Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court modifying the disposition of this case to terminate Petitioners' parental rights under W. Va. Code Ann. 49-4-604(c)(6), holding that the circuit court erred in modifying the disposition absent a motion under section 49-4-606 and that the parties were deprived of due process when they were not notified that the circuit court intended to take up a motion to modify disposition.In 2017, the circuit court ordered a "section 5" disposition, concluding that Petitioners were unwilling or unable to provide for B.W.'s needs and that there were no parenting services available specifically tailed to Petitioners' need for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213. The court did not terminate Petitioners' parental rights at that time but dismissed the case from its docket. In 2019, the circuit court held a status hearing and sua sponte modified the case's disposition to terminate Petitioners' parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that termination of Petitioners' parental rights violated the procedure required by section 49-4-606 to modify disposition and denied Petitioners due process. View "In re B.W." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of individual employees of the Clark County DFS and the County in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants wrongfully removed plaintiffs' infant daughter, M.M., from plaintiffs' home, wrongfully removed M.M. from her foster mother's home, and then placed her in a neglectful foster home that caused her death.The panel held that plaintiffs waived several appellate arguments where these arguments were either not raised before the district court, are inconsistent with positions employed there, or are presented without argument. The panel also held that each of plaintiffs' asserted factual disputes are either resolved by the record or are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on its claims. In this case, plaintiffs' third claim of failure to train has been waived whereas its fifth claim of state-law negligence was effectively dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to present a genuine dispute that M.M. was wrongfully removed from their home or that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly decided the question of causation for the state negligence claim as a matter of law rather than a matter of fact, and that plaintiffs waived their wrongful death claim. View "Momox-Caselis v. Donohue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice a complaint for protection from abuse that Plaintiff brought on behalf of her three minor children against the children's father (Father), holding that due process did not require that the court dismiss this matter with prejudice.After Plaintiff filed her complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of her children, Father was arrested. Father's bail conditions prohibited contact between Father and the children. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice given that Father's bail conditions protected the children. The court denied Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that it did not have the discretion to grant Plaintiff's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that due process and Me. Rev. Stat. 4006(1) required it to either hold the hearing as scheduled or dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the court had the authority and discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. View "Doe v. Hills-Pettitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 is unconstitutionally underinclusive as applied to indigent parents facing the loss of their parental rights in probate court and that indigent parents are entitled to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court as a matter of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 2.Petitioners filed petitions in the probate court to adopt Mother's two children. Mother filed a request for appointed counsel, which the probate court denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Mother's request for appointed counsel, concluding that equal protection and due process guarantees are inapplicable to requests for appointed counsel in adoption causes brought by private petitioners. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disparate treatment between indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in a custody proceeding in juvenile court, who are entitled to appointed counsel, and indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in an adoption proceeding in probate court, who are not entitled to appointed counsel, violates equal protection guarantees. View "In re Adoption of Y.E.F." on Justia Law

In November 1999, the SSA filed a dependency petition on behalf of plaintiff and her sister against their parents. The juvenile dependency court assumed jurisdiction over the children, but permitted them to remain in their mother's custody and to have supervised visitation with their father. In February 2000, the dependency court ordered that the children be removed from mother's custody. In 2001, mother filed an action in California superior court alleging that Orange County social workers violated her constitutional right to familial association. The jury returned verdicts in favor of mother against all defendants except one. Plaintiff filed this 2013 federal action alleging that defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association and her Fourth Amendment right against wrongful seizure.The Ninth Circuit held that where constitutional familial rights are at stake, there are identical companionship rights between a parent and child that could allow a plaintiff to invoke issue preclusion to bar relitigation of issues previously decided. However, in this case, plaintiff cannot assert issue preclusion because mother litigated more than just the overlapping companionship rights in her state court case and the panel cannot determine the basis for the jury's verdict. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish that the issues litigated in the prior state proceeding were identical to the issues raised in her federal case. View "Hardwick v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Appellant's parental rights, holding that the district court violated Appellant's due process rights when it determined the best interests of the child without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.The district court found that the Department of Family Services established statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, Appellant argued that he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the question of whether termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court held (1) neither the termination statutes nor Wyoming case law require a separate hearing to determine the best interests of the child; but (2) Appellant's due process rights were violated when he was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the question of best interests. View "Niland v. State, ex rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the County and DCFS violated plaintiff's due process and privacy rights by maintaining unfounded child abuse allegations against plaintiff in California's Child Welfare Services Case Management System (CWS/CMS) without providing him notice or a hearing to challenge them.The panel held that the County has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in CWS/CMS—even those that result in "unfounded" dispositions—because doing so helps its child welfare and law enforcement agencies protect children from abuse and neglect. In this case, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that the records of his "unfounded" allegations in CWS/CMS caused him reputational harm, or that they are used by the County to alter or extinguish his rights to employment, child placement, or child visitation. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show that his inclusion in CWS/CMS implicates his liberty interests so as to require procedural due process. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the County publicly disseminates or misuses his information in a manner that would violate his constitutional right to privacy. View "Endy v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the strict compliance requirement of section 110 of Utah's Adoption Act, which permits a district court to terminate parental rights if the parent does not "fully and strictly comply" with the statutory requirements, as applied to Mother, is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's compelling interest in prompt adoption proceedings.Mother gave birth to Child in 2010. Sometime thereafter, Child went to live with Adoptive Parents. In 2015, Adoptive Parents filed an adoption petition and served notice of the proceeding on Mother. The notice informed Mother that she had thirty days to file a motion to intervene or she would forfeit her parental rights in Child and would be barred from participating in the adoption proceeding. Mother attempted to intervene, but the district court struck her filing due to a procedural deficiency in the document and barred her from participating in the adoption proceeding. Mother filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking relief from the order to strike, which district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mother's substantive due process rights were violated because section 110's strict compliance requirement is not narrowly tailored. View "In re K.T.B." on Justia Law

New Hope Family Services, a voluntary and privately funded Christian ministry devoted to providing adoption services, filed suit alleging that OCFS violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by advising New Hope that it either had to change its policy of not recommending adoptions by unmarried or same-sex couples or close its operation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied New Hope's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.The court held that the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to New Hope, state plausible claims under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the Constitution because they (a) raise a plausible suspicion that OCFS acted with hostility towards New Hope because of the latter's religious beliefs, (b) plausibly allege that New Hope would be compelled to speak or associate in violation of those beliefs if the regulation in question were enforced, and (c) do not permit a court to conclude as a matter of law that New Hope's speech equates to government speech merely because New York State has authorized New Hope to provide adoption services.The court also held that this case is not analogous to Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020), now pending before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, because New Hope's Free Exercise and Free Speech claims should not have been dismissed, the court held that its motion for a preliminary injunction was not moot and should not have been denied on that ground. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed New Hope's Free Exercise and Free Speech claims, and vacated the judgment insofar as it denied New Hope's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment entered in favor of Rand in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, alleging that Rand unlawfully fired her for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The court affirmed and agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Rand's justification for the termination was false and merely a pretext for retaliation. In this case, Rand presented a lawful explanation for firing plaintiff: performance problems. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a former employee's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. View "Fry v. Rand Construction Corp." on Justia Law