Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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The State enacted an Act in 2011 pursuant to which health insurers were required to disclose, upon written request from a public school district, aggregate loss information pertaining to any group policies held by the district's employees. Maine Education Association Benefits Trust, which managed a statewide health insurance plan for a substantial segment of Maine's public school work force, subsequently filed suit in the district court, seeking to permanently enjoin the law prior to its enforcement. The Trust alleged that because its information constituted a confidential trade secret, the Act's disclosure requirement resulted in an uncompensated taking proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied the Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Trust did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its takings claim. View "Me. Educ. Ass'n Benefits Trust v. Cioppa" on Justia Law

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In two separate actions, seven Massachusetts hospitals and one managed health care organization that disproportionately provided medical care to the poor alleged that the Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services violated her obligation to reimburse them for the reasonable costs incurred in providing medical services to MassHealth enrollees. A superior court judge granted the Secretary's motion for judgment on the pleadings in one case and the Secretary's motion to dismiss in the other, concluding as a matter of law that the plaintiffs could not prevail even if their allegations were true. The plaintiffs appealed, and the cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions denying the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the plaintiffs' redress for their claims rested in the political arena, not in the courts. View "Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

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Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public.

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Applicants for and recipients of Medicaid home health Services claimed that the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Department of Health, violated their statutory right, enforceable under 42 U.S.C.1983, to an opportunity for Medicaid fair hearings. They claimed that this right, as construed by federal regulation, entitles them to “final administrative action” within 90 days of their fair hearing requests. The district court declared that “final administrative action” includes the holding of Medicaid fair hearings, the issuance of fair hearing decisions, and the implementation of any relief ordered in those decisions and permanently enjoined the state agencies to ensure that “final administrative action” implemented within 90 days of fair hearing requests. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the plaintiffs have a right to a Medicaid hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of their fair hearing requests, and that such right is enforceable under section 1983. The permanent injunction was, however, overbroad because “final administrative action” refers not to the implementation of relief ordered in fair hearing decisions, but to the holding of fair hearings and to the issuance of fair hearing decisions.

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Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts.

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VRichards, an Indiana inmate, had complained since January 2008 about abdominal pain and blood in his stool; physicians in the prison system assured him that he was fine. In October 2008 they sent him to a hospital, where specialists diagnosed ulcerative colitis. By then it was too late to do anything but excise the colon and construct an ileo-anal pouch. Richards filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in December 2010, contending that defendants violated the eighth amendment by indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely. Richards concedes that his claim accrued in October 2008, but contends, however, that the time was tolled while he was physically unable to sue despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of Richards’ physical condition and his ability to file suit.

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The Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota, along with two intervening crisis pregnancy centers and two of their personnel appealed the district court's permanent injunction barring enforcement of a South Dakota statute requiring the disclosure to patients seeking abortions of an "increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide" and the underlying grant of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and its medical director Dr. Carol Ball. The district court found that this advisory would unduly burden abortion rights and would violate physicians' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that on its face, the suicide advisory presented neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor a violation of physicians' free speech rights.

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Dr. Lee Davis, an African-American cardiologist, obtained medical-staff privileges at Jefferson Regional Medical Center (JRMC). Later, JRMC's Board of Directors voted to revoke Davis's medical-staff privileges for poor quality of patient care, improper medical documentation, and unprofessional behavior. Davis filed the instant suit in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, race discrimination and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), and conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, JRMC, its CEO, and several physicians (Defendants), and dismissed all of Davis's claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Davis failed to provide any evidence giving rise to an inference that Defendants racially discriminated against him, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Davis's race discrimination claims; (2) Davis failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 1981 and ACRA; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing Davis's civil rights conspiracy claim pursuant to section 1985(3), as Davis failed to show any racial animus on the part of Defendants.

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Petitioner pled guilty to the charge of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. He was not informed that his conviction made him eligible for deportation. Later, an immigration judge conducted a hearing and ordered Petitioner's removal. On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner claimed derivative citizenship under 321 of the former Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA denied Petitioner's appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Petitioner's parents never legally separated, and because Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that his mother was deceased, Petitioner failed to satisfy INA 321; and (2) INA 321 did not violate Petitioner's equal protection rights.

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A former inmate sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794–94e, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111–213, and the Eighth Amendment, claiming that prison officials ignored his need for placement in an ADA-compliant facility, and refused to consider him for a work-release program solely because he walks with a cane. Imprisoned for driving on a suspended license, the inmate had advanced osteoarthritis and vascular necrosis in his hip. The prison declined his request for installation of grab bars or for a transfer. The district court screened the complaint before service and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the court correctly dismissed the Eighth Amendment count, the inmate adequately alleged that refusal to accommodate his disability kept him from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates.