Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, five individual "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA) recipients living in Arizona, sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing their policy that prevents DACA recipients from obtaining Arizona driver's licenses. The district court denied the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' requested preliminary injunction was prohibitory, not mandatory; the court need not rely on plaintiffs' preemption claim to determine whether plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their challenge to defendants' policy; plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their equal protection claim and the subsequent revision of defendants' policy did not undermine this conclusion where the current policy continues to permit the use of Employment Authorization Documents as proof of authorized presence for two sizeable groups of noncitizens similarly situated to DACA recipients and where there was no rational relationship between the policy and a legitimate state interest; plaintiffs have shown that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, they are likely to suffer irreparable harm where, among other things, plaintiffs' inability to obtain driver's licenses limits their professional opportunities; and plaintiffs have established that both the public interest and the balance of the equities favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law. View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

In 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in New Hampshire arrested six aliens who had prior criminal convictions or arrests. The arrests were part of a nationwide enforcement program. The Union Leader, a New Hampshire newspaper, requested the names and addresses of the six individuals arrested in New Hampshire. The ICE provided the Union Leader with I-213 forms from which the aliens’ names, addresses, and other personal information had been redacted. The Union Leader subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint to compel disclosure of the arrestees’ names and addresses. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ICE, concluding that FOIA exempted the requested information from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of the arrestees’ privacy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the arrestees’ privacy interests, and therefore, the withheld information subject to this appeal was not exempt from disclosure. Remanded. View "Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. " on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, detainees, filed Bivens claims against defendant, a border officer, for violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs were detained as excluded aliens for varying amounts of time and neither of the claims involved physical abuse. Therefore, the claims fell within the confines of entry fiction, and the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable; the detention did not violate constitutional rights; and the district court properly dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Even if plaintiffs were in fact U.S. citizens, dismissal was proper because defendant enjoyed qualified immunity where plaintiffs pointed to no authority clearly establishing that defendant's actions in detaining, even for as long as ten hours, individuals who presented facially valid documentation, plus the use of unspecified threats and insults during interrogation, violated the Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Castro, et al. v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

An immigration judge found petitioner Nadia Maatougui removable for marriage fraud in 2004. Petitioner then asylum and four other forms of relief from removal. The Immigration Judge denied the requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Petitioner claimed on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the IJ and BIA erred in denying her a hardship waiver and cancellation of removal based on their credibility determinations and the weight they gave the evidence in her case. Under case law, the Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to overturn their credibility determinations or evidence weighing, and thus could not grant relief on that claim. Petitioner also claimed that changed conditions in her native Morocco and the ineffective assistance of her prior counsel at a hearing in 2004 merited reopening her case. The Tenth Circuit concluded petitioner failed to present new, material, previously unavailable evidence that justified reopening her case. View "Maatougui v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally stopped, searched, or detained by the U.S. Border Patrol for the Sandusky Bay Ohio Station, based upon their Hispanic appearance, race and ethnicity. They claimed that in the three years the station has been open, 61.8% to 85.6% of those apprehended have been Hispanic, and use of racial slurs by agents. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief and monetary damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, and claimed that agents had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged conspiracy between the Border Patrol and municipalities, police chiefs and individual officers, to violate the civil rights of Hispanics. An amended complaint added the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, as a source of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs settled their claims with local agencies. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request to add claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 and dismissed, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to establish waiver of sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The APA section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity extends to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers sued in their official capacity, regardless of whether plaintiff seeks review of “agency action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.View "Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol" on Justia Law

Arizona’s 2010 Senate Bill 1070 includes various immigration-related provisions, passed in response to the growing presence of unauthorized aliens in Arizona. The stated purpose of S.B. 1070 is “to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and government agencies in Arizona” by creating “a variety of immigration-related state offenses and defin[ing] the immigration-enforcement authority of Arizona’s state and local law enforcement officers.” Section 13-2929 of the Bill attempts to criminalize transporting, concealing, harboring, or attempting to transport, conceal, or harbor an unauthorized alien under certain circumstances and to criminalize inducing or encouraging an unauthorized alien to come to or reside in Arizona. The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to 13-2929 on the basis that it is preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute, as written, is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause because one of its key elements—being “in violation of a criminal offense”—is unintelligible. The provision is also preempted by federal law and invalid under the Supremacy Clause. View "Valle del Sol, Inc. v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Verde, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1991. After several DUI convictions, he was sentenced to more than two years in prison. In 1998, Verde was charged with removability as an “aggravated felon.” He appeared before an immigration judge with seven other Mexican nationals, was deported, returned, and was removed for a second time in 2000. In 2011 the removal order was reinstated and he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. The government dropped that charge and allowed him to plead guilty to use of a false Social Security number, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B). He was sentenced to time served and supervised release. Verde filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to be reinstated as a permanent resident or to be granted cancellation of removal, arguing that his initial removal was a gross miscarriage of justice because of procedural shortcomings and that, because the Supreme Court has decided that a DUI conviction is not an aggravated felony, his conviction was not a valid basis for original removal. The district court dismissed Verde’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1101, eliminated habeas relief in district courts for aliens challenging orders of removal. The Third Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Verde-Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen of the United States" on Justia Law

Belbachir, an Algerian citizen, 27 years old, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 2004. She overstayed and, in 2005, flew from Chicago to England, where immigration authorities returned her to Chicago. She was placed in the McHenry County Jail, which has a contract with the federal government to house detainees. She planned to seek asylum on the ground that she had a well‐founded fear of being persecuted if returned to Algeria. She committed suicide by strangling herself with her socks about eight days after arriving at the jail. Her estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that defendants had deprived Belbachir of her life without due process of law, and under Illinois tort law. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the section 1983 claims. The plaintiff appealed only with respect to McHenry County; the county sheriff and the director of the jail; and three employees of Centegra, a private firm, hired to provide medical services at the jail. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one Centegra employee, who was aware of Belbachir’s suicidal thoughts and depressed condition, but failed to take action. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Belbachir v. McHenry Cnty., IL" on Justia Law