Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the Secretary's denial of their claims for Medicare coverage for dental services. Plaintiffs contended that this denial was premised on the Secretary's unreasonable interpretation of the Medicare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, which contravened the intent of Congress and violated plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that, although the statutory provision for exclusion of dental services was ambiguous in the sense that plausible divergent constructions could be urged, the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. The court also concluded that the Secretary's statutory interpretation warranted Chevron deference and the Secretary's statutory interpretation was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fournier v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree harassment. While Appellant was incarcerated for the offense, the State sought to have him committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code 229A. A jury found Appellant was an SVP, and Appellant was ordered for commitment. The Supreme Court remanded the case. On retrial, the jury against concluded Appellant was an SVP, and Appellant was again ordered committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to meet his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was prejudiced by his counsel's advise to sign a speedy trial waiver; (2) Appellant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to adequately argue the trial should have been bifurcated to protect Appellant's due process rights; and (3) the prosecution did not misstate the evidence during trial. View "In re Detention of Blaise" on Justia Law

Respondent was an inmate in the custody of the State Department of Corrections and Correctional Services (DOCCS). In 2010, Respondent undertook a month-long hunger strike, contending that he had ceased eating in order to secure transfer to another DOCCS facility and to bring attention to certain claims of mistreatment. After Respondent had lost 11.6 percent of his body weight, DOCCS commenced this proceeding requesting a court order permitting medical personnel to insert a nasogastric tube and take other reasonable steps necessary to provide hydration and nutrition to Respondent. Supreme Court granted DOCCS' motion. Respondent subsequently resumed eating solid food but nevertheless appealed. The Appellate Division concluded the case was moot except for the issue of whether the State violated Respondent's rights by securing the force-feeding order. On that issue, the Appellate Division ruled in favor of DOCCS, concluding that the force-feeding order did not violate Respondent's right to refuse medical treatment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent's rights were not violated by the judicial order permitting the State to feed him by nasogastric tube after his health devolved to the point that his condition became life-threatening. View "Bezio v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

The director of the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (Department) petitioned the superior court for an emergency transfer of Irving Briggs, a sentenced inmate, from the forensic unit of the Eleanor Slater Hospital, where Briggs was receiving mental-health services, back to the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) where he had previously been incarcerated. The superior court allowed an emergency transfer in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing, finding that potential harm could occur to others if Briggs were to remain at the forensic unit. After a post-transfer evidentiary hearing, a mental health advocate filed a motion to impose sanctions, alleging that the Department contrived a materially inaccurate set of facts to secure an immediate discharge of Briggs from the hospital. The trial justice declined to find a conspiracy among the Department staff and administration to remove Briggs from the forensic unit at any and all costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when it denied to impose sanctions; and (2) Briggs's argument that his emergency transfer to the ACI violated his procedural due process rights was moot. View "In re Briggs" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from California's implementation of a change to Medicare in 2006. The Centers argued that California mishandled the shift in payment responsibility for dual-eligibles' prescription drug costs from state Medicaid programs to the new, federal Medicare Part D Program. The Centers brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other things, the Centers urged the federal courts to declare unlawful California's "seizure" of the Centers' Medicare Part D funds, in excess of what would be owed under the per-visit rate for the Centers' expenses. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Centers' claims for retroactive monetary relief; the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Centers' claims to the extent that they sought money damages; however, the court reversed the district court and remanded to allow the district court to assess Ex parte Young's application to the Center's remaining claims. View "North East Medical Services v. CA Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

In 1979, Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, on behalf of present and future recipients, alleging that Tennessee’s Medicaid program violated federal requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1396, and the Due Process Clause. The decades that followed involved intervenors, consent orders, revisions, and creation of a subclass. In 1994, Tennessee converted to a managed care program, TennCare. In 1995, five class members filed motions alleging that TennCare was being administered inconsistent with a 1992 decree and federal law. In 2009, the district court awarded plaintiffs more than$2.57 million for fees and expenses leading up to a 2005 Revised Consent Decree. Plaintiffs had originally requested a lodestar amount of $3,313,458.00, but the court reduced the award by 20 percent on account of plaintiffs’ “limited” success relative to the breadth of defendants’ requests and the scope of the litigation. The court noted that there was “no dispute that Plaintiffs in this case are the prevailing party, and thus entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.” The Sixth Circuit vacated parts of the award, noting that section 1988 “is not for the purpose of aiding lawyers and that the original petition for fees included requests for dry cleaning bills, mini blinds, and health insurance. View "Binta B. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Appellant was a fifty-five-year-old male with a history of schizoaffective disorder. The State filed a petition to involuntarily commit Appellant, alleging that Appellant was unable to care for his basic needs and appeared to pose a danger to himself and others. After a hearing, the district court granted the State's petition and involuntarily committed Appellant to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), authorizing MSH to administer appropriate medication involuntarily. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate Appellant's statutory and due process rights when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of rights under Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119(1), as Appellant effectively waived his rights by allowing his counsel to inform the judge of his desire to do so; and (2) the district court complied with the statutory requirements in ordering Appellant to take medications as prescribed by his doctors, and this directive was sufficient to authorize involuntary medication. View "In re R.W.K." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law

Hudson filed suit in an Illinois district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, charging that medical personnel at a federal prison in Kansas, where he had been incarcerated, had negligently failed to diagnose a blood clot in his leg and that, as a result, he experienced serious health problems. The government moved to transfer the case to the federal district court in Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), on the ground that the principal witnesses are in Kansas and that the Kansas court has a lighter caseload. The district court granted the motion. Hudson has petitioned the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case should remain in Illinois because he lives here, as do his current treating physicians, who will testify about his current health problems and causation. His Illinois relatives will also testify to his continuing health problems. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that about two-thirds of the witnesses are closer to Kansas, that the medical records are in Kansas, and the ease of electronic communications. View "Hudson v. Baker" on Justia Law