Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and for an immigration violation. Defendant conditionally pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to 108 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless traffic stop, arguing that deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, and the district court's admission of the evidence resulting from the traffic stop was proper.

Petitioner was born was born in El Salvador and was admitted to the United States as legal permanent resident in 1992. In 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to resisting an executive officer in violation of Cal. Penal Code 69. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. An immigration judge ultimately found that Petitioner's conviction was a categorical crime of violence, rendering Petitioner removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that because the record of Defendant's conviction may be incomplete, the case was remanded to the BIA to apply the modified categorical approach to the question of whether Defendant committed a crime of violence and whether he was removable.

Petitioner pled guilty to the charge of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. He was not informed that his conviction made him eligible for deportation. Later, an immigration judge conducted a hearing and ordered Petitioner's removal. On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner claimed derivative citizenship under 321 of the former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA denied Petitioner's appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Petitioner's parents never legally separated, and because Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that his mother was deceased, Petitioner failed to satisfy INA 321; and (2) INA 321 did not violate Petitioner's equal protection rights.

This appeal arose out of Defendant's attempt to illegally reenter the United States at the United States-Mexico border. A jury convicted Defendant of attempted illegal reentry and for making a false statement to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not unconstitutionally direct a verdict by commenting on the evidence while delivering the jury instructions and by its response to the jury's note; (2) the district court did not constructively amend the indictment by commenting on the evidence while delivering the jury instructions and responding to the jury's note; and (3) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions.

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial.

In 1997 Javier unlawfully entered the U.S.; he married in 2001. In 2007 the bank hired wife. Husband, attempting to start a business, could not open a bank account without a social security number. He obtained an individual tax identification number. Wife named him a joint owner on her account and helped use his ITIN to open accounts of his own. The business failed. Husband returned to Mexico to deal with his citizenship. Wife revealed the situation to her supervisor, requesting time off to help husband obtain citizenship. The supervisor agreed and called the bank security officer, who was concerned that the accounts might implicate bank fraud laws. During a meeting, the security officer became angry and berated wife. Wife refused to attend another meeting without her attorney The bank terminated her employment and reported her activity to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a consortium of area banks. Wife sued, claiming blacklisting, defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any discrimination was not based on race or national origin, but on an unprotected classification, husband’s status as an alien lacking permission to be in the country.

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis.

Alma Gonzalez was convicted of fraudulently obtaining public assistance benefits based upon a no contest plea that she entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Over two years after her sentencing, Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw her plea, alleging that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained that her plea would result in automatic deportation. The district court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) procedurally, Gonzalez was permitted to move for withdrawal of her plea; but (2) Gonzalez failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal of her plea was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice.

Plaintiff sued the Louisiana State Board of Practical Nurse Examiners, claiming its status requirement violated the Constitution when the Board denied her a license solely on account of her immigration status. Plaintiff was an alien who had applied for permanent residence. The district court granted the Board summary judgment on all grounds. The court held that because applicants for permanent resident status did not constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, and a rational basis supported the immigration-status requirement, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner was detained for 1,072 days pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which requires that any person who is removable from this country because he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled substance be taken into custody and does not provide for release on bond. Petitioner, a citizen of Senegal, apparently had a state conviction for possessing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that the detention was lawful. The Third Circuit construed the pro se petition as seeking habeas corpus and reversed. The statute authorizes only detention for a reasonable period of time, after which the Due Process Clause requires that the government establish that continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the detention statute. Detention of petitioner for nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable.