Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

Paul Sykes was convicted of burglary and aggravated sexual battery. Prior to the expiration of his sentence, the State filed a petition seeking to have Sykes adjudicated a sexually violent predator. Although Sykes was found incompetent to assist in his own defense, the district court ultimately ruled Sykes was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The court of appeals affirmed. Sykes appealed, arguing that due process requires that a respondent be mentally competent to assist in his or her own defense in order to be civilly adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication, holding that a respondent need not be competent to be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, and therefore, Sykes did not suffer a violation of his due process rights. View "In re Care & Treatment of Sykes" on Justia Law

In 2012, a principal of Lipson O’Shea Legal Group made a request for records from Cuyahoga County Board of Health (Cuyahoga County BOH) seeking documentation of homes in the County where a minor child was found to have elevated blood lead levels. Cuyahoga County BOH sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the records sought by Lipson O’Shea. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cuyahoga County BOH, concluding that the release of the records was prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.01, which exempts from disclosure certain health information if the information could be used to reveal the individual’s identity. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that, rather than withholding all records, Cuyahoga County BOH must examine each document, redact any protected health information, and release any remaining unprotected information not otherwise excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of the information in the requested records prepared by the Cuyahoga County BOH is not protected health information, and therefore, it cannot be said that all of the information responsive to the request is protected. View "Cuyahoga County Bd. of Health v. Lipson O'Shea Legal Group" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a), arguing that the regulations’ accommodation for nonprofit organizations with a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, et seq. The court concluded that the regulations do not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise and, alternatively, because (1) the government has compelling interests to justify the accommodation, and (2) the accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. The court rejected EWTN’s challenges under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the accommodation is a neutral, generally applicable law that does not discriminate based on religious denomination. The court also rejected EWTN’s challenge under the Free Speech Clause because any speech restrictions that may flow from the accommodation are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are thus constitutional. View "Eternal Word Television Network v. Secretary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leslie Taylor asked the Colorado Medicaid program to combine the benefits she received through two assistance programs to help her get to medical appointments. If approved, this combination would allow the agency to pay attendants for time driving Taylor to and from her appointments. The agency refused, and the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the refusal constituted discrimination against Taylor based on her disability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this refusal did not constitute discriminate against Taylor based on her disability. View "Taylor v. Colorado Dept of Health Care" on Justia Law

In 2003 Tipton Hospital awarded Babchuk medical staff privileges and gave his professional corporation an exclusive contract to provide radiology services. In 2012 Tipton cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s contract. In Babchuk’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to prove they had a federally protected property interest in Dr. Babchuk’s hospital privileges or in the contract between his professional corporation and the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the conduct of which Babchuk complained was not state action and, therefore, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The fact that some of Tipton’s revenues are siphoned off to the state university that owns it does not make the hospital a state actor. The university may well exert pressure direct and indirect on Tipton, just as federal and state governments in manifold ways exert pressure on private institutions. “Government is omnipresent; that doesn’t make all employees of private entities state actors.“ View "Babchuk v. IN Univ. Health, Inc" on Justia Law

The Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. filed a request with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services seeking information about the death of Gary Farris, a ward of the Commonwealth who was transferred from an institution to a community residence shortly before his death. The Cabinet denied the Council’s request, concluding that the records were confidential under Ky. Rev. Stat. 209.140 and that the Council did not qualify as an organization exempt from the confidentiality restrictions in that statute. The trial court upheld the denial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Council was not entitled to the requested information under either the Kentucky Open Records Act or section 209.140(3). View "Council on Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v. Cabinet for Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant, Plaintiff’s co-worker at a mental health facility in Norton, Massachusetts, issued an order, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 12, authorizing Plaintiff to be seized from her home and brought to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, certifying that there was a “very substantial risk” that Plaintiff would injure herself. Pursuant to that order, the police took Plaintiff from her home and drove her to the hospital. A doctor at the hospital determined that Plaintiff was lucid and released her. Plaintiff subsequently brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Defendant. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for failure to state a claim that Defendant had violated Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Durand v. Harpold" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six homecare providers, filed suit challenging Minnesota's Individual Providers of Direct Support Services Representation Act, Minn. Stat. 179A.54, 179A.06. The Act allows homecare providers for Medicaid program participants to unionize. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause claim because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 152, does not preempt Minnesota's regulation of domestic service workers; plaintiffs' state preemption argument against the SEIU failed because even if the state laws conflict irreconcilably, the law passed most recently by the legislature controls and thus the Act trumps the older statute's definition of "employees;" the district court properly dismissed the providers' tortious interference claim against the state defendants because federal courts are unable to order state officials to conform their conduct to state law; and the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' Contract Clause claims where plaintiffs did not have authority to negotiate compensation or benefits terms with program participants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Greene v. Dayton" on Justia Law

On July 5, 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into a law a statute that the Wisconsin legislature had passed one month earlier prohibiting a doctor from performing an abortion unless he or she has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin and Milwaukee Women’s Medical Services (which operate the only four abortion clinics in Wisconsin) joined by two doctors employed by Planned Parenthood, challenged the statute’s constitutionality under 42 U.S.C. 1983, first seeking and obtaining a preliminary injunction and ultimately seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. After a trial, the trial judge granted a permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to sue; and (2) the statute is unconstitutional because it imposes a burden excessive in relation to the aims of the statute and the benefits likely to be conferred by it. View "Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel" on Justia Law