Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Coons and Novack filed suit challenging the constitutionality of two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Affordable Care Act): the individual mandate and the establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, section 2, is not preempted by the Affordable Care Act. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the individual mandate does not violate Coons' substantive due process right to medical autonomy; affirmed the dismissal of Coons' challenge, based on lack of ripeness, to the individual mandate for violation of his substantive due process right to informational privacy; affirmed the district court's holding that the Affordable Care Act preempts the Arizona Act; and, with respect to Novack's challenge to IPAB, the court vacated the district court's decision on the merits of the claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coons v. Lew" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Mississippi's H.B. 1390, which requires that all physicians associated with the abortion facility must have admitting privileges at a local hospital and staff privileges to replace local hospital on-staff physicians. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the admitting privileges provision of H.B. 1390. The provision effectively will close the state's only abortion clinic. The court held that, assuming a rational basis inquiry is a necessary step in deciding the constitutionality of an abortion regulation, H.B. 1930 satisfied rational basis review; Gaines v. Canada instructs the court to consider the effects of H.B. 1390 only within Mississippi in conducting an undue burden analysis; JWHO, the only licensed abortion clinic in the state, has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that H.B. 1390's admission privileges requirement imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion in Mississippi and is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs; and, to the extent the preliminary injunction enjoined enforcement of H.B. 1390 against parties other than plaintiffs, it was overly broad and was modified to apply only to the parties in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court with modifications. View "Jackson Women's Health Org., et al. v. Currier, et al." on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and an injunction in favor of plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of Florida's Firearm Owners Privacy Act, Fla. Stat. 381.026, 456.072, 790.338, on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The Act seeks to protect patients' privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians regarding firearms. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Act and plaintiffs' claims are ripe for adjudication; the Act is a legitimate regulation of professional conduct where the Act simply codifies that good medical care does not require inquiry or record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient's care, and any burden the Act places on physician speech is incidental; and the Act is not unconstitutionally vague when the Act is properly understood as a regulation of physician conduct intended to protect patient privacy and curtail abuses of the physician-patient relationship, and it is readily apparent from the language of the Act the type of conduct the Act prohibits. Accordyingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and vacated the injunction. View "Wollschlaeger, et al. v. Governor State of FL, et al." on Justia Law

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations implementing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) require that employers’ group health plans furnish preventive care and screenings for women without cost sharing requirements, 42 U.S.C. 300gg–13(a)(4). Nonexempt employers must provide coverage for 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including four that may have the effect of preventing a fertilized egg from developing. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from the contraceptive mandate. HHS has effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations; an insurer must exclude contraceptive coverage from such an employer’s plan and provide participants with separate payments for contraceptive services. Closely held for-profit corporations sought an injunction under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even by a rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that imposing the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” The Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious exercise” under RFRA and that the mandate imposed no requirements on corporate owners in their personal capacity. The Tenth Circuit held that the businesses are “persons” under RFRA; that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise; and that HHS had not demonstrated that the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling governmental interest.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the businesses, holding that RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations. The Court declined to “leave merchants with a difficult choice” of giving up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgoing the benefits of operating as corporations. Nothing in RFRA suggests intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which includes corporations, 1 U.S.C.1; no definition of “person” includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but excludes for-profit corporations. “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate law.” The Court rejected arguments based on the difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations and that the mandate itself requires only insurance coverage. If the plaintiff companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences; the government failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods. The government could assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives or could extend the accommodation already established for religious nonprofit organizations. The Court noted that its decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate, not all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions. View "Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-449.03(E)(6), and its implementing regulation, which restricts the manner in which certain medications may be used to perform abortions. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argued that, under a proper reading of its text, the Arizona law prohibits all medication abortions. The State argued that the law allows medication abortions, but only if they are performed in accordance with the on-label regimen. The court assumed without deciding that the Arizona law passes rational basis review and moved directly to the application of the undue burden test in light of Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. The court concluded that plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence that the Arizona law substantially burdens women's access to abortion services, and Arizona has introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in women's health. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their undue burden claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble" on Justia Law

A psychiatrist at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center sought a court order authorizing involuntary treatment of Rita. Stating that Rita met the criteria for a diagnosis of “schizophrenia paranoid type,” the doctor requested authorization to administer specific medications, including Risperidone, for up to 90 days. At a hearing, there was testimony about Rita’s behavior before her hospitalization, about police response to a call about Rita’s behavior, and about Rita’s own descriptions of her delusions and trying to choke herself to kill the people inside her. Rita had not threatened anyone at Chicago-Read, and no cause existed to place her in restraints or administer emergency medication. Although generally cooperative, Rita refused to attend group therapy, and would not take medication. The circuit court authorized involuntary treatment. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court failed to comply with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/3-816(a), requirement that final orders “shall be accompanied by a statement on the record of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.” The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court order, reasoning that reading the code as “directory,” so that noncompliance can be excused, does not impair the safeguards the law is intended to protect.View "In re Rita P." on Justia Law

In 1968, Respondent pleaded guilty to rape and robbery. A federal court later vacated Respondent’s convictions. In 1978, Respondent was convicted of rape in the first degree. After Respondent was released on parole, he pleaded guilty in 1996 to rape in the first degree. Prior to Respondent’s release from custody, the State filed a petition under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. Respondent moved to preclude expert testimony relating to both the 1968 charges and an uncharged rape Respondent allegedly committed in 1978. Supreme Court denied the motion. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality qualifying him for civil management under article 10. Supreme Court subsequently ordered Respondent committed to a secure treatment facility. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) basis hearsay related to Respondent’s 1968 indictments for rape and robbery met minimum due process requirements and was properly admitted at trial; and (2) basis hearsay about Respondent’s uncharged rape was unreliable and should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless error. View "State v. John S." on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff, frustrated with then-proposed budget cuts to mental health services, sent the Governor a series of emails that were interpreted as threatening. Plaintiff was delivered to MaineGeneral Medical Center for a psychiatric evaluation, where she was eventually subjected to a search and held against her will for the night in a locked room. Plaintiff later filed an action against MaineGeneral and Scott Kemmerer, an emergency room physician, alleging that Defendants deprived her of liberty without due process and subjected her to an unreasonable search in violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA). Defendants filed for entry of summary judgment as to the MCRA claims. The court (1) granted the motion as to MaineGeneral, determining that MaineGeneral could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under the MCRA; and (2) denied the motion as to Kemmerer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to Kemmerer on issues of immunity, holding that Kemmerer was not entitled to absolute immunity or common law qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s MCRA claims; and (2) did not reach Kemmerer’s remaining arguments in this interlocutory appeal. View "Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law