Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

In 1992, Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. 10301) Section 2 litigation challenging Alabama’s districting map resulted in Alabama’s first majority-black district and its first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained similar since then. Following the 2020 census, the state enacted a new districting map (HB1), which produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority.The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of HB 1.Section 2 provides that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A 1982 amendment incorporated an effects test and a disclaimer that “nothing” in Section 2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” The Supreme Court subsequently employed the “Gingles framework,” under which Section 2 plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions and then show that, under the “totality of circumstances,” the challenged process is not “equally open” to minority voters.The district court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured” and that there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate. The court’s findings that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and concerning “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination” were unchallenged.The Court rejected Alabama’s arguments that a state’s map cannot abridge a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives and that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent. Section 2, as applied to redistricting, is not unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Matthew Haney's complaint, brought as the Trustee of the Gooseberry Island Trust, against the Town of Mashpee and its Zoning Board of Appeals, holding that Haney's arguments on appeal were either waived or meritless.Haney brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants' actions constituted uncompensated taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution due to an unconstitutional taking and the Massachusetts Constitution due to inverse condemnation. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the claims were not ripe for review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Haney waived his argument relative to whether the government had reached a final decision on the Trust's request for variances; and (2) Haney's remaining arguments were meritless. View "Haney v. Town of Mashpee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this direct appeal brought by the Iowa Department of Human Services (HDS) from a district court ruling requiring Iowa's Medicaid program to pay for sex reassignment surgery for two transgender adults and affirmed the denial of fees on cross-appeal, holding that the appeal was moot.Petitioners, adult transgender Iowans who were denied preauthorization for sex reassignment surgeries through the Medicaid program, appealed their managed care organization's denial of coverage to DHS. DHS affirmed the denials. The district court reversed, concluding that Iowa Code 216.7(3), an amendment to the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) violated the guarantee of equal protection under the Iowa Constitution. DHS appealed, but, thereafter, agreed to pay for Petitioners' surgeries. The Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal as moot and affirmed the district court's order denying any fee award, holding that the court erred in denying Petitioners' request for attorney fees. View "Vasquez v. Iowa Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), is a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country. An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), listing only the Northport facility in the written charge. The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the nation. ENA objected to the scope of those requests. The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama, facility but refused to enforce the subpoena as to information from other facilities. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility, nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena. The court explained the EEOC’s investigatory process is a multi-step process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. The court held that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility— which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to that charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eberspaecher North America Inc." on Justia Law

Moore is a male Examination Manager at the SEC's Washington, D.C. headquarters. Two women Examination Managers in that office perform the same work as Moore under similar working conditions. In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they could receive credit for years of relevant work experience regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open to all SEC employees from September 14-October 14, 2014. The women applied for the Program during this open period. Moore did not, due to family-related issues occupying his attention. The SEC permitted 10 other employees with extenuating circumstances to apply for the Program in November-December 2014. Program pay adjustments began taking effect around June 2015; the women’s salaries were increased. In August-September 2016, Moore unsuccessfully tried to apply for the Program.Moore's Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), lawsuit argues that the SEC lacks justification for any Program-related pay differential between him and the women because the application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC always had the necessary information in its records and the SEC had no valid basis for creating, or not extending, an application deadline. The Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal of Moore’s complaint, first overruling its own 2009 decision, Yant, which added an element to the prima facie case–a showing that the pay differential “is either historically or presently based on sex.” The court remanded for consideration on non-Yant grounds. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law