Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, The Associated Press and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The claim arose from an article that reported on two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. The defendants responded with a special motion to dismiss the claim under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which aim to protect the right to free speech and prevent meritless lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of these rights.The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis under the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found that the defendants had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim was based on a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.Under the second prong, the court clarified that a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In this case, the court determined that Wynn failed to meet this burden. Hence, he could not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's order granting the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state.The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA.The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim. View "Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming" on Justia Law

Section 1513 of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act prevents the plaintiffs from making political contributions because they hold interests in businesses that have gaming licenses. They sued, claiming First Amendment and Equal Protection violations. The district court concluded that Section 1513 furthers a substantially important state interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption but ruled that the restriction is unconstitutional because the Commonwealth did not draw it closely enough. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of Section 1513.The Third Circuit affirmed. Limitations on campaign expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny. The government must prove that the regulations promote a “compelling interest” and are the “least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Even applying an intermediate threshold, examining whether the statute is “closely drawn,” the Commonwealth does not meet its burden. The overwhelming majority of states with commercial, non-tribal casino gambling like Pennsylvania do not have any political contribution restrictions that apply specifically to gaming industry-related parties. The Commonwealth’s implicit appeal to “common sense” as a surrogate for evidence in support of its far-reaching regulatory scheme is noteworthy in light of the approach taken by most other similarly situated states. View "Deon v. Barasch" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging California Business & Professions Code 19858 and 19858.5 as facially unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court dismissed the action as time-barred.The panel reversed and held that, although it has not applied a state statute of limitations to a facial challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, it saw no reason to treat such a claim differently from facial constitutional claims under the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, consistent with its case law, the panel held that plaintiffs' claims were subject to the forum state's statute of limitations. In this case, the relevant statute of limitations was two years. The panel held that, assuming for the sake of analysis that sections 19858 and 19858.5 violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, plaintiffs have demonstrated a continuing violation. Therefore, plaintiffs' injuries fell within the relevant statutory period and the district court erred by concluding otherwise. View "Flynt v. Shimazu" on Justia Law

Defendant, a corporal in the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AGFC), appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss claims related to the search of a residence. The district court determined that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would have known that a warrant should not have issued based on the information he provided to the issuing court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that it was not entirely unreasonable for defendant to believe that his affidavit established sufficient indicia of probable cause for the search and seizure of the items listed in the warrant. In this case, the affidavit provided probable cause to seize a deer, based on an anonymous tip and a recorded jailhouse call. Furthermore, the items described in the warrant were relevant to the criminal offense under investigation, as they directly related to the existence, capture, and maintaining of a pet deer. View "Kiesling v. Spurlock" on Justia Law

Trask was gambling at the Horseshoe Casino when she picked up a $20 bill from the floor. The customer who had dropped the money thought he had been short-changed and reported the loss. Casino personnel reviewed security videos. For 70 minutes Trask was detained by agents of the Indiana Gaming Commission. At the request of the agents, she dumped the contents of her purse and agreed to be patted down; her cell phone was temporary taken from her. Agents seized $8 from the purse. Trask could not find her driver’s license. Agents escorted her to her car, where she found the license and $5, both of which the agents confiscated. She was told she was banned from the casino and would be arrested if she tried to return. Trask filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana law. Trask, acting pro se, contacted the casino's lawyer and accepted a settlement of $100. She later left a voicemail, rejecting the settlement, stating that “I had a change of heart and I called you within 24 hours.” The court ordered the settlement enforced and her claims dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trask’s notarized letter to the casino admitted that she agreed to accept $100 in satisfaction of her claims; her belief that she could back out is “unfounded in the law.” View "Trask v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Moody, engaged in harness racing, is the horse trainer of record for his family farm. The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) suspended Moody’s father, John, in 2010. John publicly criticized and sued the MGCB. An anonymous email led to MGCB’s investigation into whether Moody was only a “paper trainer” for John. When Moody attempted to apply for 2013 licensing, he was disqualified. In January 2013, a consent order was prepared that would have allowed Moody to begin participating in racing in March 2013, but it required Moody to agree not to take legal action against MGCB. Moody did not sign the order; he remained disqualified for six months. In September 2013, Moody was told that he could apply for licensure without any conditions. The ALJ dismissed the case. In 2015, Moody filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation in his disqualification due to his father’s lawsuit, and that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests in his right to engage in harness-racing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. MGCB was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity; neither MGCB nor the individual defendants in their official capacities were “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Moody lacked third-party standing for a First Amendment claim because failed to show a hindrance to his father’s ability to protect his own rights. Moody did not have a liberty interest in his license and was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs held licenses from the Puerto Rico Treasury Department (Treasury) authorizing them to own and operate “adult entertainment machines” (AEMs). Special Treasury task-force agents later seized AEMs belonging to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, the parties supposedly responsible for damages, in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the inspections and confiscations of the AEMs violated their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also asserted supplemental local-law claims mirroring their federal-law claims. The court granted Defendants summary judgment on the federal law claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the local-law claims. The First Circuit (1) vacated the summary judgment on the search-and-seizure and local-law claims, holding that the case must be remanded so the district court can address timing and scope matters in the qualified-immunity context; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Rivera-Corraliza v. Puig-Morales" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law

New Jersey enacted the 2002 Off-Track and Account Wagering Act, N.J. Stat. 5:5-127, providing for establishment of 15 off-track wagering (OTW) facilities. The Act authorized a license for the N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority, conditioned upon NJSEA entering into a participation agreement with other entities that held horse racing permits in 2000 (ACRA and Freehold). NJSEA, ACRA, and Freehold entered into an agreement, allocating permit rights. By 2011, only four facilities had opened. NJSEA had leased control of its tracks to the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) and another. The 2011 Forfeiture Amendment provided that permit holders would forfeit rights to any OTW not licensed by 2012, unless they demonstrated “making progress” toward establishing an OTW; forfeited rights would be available to other “horsemen’s organizations” without compensation to the permit holder. NJTHA qualified for forfeited rights. The 2012 Deposit Amendment extended the forfeiture date and allowed a permit holder to make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility not licensed by December 31, 2011, retaining the “making progress” exception. The Pilot Program Act allowed installation of electronic wagering terminals in some bars and restaurants, by lessees or purchasers of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who could exchange unused OTW licenses to install electronic terminals. NJTHA secured such a license. ACRA and Freehold submitted challenged the constitutionality of the amendments under the Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Commission determined that both ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities and absolved them of the obligation to submit deposits. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on Younger abstention grounds. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, (2013), clarifying the Younger abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the action does not fit within the framework for abstention. View "Acra Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki" on Justia Law