Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Health Law
In re Henry B.
After Henry B. was admitted to Pen Bay Medical Center (PBMC), PBMC staff applied to involuntarily commit Henry pursuant to the “white paper” procedures of Me. Rev. Stat. 34-B, 3863(5-A). After a commitment hearing, the district court ordered that Henry be submit to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days. The superior court affirmed the district court’s judgment of involuntary commitment. Henry appealed, arguing that he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) individuals subject to involuntary commitment proceedings in Maine have the right to effective representation of counsel, and the Strickland standard applies for courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings; and (2) Henry was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in this case. View "In re Henry B." on Justia Law
Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center
Diana Lemke challenged the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of respondents Sutter Roseville Medical Center, Peter V. Hull, M.D., Debbie Madding, and Julie Fralick (collectively Sutter Roseville). Lemke was terminated from her employment as a registered nurse at Sutter Roseville after improper administration of narcotics to a patient and failure to properly monitor and document the patient’s condition. In response, Lemke filed an action against Sutter Roseville in which she claimed retaliation for whistleblowing, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate a disability, failure to engage in an interactive process, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent retaliation, and defamation. On appeal, Lemke addressed only her causes of action for retaliation, failure to prevent retaliation, and defamation, contending: (1) there was a triable issue of material fact as to whether Sutter Roseville’s stated reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual; (2) the same reasons establishing her claim for retaliation also compel reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of her claim for failure to prevent retaliation; (3) she presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate triable issues of material fact for her claim of defamation; and (4) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings related to the motion for summary judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Lemke did not meet her burden to show Sutter Roseville’s stated reasons were merely a pretext for retaliating against her. Furthermore, the Court determined the trial court properly dismissed her claim of failure to prevent retaliation. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center" on Justia Law
In re Care & Treatment of Ellison
The State sought to have Todd Ellison, a convicted sex offender, involuntarily committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Under the Act, Ellison was entitled to a jury trial during which the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellison, however, waited in jail for more than four years without a trial. The district court concluded that the delay violated Ellison’s due process rights, dismissed the action, and ordered Ellison released. A court of appeals panel reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings to more fully address the due process issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the order of release, holding (1) the district court did not err when it applied Barker v. Wingo to Ellison’s due process claim; and (2) the court of appeals panel erred when it concluded that the district court failed to render adequate factual findings and incorrectly based its release order solely on the length of delay. View "In re Care & Treatment of Ellison" on Justia Law
Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital
This case presented two issues of first impression for the Court of Appeals’ review. The issues touched on the interaction between (a) hospital peer review proceedings against doctors governed by sections 805 to 809.7 of the Business and Professions Code, and (b) the hospital whistleblower statute, Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. The first question was left open by the California Supreme Court “Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospital,” (58 Cal.4th 655 (2014)). Fahlen held that a physician could prosecute a section 1278.5 action without first having to prevail in an administrative mandate proceeding attacking a peer review determination, but the court did not go so far as to excuse the physician from completing the internal peer review process before filing a section 1278.5 action. The second question was whether a physician bringing a section 1278.5 action could name as defendants individual physicians involved in the peer review process who allegedly instigated the process in retaliation for the physician’s whistleblowing. Based on the analysis of “Fahlen” and the text and legislative history of section 1278.5, the Court of Appeals held that a physician need not complete the internal peer review process prior to filing a section 1278.5 action. With respect to the second issue, the Court held that a physician may not name individual physicians in his/her 1278.5 complaint. A third issue involved the tripartite interaction of the anti-SLAPP stattue, the peer review process, and a physician’s religious discrimination claims against a hospital under FEHA. Specifically, the issue raised here was whether the fact the physician reiterated complaints of religious discrimination by the hospital in the context of protesting the initiation of peer review proceedings against him so intertwined his discrimination claims with the peer review proceedings as to subject his discrimination claims to an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeals found that based on the facts of this case, the physician first voiced his complaints of religious discrimination prior to the initiation of the peer review proceedings. His discrimination claims were therefore not based on activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital" on Justia Law
Planned Parenthood v. Gee
In response to secretly recorded videos released by the Center for Medical Progress depicting conversations with Planned Parenthood employees elsewhere, LDHH terminated PPGC Louisiana Medicaid provider agreements. PPGC and the Individual Plaintiffs filed suit against LDHH under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23) and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Individual Plaintiffs, three women who are Medicaid beneficiaries and who receive medical care from one of PPGC’s Louisiana facilities, seek to continue receiving care from PPGC’s facilities. The Individual Plaintiffs contend that LDHH’s termination action will deprive them of access to the qualified and willing provider of their choice, PPGC, in violation of Medicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against LDHH’s termination of PPGC’s Medicaid provider agreements. The court held that the Individual Plaintiffs met their burden to show their entitlement to a preliminary injunction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining LDHH’s termination of PPGC’s provider agreements; and thus the court affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood v. Gee" on Justia Law
Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc.
The two decedents in these consolidated cases were residents at two different nursing homes operating by Virginia Health Services, Inc. After their deaths, the executors asked the nursing homes to provide copies of the written policies and procedures in effect during the decedents’ stays. The nursing homes refused, and the decedents’ estates filed declaratory judgment complaints seeking to assert a private right of action for the production of documents under 12 VAC 5-371-140(G). Specifically, the estates sought an order of “specific performance” compelling the nursing homes to provide the requested documents. The circuit court dismissed both complaints, holding that the regulation did not require the production of documents requested by the estates. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the governing statute does not imply a private right of action for the enforcement of this regulation; and (2) therefore, the estates’ claims cannot be enforced in a declaratory judgment action. View "Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law
Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma
At issue in this case was the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), which makes certain "service establishments" public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title III, in turn, generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. Brent Levorsen suffered from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, Levorsen has donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. And in May 2013, he attempted to do just that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. When an Octapharma employee learned that Levorsen suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee thus advised Levorsen that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Levorsen then provided Octapharma with a signed form from his psychiatrists, who both indicated that Levorsen is medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week. When Octapharma maintained its refusal to allow Levorsen to donate, he brought this action under Title III of the ADA. The district court concluded that plasma-donation centers (PDCs) aren’t service establishments because, unlike section 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples, PDCs don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee. The Tenth Circuit found this "superficial distinction" irrelevant. Under the plain language of section 12181(7)(F), a PDC was a "'service establishment' for two exceedingly simple reasons: It’s an establishment. And it provides a service." Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise, and in dismissing the underlying action on that basis, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma" on Justia Law
Trueblood V. WSDSHS
This appeal arose out of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action filed against DSHS by plaintiff. At issue is whether the Due Process Clause compels the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation. The district court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The district court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. View "Trueblood V. WSDSHS" on Justia Law
State v. Henton
Appellant filed a pleading in the court of appeals entitled “Eighth Admendment [sic] Violation” seeking an order compelling a county jail to send medical records pertaining to treatment he received while he was there to the correctional institution where he is currently incarcerated. The court of appeals construed Appellant’s pleading as a petition for a writ of mandamus and then dismissed his case for failing to follow procedural requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by dismissing Appellant’s mandamus petition because he failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25. View "State v. Henton" on Justia Law
Griffith v. Aultman Hosp.
Appellant’s father (Decedent) died after receiving surgery at Aultman Hospital. Appellant requested a copy of Decedent’s complete medical record. The Hospital produced the medical record that existed in the medical-records department. Dissatisfied with the Hospital’s response, Appellant filed this action to compel the production of Decedent’s complete medical record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, concluding that the Hospital had produced the requested medical record, as defined by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74(A)(8). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the term “medical record” as that term is used in Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74 does not include all patient data but consists only of information maintained by the medical-records department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) data that was generated in the process of the patient’s healthcare treatment and that pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition qualifies as a “medical record”; but (2) “medical record” means any patient data “generated and maintained by a health care provider” without limitation as to the physical location or department where it is kept. Remanded. View "Griffith v. Aultman Hosp." on Justia Law