Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Rosaura Building Corp. (“Rosaura”) filed a lease contract petition form offering its building as property for Head Start classrooms. The Mayor of the Municipality of Mayguez rejected the contract. Rosaura brought a civil rights claim for equitable relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Mayor and the municipal government (collectively, “Defendants”), claiming that Defendants’ rejection of the contract was solely motivated by Rosaura’s political beliefs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting the dismissal of the claims against the Municipality, as there was no practical effect in dismissing the claims against the municipal government where a mayor’s “employment decisions ipso facto” constitute the official policy of the municipality; and (2) did not err in dismissing the claims against the Mayor in his official capacity, as Rosaura failed to state a First Amendment retaliation cause of action and failed to state an equal protection claim by not alleging what protected activity it exercised and was a substantial motivating factor in bringing about the Mayor’s purported retaliation. View "Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez" on Justia Law

O’Gorman worked for Chicago from 1996-2007, as a carpenter and later as a General Foreman, placing city orders with Arrow Lumber, owned by Beal. After an investigation following reports from an Arrow employee, O’Gorman was arrested and charged with theft of city property and violations of City Personnel Rules. The city also pursued a civil case under the Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Chicago False Claims Act, which remains pending. The city issued a press release announcing the charges that he had diverted $50,000 in goods for his own use and tried to cover the theft. Beal pled guilty. O’Gorman’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the investigation improperly focused on O’Gorman and protected Arrow and Beal for political reasons and that Beal covered up Arrow’s fraud; that the Human Resources Director informed a union representative that if O’Gorman did not resign he would be fired and that any hearing would be a sham; and that supervisors told him that if he resigned, he would be reinstated once he was acquitted. O’Gorman resigned, was acquitted of all criminal charges, and unsuccessfully requested reinstatement. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the termination claims untimely and that there is no property interest in rehiring. View "O'Gorman v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee.View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations concerning the rescission of a bid award for a potential, but unexecuted, insurance brokerage contract with the Puerto Rico government. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim where he had no constitutionally protected property interest in the initial bid award; reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claim for political discrimination where there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales" on Justia Law

Carnell, a "minority-owned" corporation, filed suit against the Housing Authority and Blaine based on claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. The court held that a corporation can acquire a racial identity and establish standing to seek a remedy for alleged race discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, but that the district court properly dismissed one of the defendants from liability on plaintiff's race discrimination claims; the district court abused its discretion in permitting the use of particular impeachment evidence, which should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; and the district court properly reduced certain damages awarded to plaintiff on its contract claims, but decided that the strict notice requirements of the Virginia Public Procurement Act, Virginia Code 2.2-4300 through 4377, required the court to narrow further the scope of recoverable contract damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville RHA" on Justia Law

Fahs, a general contractor, filed suit against defendant, a construction supervisor with DOT, alleging First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. On appeal, Fahs challenged the district court dismissal of its claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment claim where Fahs's speech was not on a matter of public concern but rather on matters of purely personal significance, and affirmed the dismissal of the Equal Protection claim where the only differential treatment alleged in the complaint took place outside the limitations period. The court considered Fahs's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. View "Fahs Construction Group, Inc. v. Gray" on Justia Law

Blackout performs asphalt paving work and other construction services and had contracts with the Chicago Transit Authority that were terminable at will. The CTA informed Blackout that it would not do business with the firm for the next year (debarment) and did not give a reason. Illinois law allows judicial review of debarment by public bodies, but Blackout did not avail itself of that process, nor did it sue for libel, although it insists that public announcement of debarment is defamatory, but filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deprivation of “occupational liberty” without due process. The district court dismissed, noting that that inability to work for a single employer is not deprivation of occupational liberty and that there was no allegation of inability to work for public or private entities other than the CTA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Blackout won a school district contract after the CTA debarment. View "Blackout Sealcoating, Inc. v. Peterson" on Justia Law

In 2005, Curtis McGhee and another individual brought claims against the City alleging violations of civil rights sounding in malicious prosecution. The City sought coverage under insurance policies issued by CIC and Columbia. On appeal, the City and McGhee challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to CIC and Columbia, on CIC's and Columbia's declaratory judgment claims concerning coverage under the various insurance policies. The court concluded that the district court correctly refused to consider and correctly denied additional discovery of extrinsic evidence. The court also concluded that the alleged malicious prosecution and resulting personal injuries occurred when the underlying charges were filed against McGhee in 1977. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the following policies did not afford coverage to the City for the malicious prosecution claims: the two excess liability policies issued by CIC; four of the special excess liability policies issued by Columbia; and the commercial umbrella liability policy issued by Columbia. As to the 1977-78 special excess liability policy issued by Columbia, the court reversed the district court's judgment regarding the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Chicago Ins. Co., et al v. City of Council Bluffs, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are motorists who use the Grand Island Bridge but, because they are not residents of Grand Island, did not qualify for the lowest toll rate. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the toll discount policies violated the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the constitutional right to travel that courts have located in the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, both in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the November 28, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order of the district court, among other things, that granted judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that plaintiffs have standing under Article III, the toll policy at issue was a minor restriction on travel and did not involve "invidious distinctions" that would require strict scrutiny analysis pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court correctly used, in the alternative, the three-part test set forth in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, to evaluate both plaintiffs' right-to-travel and dormant Commerce Clause claims; and the Grand Island Bridge toll scheme was based on "some fair approximation of use" of the bridges; was not "excessive in relation to the benefits" it conferred; and did not "discriminate against interstate commerce." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Selevan, et al. v. New York Thruway Authority, et al." on Justia Law