Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The case involves M.A.C., a homeless individual with mental health disorders, who was involuntarily committed in Waukesha County in 2020. In 2022, the County sought to extend M.A.C.'s commitment. However, M.A.C. was not present at the recommitment hearing, and her appointed counsel had been unable to contact her. The circuit court found M.A.C. in default and ordered her to be recommitted and involuntarily medicated. M.A.C. appealed, challenging the recommitment and involuntary medication orders on three grounds: lack of individual notice of the hearings, the unavailability of default judgment in such hearings, and insufficient evidence for her involuntary medication.The case was initially reviewed by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's orders. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on a previous case, Waukesha County v. S.L.L., to uphold the circuit court's decisions. M.A.C. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that under Wisconsin statutes, a subject individual is entitled to notice of recommitment and involuntary medication hearings, and providing notice to counsel only is not sufficient. The court also held that default judgment is not available for recommitment or involuntary medication hearings under Wisconsin statutes. Finally, the court found that the County failed to provide sufficient evidence for M.A.C.'s involuntary medication. The court overruled the contrary holdings of the S.L.L. case. View "Waukesha County v. M.A.C." on Justia Law

Rodney Clemons, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center, filed a lawsuit against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and two of its physicians, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious foot condition. Clemons had injured his right ankle before his incarceration and suffered from pain in his right ankle and foot for several years while incarcerated. He claimed that the defendants prioritized cost concerns over reasoned medical judgment.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the treatment plan adopted by the physicians was reasonable and that there was no evidence of a widespread pattern of indifference that could infer a constitutional violation by Wexford.Clemons appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the prison doctor's treatment decisions were not so unacceptable that no minimally competent professional would have responded in the same way. The court also found that the alleged policy of limiting referrals to trim costs was not facially unconstitutional. Furthermore, Clemons failed to show a pattern of violations that would infer that Wexford was aware of and condoned the misconduct of their employees. Therefore, the court concluded that Clemons failed to show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. View "Clemons v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Nicole Costin, individually and on behalf of her minor son, filed a lawsuit against Glens Falls Hospital and several of its staff members. Costin alleged that the hospital discriminated against her due to her substance-abuse disorder, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. She also raised state-law claims. Costin's allegations included the hospital conducting drug tests without informed consent, reporting her to the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register based on a false positive drug test, withholding pain relief, accelerating her labor without consent, and refusing to correct their actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Costin’s action, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against due to her disability. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court agreed with the lower court's dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the denial of an epidural, acceleration of labor, and treatment of her newborn. However, the court disagreed with the dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the hospital's instigation of a Child Protective Services investigation and its administration of a drug test. The court found that Costin had plausibly alleged that these actions were based on discriminatory policies, not medical decisions. The court also vacated the lower court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Costin’s state-law claims. View "Costin v. Glens Falls Hospital" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, including the Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. and California Educators for Medical Freedom, who challenged the COVID-19 vaccination policy of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The policy, which was in effect for over two years, required employees to get the COVID-19 vaccination or lose their jobs. The plaintiffs argued that the policy interfered with their fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.The case was initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which applied a rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, concluding that the policy served a legitimate government purpose. The court held that even if the vaccine did not prevent transmission or contraction of COVID-19, it furthered the purpose of protecting LAUSD students and employees from COVID-19.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. During the appeal, LAUSD rescinded its vaccination policy. LAUSD then asked the court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the case was now moot. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that LAUSD withdrew the policy because they feared an adverse ruling.The Ninth Circuit held that the case was not moot, applying the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The court found that LAUSD's pattern of withdrawing and then reinstating its vaccination policies, particularly in response to litigation risk, was enough to keep the case alive.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court found that Jacobson did not apply because the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the COVID-19 vaccine does not effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. ALBERTO CARVALHO" on Justia Law

Barbara Harrison, a severely disabled individual, challenged the Texas Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) decision to deny funding for medical services she claimed were necessary for her survival. Harrison lived in a group home and received nursing services funded by HHSC’s program for providing home and community-based care to people with disabilities. However, when her condition deteriorated to the point where she required 24/7 one-on-one nursing care, HHSC determined that the cost of providing Harrison’s necessary level of care exceeded the cost cap set by the program. Harrison was therefore denied program-funded nursing services, meaning her only option for receiving government-funded medical care was to move to an institutional setting.Harrison challenged HHSC’s determination in court, arguing that HHSC discriminated against her because of her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, by denying her program-funded nursing services. The district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring HHSC to fund 24/7 one-on-one care for Harrison until she received a hearing on her request for general revenue funds. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Harrison was unlikely to succeed on her due process claim and had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims.After the case was remanded to the district court, Harrison submitted a new application to HHSC for 24-hour nursing care under the Program, the cost of which again exceeded the Cost Cap. HHSC determined that Harrison did not require 24-hour nursing care and that 5.5 hours of nursing care per day would be sufficient to meet her medical needs. The district court found that Harrison’s change in status— from receiving no Program funding to receiving some Program funding— mooted Harrison’s ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims. The court therefore dismissed them and then granted summary judgment to HHSC on Harrison’s due process claim. Harrison appealed this decision.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to HHSC on Harrison’s due process claim but reversed the district court’s dismissal of Harrison’s discrimination claims. The court found that the district court’s mootness determination was erroneous and that the factual record was still not sufficiently developed to support a judgment as to Harrison’s discrimination claims. The case was remanded for further factfinding and proceedings. View "Harrison v. Young" on Justia Law

The case involves Disability Rights Texas (DRTx), an advocacy organization for individuals with mental illness, and Houston Behavioral Healthcare Hospital (Houston Behavioral). DRTx sought to compel Houston Behavioral to disclose video footage related to the involuntary confinement of its client, G.S., who alleged abuse during his detention at the hospital. G.S. had signed a waiver allowing DRTx to access his records. Houston Behavioral initially cooperated with DRTx's requests for information but refused to provide the requested video footage, citing confidentiality regulations related to substance use disorder treatment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of DRTx and issued an injunction, compelling Houston Behavioral to disclose the video footage. Houston Behavioral appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act) grants broad investigatory powers to organizations like DRTx, including access to "all records of any individual." The court held that the video footage requested by DRTx falls within the definition of "records" under the PAIMI Act. The court also found that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does not bar the disclosure of such records, as the required-by-law exception in HIPAA permits disclosure when another law, such as the PAIMI Act, requires it. The court concluded that Houston Behavioral's refusal to provide the video footage violated the PAIMI Act. View "Disability Rights Texas v. Hollis" on Justia Law

Wade T. Hamilton, a pediatric cardiologist, recommended a patient for a cardiac MRI scan but warned her that due to her COVID-19 vaccination, which he claimed included "magnets and heavy metals", it would be unsafe for her to enter an MRI machine. The patient's mother reported Hamilton's statements to the nurse practitioner who had referred the patient to Hamilton, leading to a report being filed against Hamilton with the Board of Licensure in Medicine. The Board, in response, opened a complaint proceeding and demanded that Hamilton undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.Hamilton challenged the Board's order in the Superior Court, arguing that the Board had overstepped its authority and violated his rights to due process and free speech. However, the Superior Court denied his petition and ruled in favor of the Board. Shortly before this decision, Hamilton's medical license in Maine expired and he did not renew it.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Hamilton's appeal as nonjusticiable, stating that there had been no final agency action and that the challenged order was moot because Hamilton had allowed his medical license to lapse. The court also noted that Hamilton's challenge to the order directing the evaluation was fully reviewable at the conclusion of the complaint proceedings, making his petition premature. Furthermore, since Hamilton was no longer licensed in Maine, the Board no longer had authority to pursue his evaluation. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for dismissal of the petition for judicial review as nonjusticiable. View "Hamilton v. Board of Licensure in Medicine" on Justia Law

An inmate, Timothy Finley, who suffers from severe psychiatric disorders, was placed in a heavily restrictive cell in administrative segregation for approximately three months by prison officials. Finley brought a case against the deputy wardens, Erica Huss and Sarah Schroeder, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and his right to procedural due process, as well as disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.The district court granted summary judgment to Huss and Schroeder on all claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on Finley’s procedural due process and statutory discrimination claims. However, the court reversed the lower court's decision on Finley’s Eighth Amendment claim, finding that he presented sufficient evidence to find that the deputy wardens violated his clearly established rights. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the Eighth Amendment claim. View "Finley v. Huss" on Justia Law

The case involves the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany and other entities, who provide medical insurance plans to their employees. They challenged a regulation by the Department of Financial Services, which requires New York employer health insurance policies that provide hospital, surgical, or medical expense coverage to include coverage for medically necessary abortion services. The plaintiffs argued that the exemption for "religious employers" was too narrow, violating the First Amendment rights of certain types of religiously affiliated employers who do not meet the terms of the exemption.The case began in 2016, raising a federal Free Exercise Claim that was similar to a previous case, Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v Serio. The lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints based on the principle of stare decisis, and the Appellate Division affirmed on the same ground. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which remanded the case to the Appellate Division to reconsider in light of a recent decision, Fulton v Philadelphia.On remand, the Appellate Division held that Serio was still good law and affirmed its previous decision that neither the medically necessary abortion regulation nor the "religious employer" exemption as defined violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that under Fulton, both the regulation itself and the criteria delineating a "religious employer" for the purposes of the exemption are generally applicable and do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The court concluded that the "religious employer" exemption survives the general applicability tests delineated in Fulton, and therefore, the Appellate Division order should be affirmed. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v Vullo" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Anna Lange, a transgender woman employed by the Houston County Sheriff's Office in Georgia. Lange was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2017 and her healthcare providers recommended a treatment plan that included hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgery. In 2018, her healthcare providers determined that a vaginoplasty was medically necessary. However, Lange's request for coverage was denied based on the health insurance plan's exclusion of services and supplies for sex change and/or the reversal of a sex change. Lange filed claims against Houston County with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and subsequently sued Houston County and the Sheriff of Houston County in the Middle District of Georgia.The district court granted summary judgment to Lange on the Title VII claim, finding the Exclusion facially discriminatory as a matter of law. The Title VII claim then proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Lange $60,000 in damages. After trial, the district court entered an order declaring that the Exclusion violated Title VII and permanently enjoined the Sheriff and Houston County from any further enforcement or application of the Exclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that a health insurance provider can be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for denying coverage for gender-affirming care to a transgender employee because the employee is transgender. The court also held that Houston County is liable under Title VII as an agent of the Sheriff's Office. The court affirmed the district court's order permanently enjoining Houston County and the Sheriff from further enforcement or application of the Exclusion. View "Lange v. Houston County, Georgia" on Justia Law