Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this dependent neglect proceeding, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order permanently placing A.J.C. in the primary care of his maternal grandmother and denying the motion filed by the Department of Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division to place A.J.C. with Father, holding that the district court violated Father’s constitutional fundamental right to parent.After the Department became formally involved with Mother, it placed A.J.C. in Grandmother’s care. The district court then adjudicated A.J.C. as a youth in need of care. After a hearing to determine a final parenting plan and a permanency plan for A.J.C., the court awarded Grandmother primary residential custody of A.J.C. The Department subsequently moved the court to approve an amended permanency plan in which the Department recommended placement of A.J.C. with Father. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that once Father successfully completed his court-ordered treatment plan and the Department determined Father to be a safe and appropriate placement, the district court unconstitutionally violated Father’s fundamental right to parent by placing A.J.C. with Grandmother. View "In re A.J.C." on Justia Law

In January 2010, 15-year-old Robert arrived at a Detroit Police station wearing no shirt, no shoes, and a pair of shorts. Employees of Wayne County Department of Health Services (DHS) opened an investigation into his parents, the Brents, visited the Brents’ home, and allegedly took photographs without their consent. A petition to remove the five Brent children from their home detailed the poor conditions, concerns about lead-based paint on the walls, and that the Brents’ youngest child, age 10, appeared to have a severe speech impediment. The Brents claim that the petition contained falsehoods, that the judge did not actually sign the order, that officers used abusive tactics in removing the children, and that Robert became ill because he was given cough medicine that had expired while in a residential facility. Brents claim that officials threatened to and did interfere with their visitation with the children. The children were released to the Brents in June 2010 but remained under DHS supervision until September 2010. The Brents sued “seemingly every person or agency involved in the removal, custody, and care” of the children. The Sixth Circuit reinstated gross negligence claims against the state defendants but affirmed the rejection of those claims as to city defendants; affirmed summary judgment for city defendants on intentional infliction of emotional distress claims; rejected failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city; and rejected 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against police officers. View "Brent v. Wayne County Department of Human Services." on Justia Law

After child abuse investigators removed seven minor children from plaintiffs' home, plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against DHS and others. On appeal, a civilian investigator for the Crimes Against Children Division appealed the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the facts plausibly alleged that the investigator could be liable if the children were removed from their parents' home without reasonable suspicion of child abuse. Furthermore, it was clearly established at the time the investigator acted that reasonable suspicion was required to remove the children from their home and their parents' custody. View "Stanley v. Finnegan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that although parents in a termination of parental rights proceeding cannot be compelled to admit to abuse of their children, they can be required to engage in meaningful therapy designed to ensure the children’s safety if returned to the home.The district court terminated the parental rights of Appellants because their oldest child was abused while in their home, the younger children witnessed the abuse and were directed to lie about it, and, while in therapy, Appellants insisted that the child’s injuries were self-inflicted. Appellants appealed, arguing that their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated because the termination of parental rights was based on their refusal to admit to the abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s findings of parental fault did not violate Appellants’ Fifth Amendment rights because Appellants did not engage in meaningful therapy and did not demonstrate the insight and behavioral changes necessary to protect the children from future abuse; (2) the district court’s findings of parental fault were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) termination was in the children’s best interests. View "In re Parental Rights as to S.L." on Justia Law

In this appeal from the juvenile court’s order on permanency hearing, the Supreme Court held that Father was not prejudiced by the juvenile court’s delay in appointing an attorney until shortly before the permanency hearing, and the juvenile court did not err in denying Father’s request for transport to the hearing.At issue on appeal was whether the juvenile court (1) violated Father’s due process rights when it did not advise him of his right to counsel and did not appoint an attorney until shortly before the permanency hearing, and (2) erred in denying Father’s request for transport to attend the hearing in person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court violated a clear rule of law when it failed to advise Father of his right to counsel at his first appearance in the proceeding and failed to act on Father’s initial request for appointment of counsel, but these errors did not materially prejudice Father; and (2) Father’s due process rights were not violated when the juvenile court denied Father’s request for transport to the permanency hearing. View "FH v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that an order appointing a guardian ad litem (GAL) for an adult is not a final, appealable order under Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B) and vacated the trial court’s order appointing a GAL to act on Appellant’s behalf in her divorce case.The court of common pleas, domestic relations division, issued an order appointing a GAL to represent Appellant in her divorce case without providing her with prior notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding (1) because the order was issued during a special proceeding and affects a substantial right and because Appellant will not be provided adequate relief if she is not permitted immediately to appeal the order, the order is a final, appealable order under section 2505.02(B)(2); and (2) the order violated Appellant’s due process rights. View "Thomasson v. Thomasson" on Justia Law

A substantial right is not affected until judgment is entered in a garnishment action, and therefore, a judgment debtor who unsuccessfully objects to a garnishment may not immediately appeal.After the district court overruled Appellant’s objection to a garnishment and ordered that “the garnishment may proceed,” Appellant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because there was no final order. Appellant filed a petition for further review, asserting that he appealed from a final order because the order that the garnishment “may proceed” affected a substantial right and was determined in a special proceeding. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the order overruling Appellant’s challenge to the garnishment did not affect a substantial right and therefore was not a final, appealable order. View "Shawn E. v. Diane S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iv), holding that Father failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the record evidence supported the court’s findings and discretionary determinations.On appeal, Father argued that his counsel’s withdrawal two months before the termination hearing amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding that Father did not demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s performance. View "In re Child of Stephen E." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not err in its parental unfitness and best interest determinations and that Father was not denied due process. The Court held (1) the district court did not err by determining that Father was unfit because he was unable to “meet his son’s special needs and take responsibility for him in a reasonable time to meet those needs” and to “protect his son from jeopardy in a reasonable time to meet his needs” and that termination was in the child’s best interest; and (2) Father was not denied due process. View "In re Child of James R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his child pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 22, 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii), holding that the court did not err in its parental unfitness and best interest determinations and that Father was not denied due process. The Court held (1) the district court did not err by determining that Father was unfit because he was unable to “meet his son’s special needs and take responsibility for him in a reasonable time to meet those needs” and to “protect his son from jeopardy in a reasonable time to meet his needs” and that termination was in the child’s best interest; and (2) Father was not denied due process. View "In re Child of James R." on Justia Law