Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Michael Battaglia worked for defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) since 1985. He alleged he received a demotion in retaliation for making certain workplace complaints and comments. In suing UPS, he alleged that his demotion violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) and the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Plaintiff also alleged breach of contract, relying on employee manuals stating that employees would not be disciplined for complaints. The trial court dismissed the contract claim for lack of evidence. Following numerous arguments over jury instructions, the court directed the jury that it could consider evidence involving credit cards, meal practices “and other things” on the CEPA claim. The jury found UPS liable on the CEPA and LAD claims, and awarded plaintiff $500,000 in economic damages and $500,000 in emotional distress damages. UPS made numerous post-trial motions, and the court granted its request for remittitur of the emotional distress award, reducing it to $205,000. The parties cross-appealed. The appellate panel affirmed the CEPA claim and dismissal of plaintiff's contract claim, but reversed the LAD verdict for lack of evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to the extent that it dismissed the LAD claim and affirmed the CEPA verdict. Under the LAD, an employee who voices complaints and allegedly suffers a retaliatory employment action need only demonstrate a good-faith belief that the complained-of conduct violates the LAD. An identifiable victim of actual discrimination is not required. An LAD plaintiff may only recover an award for future emotional distress if evidence of permanency is offered in the form of an expert opinion. In order to succeed on a fraud-based CEPA claim, a plaintiff must reasonably believe that the complained-of activity was occurring and was fraudulent. View "Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter, Bostco) filed a complaint against Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), claiming that MMSD's negligent operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater seepage into the tunnel, causing significant damage to Bostco's buildings. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on all but one of the issues, holding (1) MMSD was not entitled to immunity for its construction and maintenance of the tunnel; (2) the court of appeals erred in denying the equitable relief of abatement, as MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD caused by its negligent maintenance of the deep tunnel was not statutorily abrogated; (3) the damage cap capping the damages recoverable in an action against governmental entities at $50,000 does not violate equal protection; and (4) MMSD had sufficient notice of Bostco's claim. Remanded. View "Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the SPCA and others, seeking damages as a result of a search of her property and her arrest based on allegations of equine abuse. The district court applied claim splitting principles to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action because she filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court. Applying the Supreme Court's Colorado River abstention standard, the court concluded, however, that the district court's decision to dismiss the federal claim because of a similar pending state court litigation was erroneous. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton abstention could not apply when plaintiff sought damages in addition to declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the detention and handcuffing of a nine-year-old student during her physical education class. Defendant, a Deputy Sheriff, appealed from the district court's grant of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff where plaintiff achieved a de minimus victory under the Farrar v. Hobby factors. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his claim for attorney's fees. View "Gray v. Bostic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant and the Church in Japan, alleging that they had tortiously induced her to transfer nearly all of her assets to the Church. After the Japanese courts awarded plaintiff a tort judgment, the Church contended that the judgment imposed liability for its religious teachings in violation of its constitutional right to free exercise of religion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff, holding that the district court's recognition and enforcement of the judgment did not constitute "state action" triggering direct constitutional scrutiny. The court also held that neither the Japanese judgment nor the cause of action on which it was based rose to the level of repugnance to the public policy of California or of the United States that would justify a refusal to enforce the judgment under California's Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1713-1724. View "Ohno v. Yasuma" on Justia Law

A vice principal of an elementary school asked a Delaware State Trooper to come to the school give a talk about bullying to four or five fifth grade students who were under “in-school suspension.” The next day, the principal was told that there had been a bullying incident involving an autistic student whose money had been taken from him on the school bus by "AB." The principal told AB’s mother about the incident, and asked her permission to have the officer talk to AB. AB’s mother consented. The officer arrived and was told what happened. The principal and officer went to a room where AB was waiting. The principal was called away, leaving the officer alone with AB. The officer got AB to admit that he had the money (one dollar), but AB claimed that another student had taken the money. AB said that he did not know that other student’s name, but that the student was seated with AB on the school bus. Without discussing the matter with the principal, the officer followed up on AB’s claim despite being virtually certain that AB was the perpetrator. The officer obtained the bus seating chart, found AB's seat-mate, brought the two students together and questioned that student in the same manner as AB. According to the other child, the officer used a mean voice and told him 11 or 12 times that he had the authority to arrest the children and place them in jail if they did not tell the truth. AB finally admitted to taking the money from the autistic student. When he got home from school, the seat-mate told his mother what had happened. The child withdrew from school and was home schooled for the rest of that school year. The mother filed suit on her son’s behalf, as well as individually, against the Cape Henlopen School District, the Board of Education of Cape Henlopen School District, the principal, the State, the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, the Division of the Delaware State Police, and the officer, Trooper Pritchett (collectively, Pritchett). Charges against all but the officer were eventually settled or dismissed; Pritchett successfully moved for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the child, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact on all claims against the officer except a battery claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Hunt v. Delaware" on Justia Law

During a seventy-two-hour involuntary mental health hold, Ian Wittner was injected with Haldol. He died following the injection. His parents sued defendants the medical center and the treating doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the parents appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that defendants were not state actors for the purposes of section 1983, and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The Court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed the denial of the parents' Rule 59(e) motion, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wittner, et al v. Banner Health, et al" on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Shannon Cavanaugh suffered a serious head injury after she was tasered by a Woods Cross City police officer. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found for the City and the officer who tasered her. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff argued the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to exclude certain testimony from the officer concerning his beliefs prior to using the taser; (2) in refusing to grant Plaintiff a new trial due to insufficient evidence she was an immediate threat; (2) in refusing to instruct the jury on what constitutes "resisting arrest;" and (4) refusing to submit Plaintiff's excessive force question to the jury. Rejecting all of Plaintiff's ground for appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court. View "Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, et al" on Justia Law

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law