Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

James, a 60-year old with a lengthy criminal record and a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, has been held involuntarily at the Chester Mental Health Center since 2003, under successive involuntary commitment orders entered after he had reached the mandatory parole date on his criminal sentences. As the most recent order was about to expire, the Chester facility filed a petition under the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813) alleging that James continued to be subject to involuntary admission, with certificates from a psychiatrist and a psychologist, stating that James was “[a] person with mental illness who, because of his illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future … is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm.” The petition was filed on April 29, 2010. The court set the matter for May 5, 2010. James’s attorney appeared on that date and obtained an order for independent evaluation. The independent doctor was prepared to testify that James should remain at Chester; on May 19 James’s attorney advised the court that his client had elected to have a jury. James agreed to wait unit the first available jury date in August. At trial on August 23, James expressed surprise that he had a court date and stated that he was not feeling any better. The jury returned a unanimous verdict that James was subject to involuntary admission. The appellate court held that under these particular circumstances, the delay between the jury request and the actual hearing was significant enough to be prejudicial to the patient and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, stating that, given all of his circumstances, the delay following James’s request for a jury trial did not cause him any prejudice.View "In re James W." on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Local Law 17. Local Law 17, inter alia, requires pregnancy services centers to make certain disclosures regarding the services that the centers provide. The court concluded that the law was not impermissibly vague; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to one of the challenged disclosures, which requires pregnancy services centers to disclose if they have a licensed medical provider on staff; plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to other provisions challenged by plaintiffs that require other forms of disclosure and impermissibly compel speech; and because the provisions are severable, the court severed the enjoined provisions from the rest of Local Law 17. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "The Evergreen Association, Inc v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law

A six-person jury found Milwaukee County met its burden to involuntarily commit Appellant for mental illness treatment under Wis. Stat. 51.20, and the circuit court entered an order that committed Appellant for a period no longer than six months. Appellant appealed, arguing that the six-person non-unanimous jury available to her under section 51.20 violated equal protection guarantees. Specifically, Appellant argued that her equal protection rights were violated because only a six-person jury with a five/six determination is available to those subject to involuntary commitment under Chapter 51 when compared to the twelve-person jury with a requirement of unanimity for individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings under Chapter 980. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the differences in the jury provisions for initial commitment hearings under Chapter 51 and Chapter 980 do not violate Appellant's constitutional right to equal protection. View "Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, her husband, and their jointly owned company filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two employees of the Department (Hansen and Watkins), alleging violations of their due process rights. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the Department failed to provide plaintiff with actual notice of her placement on the disqualification list and deprived all the plaintiffs of due process. The court could find no authority or "general constitutional rule" requiring Hansen and Watkins to provide plaintiff final oral notice or request written confirmation of her termination in addition to the notice and opportunity for hearing they had already provided. Therefore, the court concluded that placing plaintiff on the disqualification list was not a deprivation of due process rights. Accordingly, Hansen and Watkins were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claims against them. Plaintiff's remaining claim was without merit. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Foster, et al. v. MO Dept. of Health and Senior Servs., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their companies filed suit alleging that the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that, even if the government had a compelling interest - from safeguarding the public health to protecting a woman's compelling interest in autonomy and promoting gender equality, the mandate was not the most restrictive means of furthering that interest. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction for plaintiffs on the grounds that their case was unlikely to succeed on the merits; the court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for the individual owners; because the district court premised its decision entirely on a question of law, the court must remand for consideration of the other preliminary-injunction factors; and the court affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction with respect to the companies. View "Gilardi, et al. v. HHS, et al." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of two amendments to the laws of Texas concerning abortions (H.B. 2). Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of the legislation were unconstitutional and granted the requested injunctive relief. The State appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's permanent injunction. The court concluded that the State has made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits in regards to the hospital-admitting privileges provision. There was a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail in its argument that Planned Parenthood failed to establish an undue burden on women seeking abortions or that the hospital-admitting-privileges requirement created a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The court also concluded that the State has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, at least in part, as to its appeal of the injunction pertaining to medication abortions. Accordingly, the court stayed the injunction pertaining to medical abortions with certain exceptions. The State has made an adequate showing as to the other factors considered in determining a stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for stay pending appeal. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Louisiana's Patient's Compensation Fund served two objectives: (1) fostering a stable market for affordable insurance and (2) ensuring that victims of malpractice could recover for their injuries. Louisiana's Act 825 provided that any person who performed an abortion was liable to the mother of the unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion. Plaintiffs, three healthcare providers, challenged the constitutionality of Act 825 facially, as applied to physicians enrolled in the Fund "who face or will face medical malpractice claims related to abortion," and as applied under the circumstances of this case. The court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge subsection (A) of Act 825; plaintiffs had standing to challenge subsection (C)(2); the case was not moot; and the Eleventh Amendment did not bar plaintiffs' challenge to subsection (C)(2). On the merits, the court concluded that Act 825 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where subsection (C)(2) was rationally related to the promotion of informed consent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court striking down subsection (C)(2). The court vacated its judgment regarding subsection (A) and dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction. View "K. P., et al. v. LeBlanc, et al." on Justia Law

Okoro was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanor property crime. For unknown reasons, Okoro never received a “Gerstein hearing” to determine probable cause during his two months of incarceration. Okoro, then 23, had Type I diabetes, which he could control by monitoring his blood sugar levels. While he was in college, however, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which compromised his ability to care for his diabetes. Immediately after his arrest, Okoro’s relatives began calling to inform correctional employees and medical staff of his conditions. Okoro was detained in his cell, usually in isolation, and was dependent on jail employees and medical staff to monitor his blood sugar level and provide insulin shots. On December 23, 2008, Okoro collapsed in his cell. An autopsy revealed that Okoro’s death was the result of diabetic ketoacidosis, a buildup of acidic ketones in the bloodstream that occurs when the body runs out of insulin. A doctor and a nurse, employed by the healthcare company that contracts with the jail, moved for dismissal of the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied their qualified immunity claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record easily supports a finding of deliberate indifference to Okoro’s serious medical condition. View "Currie v. Chhabra" on Justia Law