Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a jury awarded John Doe $150,000 in punitive damages as part of a judgment in Doe's lawsuit against a priest for childhood sexual abuse. The priest moved to reduce the punitive damages pursuant to the statutory cap. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the State Constitution's separation of governmental powers provision and right to a jury trial in civil cases provision. The State subsequently intervened. In 2011, the trial court issued an order declaring that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the separation of powers and right to a jury trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutes did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Remanded with instructions to grant the priest's motion to reduce the punitive damages to the statutory maximum. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of child molestation. The only substantive evidence implicating him in those crimes was a forensic nurse examiner that testified about statements made by the alleged victim, a six-year-old child who, at the time of the trial, had recanted. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions with respect to two counts of child molestation, holding (1) there was an insufficient showing that the child victim in this case was motivated to provide truthful information to her nurse, and therefore, the nurse's testimony should not have been admitted as substantive evidence against Defendant; and (2) without this testimony, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to sustain his convictions for child molestation. Remanded for a new trial. View "VanPatten v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated certain water and sewer facilities in the City of Fort Wayne. The facilities were divided into two separate geographic areas - the North System and the Aboite System. In 2002 the City passed a resolution appropriating and condemning the North System. The City assessed damages in the amount of $14,759,500. Plaintiff challenged the condemnation proceedings alleging that the City failed to follow the proper eminent domain or condemnation statutes. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The City subsequently reaffirmed its initial resolution appropriating and condemning Plaintiff's North System and adopted a resolution assessing damages in the amount of $16,910,5000. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the trial court and requested a trial by jury. The trial court refused the trial request and granted the City's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had a right to the trial court's review of the record which included a full evidentiary hearing before a jury. View "Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted was the murders of Donna Claspell and her two daughters. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury, and that he was entitled to in camera review of the mental health records of a juror's family. The post-conviction court denied relief on all but one of Defendant's claims, modifying Defendant's sentence from death to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed the denial of his additional post-conviction request for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that the post-conviction evidence conclusively pointed to a conclusion contrary to that of the post-conviction court. View "Wilkes v. State" on Justia Law

After Mother gave birth to an infant alone at home, Boyfriend took Mother and the infant to the hospital. Medical staff noticed puncture wounds on the infant's back and notified the authorities. An ensuing investigation resulted in the removal of the infant from Mother's care. The county prosecutor subsequently petitioned the trial court for subpoenas to compel Mother and Boyfriend to give testimony relating to the home birth of the infant. The trial court issued the subpoenas. Before Mother and Boyfriend testified, their attorney moved to quash the subpoenas pursuant to their rights against self-incrimination. The court granted the motion. The trial court then granted the prosecutor's petition for use immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor was not authorized to request a grant of use immunity; and (2) where, as here, no charges have been filed and no grand jury has been convened, a prosecutor may subpoena witnesses pursuant to Ind. Code 33-39-1-4, but if those witnesses invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor cannot petition the court to grant them use immunity and compel them to testify without first filing charges or convening a grand jury. View "In re Prosecutor's Subpoena re S.H." on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF) and sought to have Defendant's sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute. Defendant pled guilty to the SVF charge, and the case proceeded to trial on the habitual offender allegation. The jury found Defendant was a habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the thirty-year enhancement the trial court had imposed under the general habitual offender statute, concluding that it constituted an impermissible double enhancement because "a double enhancement is improper where the underlying conviction is for unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF." The Court subsequently granted rehearing and again affirmed that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the person was a serious violent felon. View "Dye v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with theft and was alleged to be a habitual offender. Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement, which provided that Defendant would plead guilty as charged and admit his status as a habitual offender. Accepting the parties' plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years for the theft conviction enhanced by three years for the habitual offender adjudication for a total executed term of six years. Defendant appealed, contending that his sentence was illegal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on grounds that under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant agreed that he waived his right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it was erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver of the right to appeal contained in the plea agreement was unenforceable because the sentence imposed was contrary to law, and Defendant did not bargain for the sentence. View "Crider v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony armed robbery and felony criminal confinement. The trial court determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years on each count, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the aggravating factors used by the trial court in determining his sentence. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial court could not aggravate his sentence with an essential element of a charge that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unless the evidence is forbidden by the terms of the plea agreement, the trial judge may consider all evidence properly before him. View "Bethea v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property, a felony. While serving her probation term, Defendant was arrested and charged with theft. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant had committed four probation violations, including commission of a new criminal offense, and ordered Defendant to serve a portion of her previously suspended sentence. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred by using the probable cause standard rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard in evaluating whether she committed the crime of theft. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the correct burden of proof for a trial court to apply in a probation revocation proceeding is the preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2) because it was unclear which standard the trial court used in this instance, the case was remanded for a new determination of whether Defendant violated the conditions of her probation by a preponderance of the evidence and, if so, the appropriate sanction for such a violation. View "Heaton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor for vandalizing another man's truck. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty days executed, 150 days suspended, and 360 days of probation. The court of appeals (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding it was supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) reversed in part Defendant's sentence and remanded for a redetermination of Defendant's period of probation, not to exceed 185 days, finding that Defendant's sentence was inconsistent with Ind. Code 35-50-3-1(b). The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the opinion below, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction; and (2) regardless of the maximum sentence available under Ind. Code. 35-50-3-2 through -4, the combined term of imprisonment and probation for a misdemeanor may not exceed one year. Remanded for imposition of a probationary period not to exceed 335 days - the difference between one year and the thirty days Defendant was ordered to serve in prison. View "Jennings v. State " on Justia Law