Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of theft in the second degree for allegedly offering to provide legal services and obtaining or exerting control over a retainer check by deception. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in sua sponte failing to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense as to her conviction. Defendant cited to State v. Stenger for the proposition that if she was laboring under a mistake of fact that could negate the state of mind necessary to commit theft, the trial court was required sua sponte to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) agreed based on Stenger and vacated the conviction. The State appealed, requesting that the Supreme Court overrule Stenger. After clarifying Stenger's holding, the Court reversed the ICA and affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not plainly err in omitting the mistake of fact jury instruction, as Defendant had not met her initial burden of adducing credible evidence of facts constituting the defense, and those facts were not supplied by the prosecution's witnesses. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with abuse of family and household members. Prior to trial, a Korean language interpreter was sworn in to translate the proceedings for Petitioner. During the trial, Petitioner's attorney informed the court Petitioner was not going to testify on his own behalf. Petitioner was subsequently found guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed, claiming that his right to testify was violated because the court's Tachibana colloquy was deficient. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) under State v. Tachibana, a colloquy between the judge and a defendant involves a verbal exchange in which the judge ascertains the defendant's understanding of his or her rights; (2) here, the advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether Petitioner understood his constitutional right to testify or not to testify; (3) further, Petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial heightened the necessity for the court to insure Petitioner understood the rights he waived; and (4) the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded. View "State v. Han" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 712-1240.8. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent term of imprisonment of five years in both counts as a young adult defendant pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-667. The State filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing that the court's decision to sentence Defendant under section 706-667 ran contrary to law. The circuit court denied the order. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing under section 712-1240.8. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "notwithstanding...any other law to the contrary" found in the sentencing provision of section 712-1240.8 overrode sentencing under section 706-667 as "contrary." The Supreme Court held that it did not, reversed the ICA's judgment, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence and order denying the State's motion to correct illegal sentence. View "State v. Casugay-Badiang" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a contract with Complainant for the purpose of remodeling part of Complainant's house. Complainant later discovered Defendant was not a licensed contractor, contrary to Defendant's representations to Complainant. Before the remodeling was completed, Complainant fired Defendant due to a dispute regarding the purchasing of materials. After an investigation, Defendant was charged with theft in the first degree and unlicensed activity. Defendant moved to dismiss the theft charge, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, determining that there was sufficient evidence for the grand jury to indict Defendant for first-degree theft given his misrepresentation to Complainant that he was an unlicensed contractor, which thereby induced Complainant to enter into a contract and pay Defendant $95,930 before ultimately firing him. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the circuit court and the ICA, holding that the evidence in this case did not suffice to establish probable cause that Defendant committed theft of property exceeding $20,000 in value because the State did not provide the grand jury with any specific amount of property of which Complainant was allegedly unlawfully deprived. Remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge of theft in the first degree. View "State v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical marijuana patient, was arrested for possessing medical marijuana while passing through airport security at Kona International Airport. Defendant was later convicted of promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded the case to the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal, holding (1) Defendant presented sufficient evidence to trigger a medical marijuana affirmative defense in a stipulated fact trial, in which the parties stipulated that Defendant possessed a valid medical marijuana certificate and that the marijuana he possessed was medical marijuana; and (2) the conflict between a statute that allows medical use of marijuana, including transportation of such marijuana, and another statute that prohibits transportation of medical marijuana through any place open to the public, created an irreconcilable conflict that must be resolved in favor of Defendant. View "State v. Woodhall" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to a five-year term of probation for the offenses of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. The probationary sentence was granted to Petitioner as a first time drug offender pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-622.5. The sentence contained several terms and conditions. After the conclusion of Petitioner's probationary period, Petitioner filed a motion for an order of expungement. The circuit court concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for expungement of her felony convictions because, in committing other crimes during her probationary period, she had violated a term of her probation. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Petitioner's motion, holding (1) for the purposes of expungement of a drug conviction, the requirement that a defendant sentenced to probation under section 706.622.5 has "complied with other terms and conditions" is satisfied if the defendant has completed her probationary term and has been discharged from probation; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, because Petitioner had completed her probation term, she had, in effect, complied with the terms and conditions of probation for purposes of expungement under section 706-622.5. Remanded for entry of an order granting Petitioner's motion. View "State v. Pali" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded no contest to one count of assault in the first degree and one count of kidnapping as a class B felony. In its first minimum term order, the Hawaii Paroling Authority (HPA) set Petitioner's minimum term of imprisonment at eighteen months for each count. After Petitioner had been imprisoned for more than six months, the HPA held a second hearing to allow Complainant to testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the HPA imposed a minimum term of five years imprisonment on each count. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the HPA violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection by reopening his minimum term hearing and by subsequently increasing his minimum term. The circuit court dismissed Petitioner's petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the HPA wrongfully withheld evidence from him prior to the second hearing. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA judgment and circuit court order, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioner waived his due process claim relating to the HPA's nondisclosure of adverse materials in Petitioner's HPA file. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "De La Garza v. State " on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several drug-related offenses. At his sentencing hearing, Defendant was represented by a court-appointed deputy public defender. Privately retained counsel also appeared on behalf of Defendant and sought to substitute for the deputy public defender. Defendant's privately retained counsel requested a continuance to prepare. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion to substitution of counsel and a continuance as untimely. The court then sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's and circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court violated Defendant's constitutional right to counsel of his choice when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance of the sentencing hearing, as the court did not properly balance Defendant's right to counsel of his choice against countervailing government interests. Remanded. View "State v. Cramer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of Unauthorized Possession of Confidential Personal Information (UPCPI) for identifying himself to a police officer during two traffic stops by using the name and address of his former neighbor. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge as a de minimis violation of the UPCPI statute on the ground that his conduct did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented by the statute. The circuit court dismissed the charge. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court's dismissal order on the ground that the circuit court had not been presented with all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the offense as required under State v. Rapozo. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Defendant's conduct constituted a de minimis violation of the UPCPI statute because Defendant's conduct actually caused or threatened the harm sought to be prevented by the statute. Remanded. View "State v. Pacquing" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did no abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint; (2) the circuit court did not plainly err in allowing the testimony of two witnesses without formally qualifying them as expert witnesses and substituting the words "opinion testimony" for the word "expert" in the jury instruction; (3) the circuit court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on self-defense, in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on defense of property, or in failing to provide a cautionary instruction on the use of medical marijuana; and (4) Defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective. View "State v. Metcalfe" on Justia Law