case did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued. View "Van Liew v. Stansfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was allegedly raped and assaulted by an officer of the Fall River Police Department. Plaintiff filed federal civil rights and state law negligence claims against the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, and Daniel Racine, the Fall River Police Chief. The district court dismissed the claims against Racine and the City for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the 42 U.S. 1983 claims against Racine and the City and her negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim against the City. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for holding Racine and the City liable under section 1983 or under the law of negligence in Massachusetts. View "Saldivar v. Racine" on Justia Law

Deborah Powell, the former women’s basketball coach at Asbury University, filed suit against the University, asserting claims of defamation, gender discrimination, and retaliation. The jury returned a verdict in the University’s favor on the defamation and discrimination claims but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. The trial court awarded Powell damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a claim of unlawful employer retaliation under Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.280(1) does not require an underlying violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; (2) there was sufficient evidence to find unlawful retaliation; (3) the admission of opinion testimony by a former employee of the university that Powell’s conduct had been “wholly innocent” was harmless; (4) the University was not entitled to an employment-at-will jury instruction; (5) the University was not entitled to a new trial for alleged defects in the jury’s damages verdict; and (6) the award of attorneys’ fees and costs was not unreasonable. View "Asbury University v. Powell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - all minors at the relevant times - were all trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com. Plaintiffs filed suit against Backpage, alleging that Backpage tailored its website to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims on the website, leading to Appellants’ victimization. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage engaged in sex trafficking of minors as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and its Massachusetts counterpart, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and abridgments of intellectual property rights. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the facts alleged here did not state grounds that Plaintiffs were plausibly entitled to relief on their claims. View "Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former inmate on Rikers Island, filed suit against several correction officers and prison officials, as well as the City, claiming that the officers used excessive force against him and then fabricated evidence, leading to his prosecution and prolonged detention. The court concluded that the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment where, as here, actual malice can be inferred when a plaintiff is prosecuted without probable cause. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court erred in excluding the officers' reports from evidence where plaintiff offered the reports into evidence to show that defendants submitted false reports in an effort to justify their use of force and deny plaintiff a fair trial; the reports were not cumulative; and the district court's error was not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment as to the fair trial, excessive force, and failure to intercede claims, remanding for a new trial. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments, but provided guidance to the district court with regards to further trial proceedings. In regard to Captain Ruffin's cross-appeal, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 50 motion on his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Rentas v. Ruffin" on Justia Law