Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The two decedents in these consolidated cases were residents at two different nursing homes operating by Virginia Health Services, Inc. After their deaths, the executors asked the nursing homes to provide copies of the written policies and procedures in effect during the decedents’ stays. The nursing homes refused, and the decedents’ estates filed declaratory judgment complaints seeking to assert a private right of action for the production of documents under 12 VAC 5-371-140(G). Specifically, the estates sought an order of “specific performance” compelling the nursing homes to provide the requested documents. The circuit court dismissed both complaints, holding that the regulation did not require the production of documents requested by the estates. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the governing statute does not imply a private right of action for the enforcement of this regulation; and (2) therefore, the estates’ claims cannot be enforced in a declaratory judgment action. View "Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), which makes certain "service establishments" public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title III, in turn, generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. Brent Levorsen suffered from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, Levorsen has donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. And in May 2013, he attempted to do just that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. When an Octapharma employee learned that Levorsen suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee thus advised Levorsen that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Levorsen then provided Octapharma with a signed form from his psychiatrists, who both indicated that Levorsen is medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week. When Octapharma maintained its refusal to allow Levorsen to donate, he brought this action under Title III of the ADA. The district court concluded that plasma-donation centers (PDCs) aren’t service establishments because, unlike section 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples, PDCs don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee. The Tenth Circuit found this "superficial distinction" irrelevant. Under the plain language of section 12181(7)(F), a PDC was a "'service establishment' for two exceedingly simple reasons: It’s an establishment. And it provides a service." Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise, and in dismissing the underlying action on that basis, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action filed against DSHS by plaintiff. At issue is whether the Due Process Clause compels the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation. The district court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The district court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. View "Trueblood V. WSDSHS" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pleading in the court of appeals entitled “Eighth Admendment [sic] Violation” seeking an order compelling a county jail to send medical records pertaining to treatment he received while he was there to the correctional institution where he is currently incarcerated. The court of appeals construed Appellant’s pleading as a petition for a writ of mandamus and then dismissed his case for failing to follow procedural requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err by dismissing Appellant’s mandamus petition because he failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25. View "State v. Henton" on Justia Law

Appellant’s father (Decedent) died after receiving surgery at Aultman Hospital. Appellant requested a copy of Decedent’s complete medical record. The Hospital produced the medical record that existed in the medical-records department. Dissatisfied with the Hospital’s response, Appellant filed this action to compel the production of Decedent’s complete medical record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, concluding that the Hospital had produced the requested medical record, as defined by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74(A)(8). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the term “medical record” as that term is used in Ohio Rev. Code 3701.74 does not include all patient data but consists only of information maintained by the medical-records department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) data that was generated in the process of the patient’s healthcare treatment and that pertains to the patient’s medical history, diagnosis, prognosis, or medical condition qualifies as a “medical record”; but (2) “medical record” means any patient data “generated and maintained by a health care provider” without limitation as to the physical location or department where it is kept. Remanded. View "Griffith v. Aultman Hosp." on Justia Law

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

Paul Sykes was convicted of burglary and aggravated sexual battery. Prior to the expiration of his sentence, the State filed a petition seeking to have Sykes adjudicated a sexually violent predator. Although Sykes was found incompetent to assist in his own defense, the district court ultimately ruled Sykes was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed. The court of appeals affirmed. Sykes appealed, arguing that due process requires that a respondent be mentally competent to assist in his or her own defense in order to be civilly adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication, holding that a respondent need not be competent to be adjudicated a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, and therefore, Sykes did not suffer a violation of his due process rights. View "In re Care & Treatment of Sykes" on Justia Law

In 2012, a principal of Lipson O’Shea Legal Group made a request for records from Cuyahoga County Board of Health (Cuyahoga County BOH) seeking documentation of homes in the County where a minor child was found to have elevated blood lead levels. Cuyahoga County BOH sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the records sought by Lipson O’Shea. The trial court granted summary judgment for Cuyahoga County BOH, concluding that the release of the records was prohibited by Ohio Rev. Code 3701.01, which exempts from disclosure certain health information if the information could be used to reveal the individual’s identity. The court of appeals reversed, declaring that, rather than withholding all records, Cuyahoga County BOH must examine each document, redact any protected health information, and release any remaining unprotected information not otherwise excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of the information in the requested records prepared by the Cuyahoga County BOH is not protected health information, and therefore, it cannot be said that all of the information responsive to the request is protected. View "Cuyahoga County Bd. of Health v. Lipson O'Shea Legal Group" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff challenged the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a), arguing that the regulations’ accommodation for nonprofit organizations with a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, et seq. The court concluded that the regulations do not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious exercise and, alternatively, because (1) the government has compelling interests to justify the accommodation, and (2) the accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. The court rejected EWTN’s challenges under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the accommodation is a neutral, generally applicable law that does not discriminate based on religious denomination. The court also rejected EWTN’s challenge under the Free Speech Clause because any speech restrictions that may flow from the accommodation are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are thus constitutional. View "Eternal Word Television Network v. Secretary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leslie Taylor asked the Colorado Medicaid program to combine the benefits she received through two assistance programs to help her get to medical appointments. If approved, this combination would allow the agency to pay attendants for time driving Taylor to and from her appointments. The agency refused, and the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the refusal constituted discrimination against Taylor based on her disability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this refusal did not constitute discriminate against Taylor based on her disability. View "Taylor v. Colorado Dept of Health Care" on Justia Law