Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiff's petition for mandamus and ordering the City of Ottumwa to disclose names of all persons who had and had not been issued automated traffic enforcement (ATE) citations by the City after their vehicles were detected as speeding by an ATE camera, holding that the district court erred in ordering the production of records whose disclosure was prohibited by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and a corresponding Iowa state law, Iowa Code 321.11.In denying the request for names, the City argued that the DPPA and section 321.11 prohibited disclosure of the requested information. The district court disagreed, concluding that the names of speed regulation violators was information on driving violations and therefore was not confidential information under the DPPA or section 321.11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the personal identifying information sought by Petitioner came from a vehicle registration and driver's license database, its public disclosure was presumptively prohibited under the DPPA and section 321.11. View "Milligan v. Ottumwa Police Department" on Justia Law

Former psychologist at Ironwood State Prison (Ironwood), John Doe, sued his former employer, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) alleging discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on disability. Doe also alleged CDCR violated FEHA by failing to accommodate his two disabilities, asthma and dyslexia, by relocating him to a cleaner and quieter office and providing him with requested computer equipment. Finding no triable issues of material fact, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Doe v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Rushton, an Illinois Times journalist, requested from the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) settlement agreements pertaining to claims filed in connection with the death of Franco, a former Taylorville inmate who died from cancer, including agreements involving Wexford, which contracts with DOC to provide medical for inmates. The DOC did not have a copy of the Wexford agreement. Wexford claimed that it was “confidential” and not a public record for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Wexford provided the DOC’s FOIA officer with a redacted version, which the DOC gave to Rushton. Rushton and the Times filed suit. The court allowed Wexford to intervene and ordered Wexford to provide an unredacted version of the agreement to the court under seal. Wexford argued that the agreement did not “directly relate” to the governmental function that it performs for the DOC because it memorializes its independent business decision to settle a legal claim, without mentioning Franco’s medical condition or medical care. The plaintiffs characterized the agreement as "settlement of a claim that Wexford failed to perform its governmental function properly" and argued that the amount of the settlement affected taxpayers.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the agreement is subject to FOIA. The statute is to be construed broadly in favor of disclosure. The contractor stood in the shoes of the DOC when it provided medical care to inmates. The settlement agreement was related to the provision of medical care to inmates, and public bodies may not avoid disclosure obligations by delegating their governmental function to a third party. View "Rushton v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the Tulsa, Oklahoma Police Department’s investigation into the murder of an infant. The police suspected the infant’s mother, plaintiff-appellant Michelle Murphy. She ultimately confessed, but later recanted and sued the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that Murphy had not presented evidence that would trigger municipal liability. Finding no reversible error after review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Murphy v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court modifying and affirming the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Director of the City and County of Honolulu Department of Planning and Permitting approving an application for a Waikiki Special District (WSD) permit for PACREP to develop the second phase of a condo-hotel at 2139 Kuhio Avenue, holding that, under the circumstances, the due process rights of Local 5, a union representing hotel and restaurant employees, were violated.In appealing the permit, Local 5 argued that the Director abused his discretion by approving the permit without certain restrictive covenant conditions. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, when the Director removed certain conditions from a WSD permit for the first phase of the condo-hotel project, conditions he knew Local 5 had advocated for, Local 5 should have had an opportunity challenge the removal of those conditions from the permit. Because Local 5 did not receive notice that the Director had removed these conditions, Local 5's due process rights were violated. View "Unite Here! Local 5 v. Department of Planning & Permitting/Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion.Walmart filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the TABC, challenging Texas statutes that govern the issuance of permits allowing for the retail sale of liquor in Texas (package store permits). Section 22.16 of the Texas Alcohol Beverage Code prohibits public corporations from obtaining package store permits in Texas. TPSA later intervened as a matter of right in defense of the statutes.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in its findings regarding the public corporation ban’s discriminatory purpose. The court held that, although the district court correctly cited the Arlington framework, some of its discriminatory purpose findings were infirm. In this case, the record did not support only one resolution of the factual issue, because there was evidence that could support the district court's finding of a purpose to discriminate. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded in part for a reweighing of the evidence.The court also held that the district court committed clear error in finding that Section 22.16 was enacted with a purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce, and the facially neutral ban did not have a discriminatory effect. The court vacated the district court's judgment that the public corporation ban violated the dormant Commerce Clause, and remanded for reconsideration of whether the ban was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The court also held that the district court erred in its analysis when it determined that section 22.16 violates the dormant Commerce Clause under the Pike test. Therefore, the court rendered judgment in favor of defendants on the claim that an impermissible burden existed under the Pike test.The court affirmed in part the district court's judgment rejecting Walmart's Equal Protection challenge to the public corporation ban, and held that the ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate purpose of reducing the availability and consumption of liquor throughout Texas. Finally, Walmart's challenges to section 22.04 and 22.05 are withdrawn in light of House Bill 1545. View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission" on Justia Law

This case involved prisoner Richard DeRemer's pro se appeal of the superior court’s dismissal of his civil complaint against three Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) employees. DeRemer alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights, and he requested declaratory relief and damages. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint addressing some, but not all, of DeRemer's claims. Specifically, the defendants did not address his First Amendment retaliation claim or request for declaratory relief. The court relied on this motion and dismissed the prisoner’s claims “for the reasons set forth in defendants’ motion,” failing to provide any independent analysis of the prisoner’s claims. Because the court, by adopting the defendants’ reasoning, failed to address all of the prisoner’s claims, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the court’s order with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the court’s dismissal of the prisoner’s other claims. View "DeRemer, III v. Turnbull" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the town on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and to Wantman on the Florida malicious prosecution claim. In a prior lawsuit, the town and its contractor, Wantman, filed suit against the plaintiff in this case under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for a fraud and extortion scheme. After the prior lawsuit was ultimately dismissed, plaintiff then filed this action.The court held that, as with section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims arising in the criminal prosecution and arrest context, the presence of probable cause will generally defeat a section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim based on a civil lawsuit as a matter of law. Furthermore, the court held that the town had probable cause to file the civil RICO lawsuit. In this case, plaintiff and others sustained a pattern of abusive requests and lawsuits against the town and the town's elected officials had a legitimate, objective reason to take legal action in response to the conduct. Finally, the court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Wantman on plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim because Wantman, like the town, had probable cause to file the RICO suit against her. View "DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream" on Justia Law

HHS issued a Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) in 2018, soliciting applications for family planning grants. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the FOA as inconsistent with a governing regulation and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The district court rejected their claims, and granted summary judgment for HHS. After plaintiffs appealed, HHS issued its FOA announcing grants for 2018.The DC Circuit held that plaintiffs' appeal was moot because, while the appeal was pending, HHS disbursed the grant funds for 2018, issued a modified FOA for 2019, and amended the regulation. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Azar" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that the FAA wrongfully terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff filed her action in the district court within the 30-day statutory limitations period, but she mistakenly named only the FAA and her former supervisor as defendants. Because plaintiff's action alleged claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, she should have named the head of the executive agency to which the FAA belonged, Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao. After the statute of limitations had expired, the FAA moved to dismiss and Secretary Chao then filed her own motion to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2). The panel held that the district court adopted an overly technical interpretation of the term "process" as used in Rule 15(c)(2). Rather, the panel held that the notice-giving function of "process" under Rule 15(c)(2) was accomplished whether or not the summons accompanying the complaint was signed by the clerk of court. Furthermore, the requirements for relation back were met here where both the United States Attorney and the Attorney General were sufficiently notified of the action within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)'s 90-day period. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Silbaugh v. Chao" on Justia Law