Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Parrino worked as a pharmacist for NRS. He was responsible for preparing medications, mainly inhalers. After leaving NRS, Parrino was contacted by the FDA and FBI, which were investigating reports that NRS was filling prescription medications for Pulmicort, a steroid used for the treatment of asthma, with a sub-potent amount of the active ingredient. Parrino cooperated and pleaded guilty to introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 352(a), and 18 U.S.C. 2, a strict liability misdemeanor. Parrino was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay $14,098.24 in restitution for Medicaid and Medicare payments. The Department of Health and Human Services notified Parrino that it was required to exclude him from participation in any capacity in the Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal healthcare programs for at least five years, under 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a). Rejecting Parrino’s argument that he lacked any mens rea to commit a crime and was convicted of a strict liability misdemeanor, an ALJ and the Appeals Board upheld HHS’s decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Parrino’s suit, finding that HHS’s action affected no substantive due process right because “health care providers are not the intended beneficiaries of the federal health care programs” and that the decision to exclude Parrino was “not so shocking as to shake the foundations of this country.” View "Parrino v. Price" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son was denied coverage related to gender reassignment services and surgery, plaintiff filed suit against Essentia and the health insurance plan's third party administrator for sex based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Eighth Circuit held that plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis of her own sex, and the protections of Title VII and the MHRA do not extend to discrimination based on her son's sex. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's ACA claim based on lack of Article III standing, holding that plaintiff has alleged an injury cognizable under Article III because she contends that defendants' discriminatory conduct denied her the benefits of her insurance policy and forced her to pay out of pocket for some of her son's prescribed medication. View "Tovar v. Essentia Health" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's suit alleging unlawful discrimination because plaintiffs could not effectively communicate with hospital staff in the absence of auxiliary aids or services. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief; rejected the district court's substantive standard for liability; and concluded that for an effective-communication claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, there is no requirement that a plaintiff show actual deficient treatment or to recount exactly what plaintiff did not understand. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the hospitals' failure to offer an appropriate auxiliary aid impaired the patient's ability to exchange medically relevant information with hospital staff. In this case, plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment where the record demonstrated that plaintiffs' ability to exchange medically relevant information was impaired. On remand, the district court was directed to consider the deliberate-indifference issue in regards to monetary damages. View "Silva v. Baptist Health South Florida" on Justia Law

Psychotherapist-patient privilege does not protect subpoenaed records from disclosure to the Department of Consumer Affairs, because Business and Professions Code section 2225, a statute enacted after codification of the privilege, permits disclosure of records that the privilege would otherwise shelter when the Department and the Board are investigating potential improper prescribing of controlled substances by a psychiatrist. Furthermore, a psychiatric patient's constitutional right to privacy requires the Department to demonstrate a subpoena for the patient's records is supported by a compelling interest and that the information demanded is "relevant and material" to the particular investigation being conducted. In this case, the State had a compelling interest in investigating excessive or otherwise improper prescribing of controlled substances, and petitioner's declaration established most of the records demanded by the subpoena were relevant and material to that investigation. However, further narrowing of the Department's subpoenas was required to comport with the weighty privacy interests at stake. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals granted the petition in part and vacated in part. View "Cross v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the parties' dispute over the precise language used in "corrective statements" cigarette manufacturers were ordered to disseminate. The district court's remedy requiring the manufacturers to issue corrective statements complied with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), because the manufacturers would be impaired in making false and misleading assurances about cigarettes if simultaneously required to tell the truth. In this case, the court held that the modified preambles satisfy RICO. Therefore, the court rejected the manufacturers' argument that the only reason to prefer the government's proposal is to taint manufacturers with implications of past wrongdoing. In regard to the manufacturers' First Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the preamble requirements are reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. Here, the preambles are confined to purely factual and uncontroversial information, geared toward thwarting prospective efforts by manufacturers to either directly mislead consumers or capitalize on their prior deceptions by continuing to advertise in a manner that builds on consumers' existing misperceptions. In regard to the manufacturers' challenge to the topic descriptions in the preambles to Statements C and D, the court concluded that the manufacturers waived its argument as to Statement D, but the language in Statement C was not previously considered and is indeed backward-looking, because it implies that the manufacturers previously sold and advertised cigarettes in such a way. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

After Henry B. was admitted to Pen Bay Medical Center (PBMC), PBMC staff applied to involuntarily commit Henry pursuant to the “white paper” procedures of Me. Rev. Stat. 34-B, 3863(5-A). After a commitment hearing, the district court ordered that Henry be submit to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days. The superior court affirmed the district court’s judgment of involuntary commitment. Henry appealed, arguing that he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) individuals subject to involuntary commitment proceedings in Maine have the right to effective representation of counsel, and the Strickland standard applies for courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings; and (2) Henry was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in this case. View "In re Henry B." on Justia Law

Diana Lemke challenged the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of respondents Sutter Roseville Medical Center, Peter V. Hull, M.D., Debbie Madding, and Julie Fralick (collectively Sutter Roseville). Lemke was terminated from her employment as a registered nurse at Sutter Roseville after improper administration of narcotics to a patient and failure to properly monitor and document the patient’s condition. In response, Lemke filed an action against Sutter Roseville in which she claimed retaliation for whistleblowing, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate a disability, failure to engage in an interactive process, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent retaliation, and defamation. On appeal, Lemke addressed only her causes of action for retaliation, failure to prevent retaliation, and defamation, contending: (1) there was a triable issue of material fact as to whether Sutter Roseville’s stated reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual; (2) the same reasons establishing her claim for retaliation also compel reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of her claim for failure to prevent retaliation; (3) she presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate triable issues of material fact for her claim of defamation; and (4) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings related to the motion for summary judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Lemke did not meet her burden to show Sutter Roseville’s stated reasons were merely a pretext for retaliating against her. Furthermore, the Court determined the trial court properly dismissed her claim of failure to prevent retaliation. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Lemke v. Sutter Roseville Medical Center" on Justia Law

The State sought to have Todd Ellison, a convicted sex offender, involuntarily committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Under the Act, Ellison was entitled to a jury trial during which the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellison, however, waited in jail for more than four years without a trial. The district court concluded that the delay violated Ellison’s due process rights, dismissed the action, and ordered Ellison released. A court of appeals panel reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings to more fully address the due process issue. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the order of release, holding (1) the district court did not err when it applied Barker v. Wingo to Ellison’s due process claim; and (2) the court of appeals panel erred when it concluded that the district court failed to render adequate factual findings and incorrectly based its release order solely on the length of delay. View "In re Care & Treatment of Ellison" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues of first impression for the Court of Appeals’ review. The issues touched on the interaction between (a) hospital peer review proceedings against doctors governed by sections 805 to 809.7 of the Business and Professions Code, and (b) the hospital whistleblower statute, Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. The first question was left open by the California Supreme Court “Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospital,” (58 Cal.4th 655 (2014)). Fahlen held that a physician could prosecute a section 1278.5 action without first having to prevail in an administrative mandate proceeding attacking a peer review determination, but the court did not go so far as to excuse the physician from completing the internal peer review process before filing a section 1278.5 action. The second question was whether a physician bringing a section 1278.5 action could name as defendants individual physicians involved in the peer review process who allegedly instigated the process in retaliation for the physician’s whistleblowing. Based on the analysis of “Fahlen” and the text and legislative history of section 1278.5, the Court of Appeals held that a physician need not complete the internal peer review process prior to filing a section 1278.5 action. With respect to the second issue, the Court held that a physician may not name individual physicians in his/her 1278.5 complaint. A third issue involved the tripartite interaction of the anti-SLAPP stattue, the peer review process, and a physician’s religious discrimination claims against a hospital under FEHA. Specifically, the issue raised here was whether the fact the physician reiterated complaints of religious discrimination by the hospital in the context of protesting the initiation of peer review proceedings against him so intertwined his discrimination claims with the peer review proceedings as to subject his discrimination claims to an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeals found that based on the facts of this case, the physician first voiced his complaints of religious discrimination prior to the initiation of the peer review proceedings. His discrimination claims were therefore not based on activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital" on Justia Law

In response to secretly recorded videos released by the Center for Medical Progress depicting conversations with Planned Parenthood employees elsewhere, LDHH terminated PPGC Louisiana Medicaid provider agreements. PPGC and the Individual Plaintiffs filed suit against LDHH under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23) and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Individual Plaintiffs, three women who are Medicaid beneficiaries and who receive medical care from one of PPGC’s Louisiana facilities, seek to continue receiving care from PPGC’s facilities. The Individual Plaintiffs contend that LDHH’s termination action will deprive them of access to the qualified and willing provider of their choice, PPGC, in violation of Medicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against LDHH’s termination of PPGC’s Medicaid provider agreements. The court held that the Individual Plaintiffs met their burden to show their entitlement to a preliminary injunction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily enjoining LDHH’s termination of PPGC’s provider agreements; and thus the court affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood v. Gee" on Justia Law