Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The City of Costa Mesa (“City”) began amending its zoning code to reduce the number and concentration of sober living homes in its residential neighborhoods. Two of its new ordinances—Ordinances 14-13 and 15-11 (“Ordinances”)—made it unlawful to operate sober living homes without a permit. Appellants SoCal Recovery, LLC (“SoCal”) and RAW Recovery, LLC (“RAW”) (together, “Appellants”) operate sober living homes in Costa Mesa, California, for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction. Appellants alleged that two new City ordinances and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Appellants did not establish that residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, or that the City regarded their residents as disabled.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that Appellants and other sober living home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather, they can meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. prong of the disability definition. View "SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC, ET AL V. CITY OF COSTA MESA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the decision rendered in the Eastern District of North Carolina in 2021 granting summary judgment to several officials of North Carolina’s Central Prison (the “Central Prison defendants”), against whom Plaintiff— a Central Prison inmate — pursued various state and federal claims. In awarding judgment to the Central Prison Defendants, the district court ruled that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior to filing his lawsuit in federal court, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”).   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that in these circumstances, however, the record presents numerous disputed issues of material fact about how North Carolina’s prison grievance procedure functions and is administered, including whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies of his own accord and whether such remedies were meaningfully “available” to him. Accordingly, because the district court’s award of summary judgment was erroneously premature and otherwise flawed. View "Matthew Griffin v. Nadine Bryant" on Justia Law

Casey N. sued the County of Orange (the County) and two employees of the County’s Social Services Agency (the Agency) for violating her civil rights in connection with a dependency proceeding involving Casey’s minor child. A jury found in Casey’s favor and awarded her damages. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: (1) the trial court did not err by failing to determine the materiality of allegedly fabricated or misrepresented evidence or omitted exculpatory evidence before giving the case to the jury for deliberation; (2) the jury’s verdict against the employees was supported by substantial evidence; (3) the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the jury’s verdict against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) was supported by substantial evidence. View "Casey N. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Sikh men, intended to join the Marines. However, existing Marines pre-enlistment requirements pertaining to hair length, beards, and a prohibition on wearing certain non-uniform items, conflicted with their faith. The Marines allowed an accommodation, but only after the men completed basic training.Appellants sought a preliminary injunction, and the district court refused. After considering the competing interests in the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision as it related to two men, finding that they showed a likelihood for success on the merits and proved irreparable harm. The court remanded the third man's case for further proceedings. View "Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vermont Human Rights Commission, on behalf of plaintiff Latonia Congress, appealed a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendant Centurion of Vermont LLC on the Commission’s claims of discrimination under the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA). Congress was incarcerated at a prison owned and operated by the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC contracted with Centurion to provide all medical services for inmates at the prison. Under the previous provider, Congress was seen by an audiologist, who determined that she had substantial bilateral hearing loss, and she was given hearing aids for both ears. In December 2016, Congress reported that the hearing aids were not working, and Centurion planned to send them “to Audiology for check of functioning.” Later in December 2016, a doctor examined Congress’s ears and did not find any indication of an obstruction or other problem that might be affecting her hearing. Congress delivered her hearing aids to the medical unit to be sent out for testing. They were returned to her without having been tested. The record established that no one knew what happened to the hearing aids during that time; they were apparently misplaced. Through 2017 and early 2018, Congress attempted numerous times to obtain functioning hearing aids. Because Congress was deemed “functional” for some period of time despite her reported difficulty in hearing conversations, she was not eligible for hearing aids under Centurion’s policies. Eventually, in March 2018, an audiologist concluded Congress had moderate to severe bilateral hearing loss, which was worse in one ear, and recommended hearing aids. She was provided with one hearing aid in April 2018, which improved her hearing in that ear. Congress was released from prison in October 2019. In March 2020, the Commission filed a complaint against Centurion, the DOC, and other state defendants, alleging, as relevant here, that they discriminated against Congress in violation of the VPAA by failing to provide her with functioning hearing aids and thereby denying her equal access to certain benefits and services offered at the prison. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Centurion, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Human Rights Commission v. Vermont, et al." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, firefighters and their union, alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Mayor Copeland, a former firefighter of 26 years, had implemented cost-cutting measures, including freezing the firefighters' salaries and benefits. During Copeland’s reelection campaign, the firefighter’s political action committee endorsed Copeland’s opponent and other candidates who opposed Copeland’s policies. Copeland was reelected. Several firefighters protested at Copeland’s inauguration. Copeland vetoed an ordinance to restore some of the benefits and directed Fire Chief Serna to develop a new schedule. An 8/24 schedule, whereby a firefighter would work eight hours and then be off 24 hours was proposed. No other fire department in the country has adopted that schedule, which assigns firefighters to different shifts every day. In a secretly-recorded conversation, Serna said: “You can call it retaliation.” The defendants proposed to give up the schedule in exchange for the Union giving up its right to lobby the Common Council. The Union rejected the proposal; the city implemented the 8/24 schedule. The Council later returned the firefighters’ to a 24/48 schedule. Copeland sued the Council, alleging that the ordinance violated his executive power. The state court agreed with Copeland and struck the ordinance—leaving the 8/24 schedule in effect.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, ordering the city to immediately begin reinstating the old work schedule. There was no evidence that the 8/24 schedule would result in cost savings; the firefighters would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. View "International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of East Chicago, Indiana" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred when it applied the plurality’s analysis in Easton Area School District v. Miller, 232 A.3d 716 (Pa. 2020) (Easton Area II) and ordered redaction and disclosure of the school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). In 2016, Valerie Hawkins, on behalf of Fox 43 News (collectively, Requester), submitted a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) request to Central Dauphin School District (the District), seeking a copy of school bus surveillance video which captured an incident between a 17-year-old member of a District high school basketball team (the student), and a parent of another player (the adult), who allegedly grabbed the student’s wrist during their interaction. The incident occurred in a parking lot outside the high school’s gymnasium, while the players and school staff were boarding the school bus following a basketball game. The adult involved received a summary citation for harassment related to the incident. Requester attached a copy of the citation notice from the magisterial district court record to the record request; the notice identified the adult and student by name as the defendant and victim, respectively. Karen McConnell, the District’s open records officer, denied the request for access to the video, explaining it was an education record containing “personally identifiable information directly related to a student or students,” which, according to the District, protected the video from release under FERPA, and consequently precluded its disclosure under the RTKL as well. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err when it applied the analysis articulated in Easton Area II and ordered the mandatory redaction and disclosure of a school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to FERPA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order with instructions to the District to reasonably redact the students’ personally identifiable information prior to disclosure. View "Central Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Hawkins, et al." on Justia Law

In the fall of 2015, D.T. enrolled as a freshman at Cherokee Trail High School in Aurora, Colorado. During his time at Cherokee Trail, he suffered from depression and a general decline in academic performance. His mother regularly communicated with school officials regarding his well-being and coordinated in-school support. During the first semester of his junior year, D.T. was reported for making a school shooting threat. As a result, he was expelled from Cherokee Trail and the Cherry Creek School District (“the District”) initiated a special education assessment. In December 2017, the District concluded D.T. suffered from a Serious Emotional Disability and approved an individualized education program (“IEP”) to assist his learning. D.T. appealed a district court's judgment finding the District did not deny him access to a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). D.T. asked the Tenth Circuit to conclude the District violated its obligation to identify, or “child find,” students with disabilities who required supplementary academic supports. The Tenth Circuit declined D.T.'s request, finding the District acted reasonably to preserve his access to the benefit of general education. "The District’s duty to assess and provide D.T. with special education services did not begin until his emotional dysfunction manifested in the school environment by way of his shooting threat." View "D.T. v. Cherry Creek School" on Justia Law

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) serves defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). Chunn was found incompetent to stand trial. After being ordered admitted to Napa State Hospital, he waited 75 days for admission. Chunn argued that DHS’s failure to promptly commence competency assessment and treatment violated his state and federal due process rights. Other defendants, also found incompetent to stand trial, sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against DSH. The trial court consolidated the cases and ordered DSH to implement specific steps within specific timeframes to meet its obligations to IST defendants in Solano County. DSH appealed. Four months later, another court of appeal (Stiavetti) concluded that the DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of all California IST defendants, holding that 28 days is the maximum constitutional limit for commencing substantive services to restore IST defendants to competency.The court of appeal remanded the Chunn order. The trial court’s ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. The court did not abuse its discretion. The problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space and the many efforts by DSH do not relieve DSH of its responsibilities. Some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered, due to changes in the law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 now allows DSH to conduct “reevaluations” of IST defendants after the initial commitment order. View "In re Chunn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a deceased employee's prior timely filing of a workers' compensation claim for an injury was sufficient to establish the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction over a dependent's subsequent claim for death benefits allegedly resulting from that injury, thus reversing the court of appeals' ruling below.The Commission in this case denied Plaintiff's claim for death benefits and dismissed the claim with prejudice on the grounds that Plaintiff's untimely filing could not grant the Commission jurisdiction over the claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decedent's timely claim established the Commission's jurisdiction over this matter. View "McAuley v. N.C. A&T State University" on Justia Law