Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a North Carolina resident, was charged in Indiana with two counts of non-support of a dependent. After the trial date was set, Defendant's public defender filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw after Defendant failed to appear for a hearing on the motion. Defendant subsequently failed to appear in court the morning of his trial date, so he was tried in absentia. A jury found him guilty on both counts. Defendant arrived at the courthouse that afternoon and was immediately taken into custody. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in trying Defendant in absentia, without counsel. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary, adjudicated an habitual offender, and sentenced to twenty-two years imprisonment. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $711.95, which reflected the loss of the victim's television set and record collection. The court of appeals reversed the restitution order on grounds there was insufficient evidence to support the amount awarded and declined to remand the case. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address whether the case could be remanded for a new restitution hearing. The Court granted transfer of jurisdiction and remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new restitution hearing at which the State would be permitted to present, and Defendant would be allowed to confront, any additional evidence supporting the victim's property loss. View "Iltzsch v. State" on Justia Law

In 1997, Defendant pled guilty to child solicitation, a class D felony. Upon discharge from probation in 1999, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender for ten years pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. In 2006, the legislature amended the Act to require lifetime registration in certain circumstances. Defendant's offense fell within these circumstances. After Defendant had completed ten years of registration, he requested the removal of his registration requirement. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case and as applied to Defendant, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibited retroactive application of the lifetime registration requirement. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of child molesting and sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty years. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to impose an aggregate term of forty years, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion sentencing Defendant. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals, and summarily affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision concerning the majority of Defendant's claims. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's sentence. View "Kimbrough v. State" on Justia Law

After David Lawler obtained a civil judgment against Michael Kucholick's girlfriend for unpaid rent, Kucholick drove by Lawler's rural home and fired two shots into the home. Kucholick was found guilty of criminal recklessness and criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Kucholick to an enhanced term of seven years for criminal recklessness and six months for criminal mischief, to be served concurrently. Kucholick appealed, arguing in part that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The court of appeals concluded that Kucholick had met his burden of establishing that his sentence was inappropriate. The Supreme Court agreed and held that a modest sentence revision was warranted in this case. The Court then directed revision of Kucholick's aggregate sentence to an advisory term of four years, all executed. View "Kucholick v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with four counts of drunk driving. Defendant moved to suppress the results of two breath tests, which the trial court granted. Rather than prosecute Defendant without the breath test evidence, the State dismissed the charges against him. Three days later, the State filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it suppressed the breath test evidence. In response, Defendant argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal because it was untimely and not authorized by statute. The court agreed and dismissed the State's appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and held that the appeal was timely and authorized by statute. Remanded for consideration of the merits of the State's appeal. View "State v. Holtsclaw" on Justia Law

Husband was found guilty of domestic battery and sentenced to two years in prison for shoving Wife and poking her in the forehead repeatedly, causing her pain. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding (1) in order for Wife to have suffered "bodily injury" sufficient to justify Husband's conviction, her pain "must be sufficient to rise to a level of 'impairment of physical condition'"; and (2) Wife's testimony was insufficient evidence of this requirement. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Wife's testimony was sufficient to sustain Husband's conviction, as under Court precedent, any physical pain is enough to constitute bodily injury; and (2) Husband's two-year sentence was appropriate. View "Bailey v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted for receiving stolen property. Appellant appealed, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give one of her proposed jury instructions and by giving a final instruction that improperly instructed the jury on the mental state required to convict her. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that the final instruction was deficient but that Appellant had failed to preserve the instructional issue for appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) Appellant did not waive her claim of instructional error; (2) the final instruction given to the jury was an incorrect statement of the law because it did not include a mental state; and (3) the error was not harmless. Remanded for retrial. View "Kane v. State" on Justia Law

Associated with a toy gun business, Defendants were charged with counterfeiting, theft, and corrupt business influence arising out of their conduct concerning toy semi-automatic weapons that were look-alikes of real weapons for which a gun manufacturer allegedly owned a federally protected trademark. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to counterfeiting, on grounds that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense, but denied Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals concluded that all charges should be dismissed on grounds that Indiana lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that Defendants engaged in no conduct nor effected any result in Indiana that was an element of either charge; (2) erred in dismissing the counterfeiting charges, as the facts alleged constituted the offense of counterfeiting; and (3) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. View "Yao v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and found to be a habitual offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court vacated the habitual-offender enhancement, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual-offender allegation, as the habitual-offender enhancement to Defendant's sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF constituted an impermissible double enhancement. The Court then affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and his sentence for that offense. Remanded for resentencing.