Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The case involves a Bosnian family, Elvir Durakovic, his wife Sanela, and their daughter, who sought asylum in the United States. The family claimed they were persecuted in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to their Muslim faith and Durakovic's past work as a police informant. They alleged that the Board of Immigration Appeals violated their due process rights by denying them an extension of time to file their brief and lacked substantial evidence in determining their ineligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The immigration judge initially denied all relief, finding that while the family's testimony was credible and they had suffered harm, there was no connection between the harm suffered and their protected group. The judge concluded that Durakovic was targeted for his cooperation with the police, not because of his Muslim faith. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision, dismissing the family's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board's decision and denied the family's petition. The court found no violation of due process rights as the family was able to submit their appellate brief on time. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision that the family was not persecuted for their Muslim faith but rather Durakovic's past informant activities. The court further held that the family failed to show it was more likely than not they would be singled out for torture if they returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus not qualifying for CAT relief. View "Durakovic v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Mestanek, a citizen of the Czech Republic, who filed two Form I-130 petitions to establish his eligibility for lawful permanent residence in the United States based on his marriages to two different U.S. citizens. The first petition was filed by his then-wife Angel Simmons, and the second by his current wife Mary Mestanek. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied both petitions, the first on the grounds that Robert’s marriage to Angel was fraudulent, and the second based on the “marriage fraud bar” which prohibits approval of Form I-130 petitions for any noncitizen who has previously been found to have entered into a fraudulent marriage to circumvent immigration laws. The Mestaneks filed suit in federal district court seeking judicial review of USCIS’s denial of Mary’s Form I-130 petition. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USCIS, and the Mestaneks appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that USCIS’s denial was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law. The court rejected all of the Mestaneks’ arguments, including their contention that USCIS applied the wrong legal standard for marriage fraud, and their assertion that the administrative record was incomplete and insufficient for judicial review. The court also found no due process violation by USCIS. View "Mestanek v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

In this case, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the park's policy that required all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, four Latino families, argued that this policy violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) because it disproportionately ousted Latinos from the park. The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals found that the district court had misunderstood the federal anti-harboring statute. The court of appeals noted that the statute requires more than simply entering into a lease agreement with an undocumented immigrant to be in violation. Rather, a person must knowingly or recklessly conceal, harbor, or shield undocumented immigrants from detection. The court of appeals concluded that the park's policy of verifying tenants' legal status did not serve the park's stated interest of avoiding liability under the anti-harboring statute. Consequently, the park had not met its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims under the FHA. As such, the court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, residents of the Waples Mobile Home Park in Fairfax, Virginia, challenged the Park's policy requiring all adult tenants to provide proof of their legal status in the United States in order to renew their leases. The plaintiffs, noncitizen Latino families, argued that this policy disproportionately ousted Latinos from the Park and therefore violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Park, reasoning that the policy was necessary to avoid criminal liability under a federal statute prohibiting the harboring of undocumented immigrants.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court determined that the anti-harboring statute did not plausibly put the Park at risk for prosecution simply for leasing to families with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the court found that the Park's policy did not serve a valid interest in any realistic way to avoid liability under the anti-harboring statute. Therefore, the Park did not meet its burden at the second step of the three-step burden-shifting framework established for disparate-impact claims in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Given these findings, the Court of Appeals did not need to reach the third step to determine whether a less discriminatory alternative was available. As such, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Park and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga, a citizen of El Salvador, sought to challenge the denial of her application for asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mejia-Alvarenga was detained when trying to cross the Rio Grande into the United States and was subsequently charged with removability due to her lack of valid documentation. She filed an application for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, later amending her application to seek asylum, based on threats she received from a man named Rigoberto Nelson and others associated with him.The immigration judge denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s application and ordered her removal to El Salvador. Despite finding Mejia-Alvarenga a credible witness and acknowledging she had suffered previous harm amounting to persecution, the immigration judge ruled she had not been harmed due to political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The judge also concluded that Mejia-Alvarenga did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not show that the government would be unable or unwilling to control a future persecutor.The Court of Appeals denied Mejia-Alvarenga's petition in part and dismissed it in part due to lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the BIA did not err in concluding that Mejia-Alvarenga failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors. The court also rejected Mejia-Alvarenga’s claim that the BIA violated its regulatory obligation to be impartial and her argument that the BIA violated her due process rights by allowing a single BIA member to render its decision. Lastly, the court dismissed Mejia-Alvarenga's claim that the BIA committed an abuse of discretion by not referring her case to a three-member BIA panel, ruling it lacked jurisdiction over this claim. View "Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case concerns Ana Sanchez Sebastian-Sebastian, a native and citizen of Guatemala, who appealed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the BIA did not fully consider whether Sebastian-Sebastian was persecuted due to her membership in certain social groups, including "Guatemalan Chuj Women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" and "Guatemalan Chuj Women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." The court noted that the BIA ended its analysis prematurely, failing to consider the possibility that Sebastian-Sebastian's persecutors may have had mixed motives for their persecution. The BIA also failed to consider whether her husband's motives were intertwined with her particular social groups. As a result, the court granted Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review in part, vacated the BIA's denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for reconsideration. However, the court denied Sebastian-Sebastian's petition for review regarding her CAT claim and dismissed her due process claim, finding that her right to due process was not violated. View "Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Petitioner Angel Aguayo filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings, contending his state detention and transfer to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody was unlawful. Aguayo was a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1992, he entered the United States unlawfully. For over twenty-five years, Aguayo and his wife lived in Utah and raised four children. In March 2018, Aguayo’s daughter - a United States citizen - filed a visa petition on her father’s behalf. After U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved the visa petition, Aguayo lawfully remained in Utah and applied to become a legal permanent resident. In 2019, state law enforcement officers arrested Aguayo in Springville, Utah. He was later charged with two counts of possession of a forged document, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and having an open container in a vehicle. At the time of his arrest, Aguayo also had pending misdemeanor state charges for issuing a bad check, shoplifting, possession or use of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Aguayo was detained at the Utah County Jail. The day after his arrest, agents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) encountered Aguayo during a routine jail check. DHS then issued an immigration detainer (an “ICE hold”) for Aguayo. He remained at the Utah County Jail for about five months. In June 2019, Aguayo pled guilty to some of the pending state charges. He was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail. He would be later sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment on the forgery convictions, and an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed five years on the bad check conviction. DHS initiated removal proceedings; Aguayo contested his removability. The Tenth Circuit denied Aguayo's petition: he did not show he was prejudiced—under any applicable standard—by the denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings. View "Aguayo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In a case in which federal civil immigration detainees— who are held in the Northeast ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”), a private detention center in Tacoma, Washington, operated by GEO Group—challenge GEO’s practice of paying them less than the State’s minimum wage to work at the detention center, the Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Washington Supreme Court:1) In the circumstances of this case, are the detained workers at NWIPC employees within the meaning of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”)? 2) If the answer to the first question is yes, does the MWA apply to work performed in comparable circumstances by civil detainees confined in a private detention facility operating under a contract with the State? 3) If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, and assuming that the damage award to the detained workers is sustained, is that damage award an adequate legal remedy that would foreclose equitable relief to the State in the form of an unjust enrichment award? View "UGOCHUKWU NWAUZOR, ET AL V. THE GEO GROUP, INC." on Justia Law