Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

The district court preliminarily enjoined Kentucky’s ban on sex-transition care for minors. The court later stayed its injunction in light of a recent Sixth Circuit decision in which the court balanced the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest and held that those factors favored allowing Tennessee to enforce its law. Kentucky bans the same conduct as in that case; the plaintiffs bring the same Equal Protection and Due Process claims that the Sixth Circuit held were unlikely to succeed. The Sixth Circuit declined to lift the stay. As a sovereign state, Kentucky has an interest in creating and enforcing its own laws. The people of Kentucky enacted the ban through their legislature. View "Doe v. Thornbury" on Justia Law

Kelsey Carpenter gave birth to a baby girl at home, alone, after deciding that she would not risk having her child removed from her custody as had happened with her two older children when they tested positive for drugs after being delivered at the hospital. She again used drugs during her pregnancy. After Carpenter’s daughter was born, the baby struggled to breathe, and Carpenter attempted to provide her with CPR. Carpenter also cut the baby’s umbilical cord but did not clamp it, and the umbilical stump continued to bleed. Carpenter bathed, diapered, clothed, and attempted to breastfeed the baby before seemingly passing out. When she woke up, her newborn daughter was dead. Before Health & Saf. Code, § 123467(a) was effective, the State charged Carpenter with implied malice murder and felony child endangerment, contending that Carpenter intentionally chose an unattended at-home delivery, despite being warned of the dangers, in an effort to evade child welfare services and at the risk of her daughter’s life. According to the State, Carpenter’s acts and omissions, including her failure to seek medical assistance after realizing her baby was in distress, caused the baby to bleed to death. Carpenter challenged the superior court’s order denying her motion to set aside the information for lack of probable cause under Penal Code section 995. She contended she was immune from prosecution based on the new law, which went into effect after the preliminary hearing, but before the superior court ruled on her section 995 motion. While the Court of Appeal agreed that Carpenter could not be prosecuted for her decision to have an unattended home birth or any effect that her alleged drug use or lack of prenatal care during pregnancy may have had on her baby, the law did not preclude the State's prosecution for her acts and omissions after her daughter was born alive. The Court therefore denied Carpenter's petition. View "Carpenter v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Tennessee enacted the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity, citing concerns that gender dysphoria treatments “can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences” while less risky, non-irreversible treatments remain available. Prohibited procedures include surgically removing, modifying, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs and prescribing or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone with exceptions for treating congenital defects, precocious puberty, disease, physical injury, and continuation of ongoing treatment. It provides for professional discipline of healthcare providers and creates a private right of action.The district court entered a preliminary injunction, finding that the challengers lacked standing to contest the surgery ban but that the ban on hormones and puberty blockers infringes the parents’ “fundamental right” to direct their children’s medical care, improperly discriminates on the basis of sex, that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class, and that the state could not satisfy the necessary justifications.The Sixth Circuit stayed the injunction, finding that Tennessee is likely to succeed on appeal. The district court erred in its facial invalidation of the law, as opposed to an as-applied invalidation. “Life-tenured federal judges should be wary of removing a vexing and novel topic of medical debate from the ebbs and flows of democracy by construing a largely unamendable federal constitution to occupy the field.” A right to new medical treatments is not “deeply rooted" in history and traditions. Tennessee could rationally exercise caution before permitting irreversible medical treatments of children. View "L. W. v. Skrmetti" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.Also at issue in this case was the process for removing June's guardian and appointing a successor guardian and June's standing to challenge certain issues on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) June had standing to challenge on appeal both the removal or her guardian and the appointment of the successor guardian; (2) the district court has authority to remove a guardian and appoint a successor guardian with the filing of a formal, written petition for removal, and a protected person is entitled to prior notice of and opportunity to be heard on such actions; (3) the district court did not improperly remove June's guardian and appoint a successor guardian, and June was afforded adequate due process; and (4) although the district court erred by improperly shifting the burden to June to file a communication and visitation petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.332-.338, the court properly denied June's proposed schedule. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction granted by the trial court preliminarily enjoining the State from enforcing Senate Bill 1, which broadly prohibits abortion but makes exceptions in three circumstances, holding that Plaintiffs could not show a reasonable likelihood of success on their facial challenge.Plaintiffs, several abortion providers, brought this lawsuit seeking to invalidate Senate Bill 1 on the grounds that the law materially burdened a woman's exercise of her right to "liberty" under Ind. Const. Art. I, 1. The trial court agreed and granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to contest the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1; (2) Senate Bill 1 was judicially enforceable; (3) Article 1, Section 1 protects a woman's right to an abortion that the extent that it is necessary to protect her life or to protect her from a serious health risk, but, otherwise, the General Assembly retains legislative discretion in determining the extent to which prohibit abortions; and (4) the record in this case did not support a preliminary injunction. View "Members of the Medical Licensing Bd. v. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court appeals denying the Texas Tech University School of Medicine's combined plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment motion in the underlying unlawful discrimination action, holding that morbid obesity does not qualify as an impairment under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) without evidence that it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder or condition.After Plaintiff was dismissed from Texas Tech's medical residency program she brought this complaint alleging that the University dismissed her because of her morbid obesity, which she argued constituted unlawful discrimination under the TCHRA. The University filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and summary judgment motion, arguing that it was protected under sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the plea and motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) morbid obesity qualifies as an impairment under the Labor Code only when caused by a physiological disorder or condition; and (2) Plaintiff could not establish that the University regarded her as having an impairment, and Plaintiff failed to show a disability as defined in the Labor Code. View "Tex. Tech University Health Sciences Center - El Paso v. Niehay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's demand for a jury trial before Walworth County extended his involuntary commitment for twelve additional months, holding that Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 966 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. 2021), applied retroactively to Appellant's case and that the denial of Appellant's jury demand was erroneous.Following a mental health crisis, Appellant was involuntarily committed and forcibly medicated for six months. Walworth County later sought to extend Appellant's commitment for twelve months. Appellant filed a jury demand at least forty-eight hours prior to his rescheduled final hearing date, but the circuit court denied the jury demand as untimely. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided E.J.W., which held that a jury demand is timely filed if it is filed at least forty-eight hours before a rescheduled final hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that E.J.W. applied retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) E.J.W. applies retroactively; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial of Appellant's jury demand was not remand but reversal. View "Walworth County v. M.R.M." on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law