Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to Child, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The Wyoming Department of Family Services filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, but Mother failed timely to respond. The clerk of the district court proceeded to enter default against Mother. On appeal, Mother argued that the district court violated her due process rights by holding the evidentiary default hearing by video conference and by not giving her a meaningful chance to be heard regarding Child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mother's due process rights were not violated when the district court held the default hearing by video conference or when it limited Mother's participation at the hearing. View "Herden v. State, ex rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the county court determining that it lacked authority to permit adoption by a same-sex married couple, holding that the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-101 permits a same-sex married couple to adopt a minor child.Kelly and Maria filed a petition to adopt Yasmin. The county court denied the request, determining that it did not have the authority to permit adoption by a "wife and wife." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to permit a same-sex married couple to adopt a child. View "In re Adoption of Yasmin S." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court determined that the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations, qualified immunity, and lack of standing. The district court also dismissed some claims for failure to state a claim.The court concluded that, under both federal and Connecticut law, the issue at the core of the parties' dispute is whether DCF reasonably accommodated plaintiffs' actual or perceived disabilities in providing services and programs to assist their reunification with their children. The court explained that the issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined by Connecticut courts. Therefore, the district court correctly granted DCF's motion to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds. The court did not reach the merits of the parties' arguments regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Connecticut's statute of limitations, or plaintiffs' standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. View "Watley v. Department of Children and Families" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court that denied Petitioner's appeal of an order of the family court modifying an infant guardianship order to prohibit Petitioner from having any contact with his child, J.B., holding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the family court erred by failing to give him adequate notice or the opportunity to be heard at the final hearing in this matter. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's final order, holding that Petitioner was not afforded his due process rights as the father of J.B. when he was not afforded the opportunity to refute the family court's assumption that he was unfit to have contact with his child. The Court remanded this case for a full evidentiary hearing before the family court. View "David C. v. Tammy S." on Justia Law

When Indiana officials determine that a child is suffering abuse or neglect, they initiate the Child in Need of Services (CHIN) process. Lawyers are automatically appointed for parents but not for children in the CHINS process. The plaintiffs, children in the CHINS process, claimed that they are entitled to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing “Younger” abstention. While declining to decide that Younger would mandate abstention in all CHINS cases, the court reasoned that principles of comity entitle states to make their own decisions. Because children are not automatically entitled to lawyers, as opposed to the sort of adult assistance that Indiana routinely provides, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to resolve the appointment-of-counsel question in any of the 10 plaintiffs’ state proceedings. A state judge may decide to appoint counsel or may explain why counsel is unnecessary. View "Nicole K. v. Stigdon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court modifying the disposition of this case to terminate Petitioners' parental rights under W. Va. Code Ann. 49-4-604(c)(6), holding that the circuit court erred in modifying the disposition absent a motion under section 49-4-606 and that the parties were deprived of due process when they were not notified that the circuit court intended to take up a motion to modify disposition.In 2017, the circuit court ordered a "section 5" disposition, concluding that Petitioners were unwilling or unable to provide for B.W.'s needs and that there were no parenting services available specifically tailed to Petitioners' need for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213. The court did not terminate Petitioners' parental rights at that time but dismissed the case from its docket. In 2019, the circuit court held a status hearing and sua sponte modified the case's disposition to terminate Petitioners' parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that termination of Petitioners' parental rights violated the procedure required by section 49-4-606 to modify disposition and denied Petitioners due process. View "In re B.W." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of individual employees of the Clark County DFS and the County in an action brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that defendants wrongfully removed plaintiffs' infant daughter, M.M., from plaintiffs' home, wrongfully removed M.M. from her foster mother's home, and then placed her in a neglectful foster home that caused her death.The panel held that plaintiffs waived several appellate arguments where these arguments were either not raised before the district court, are inconsistent with positions employed there, or are presented without argument. The panel also held that each of plaintiffs' asserted factual disputes are either resolved by the record or are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact on its claims. In this case, plaintiffs' third claim of failure to train has been waived whereas its fifth claim of state-law negligence was effectively dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiffs fail to present a genuine dispute that M.M. was wrongfully removed from their home or that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly decided the question of causation for the state negligence claim as a matter of law rather than a matter of fact, and that plaintiffs waived their wrongful death claim. View "Momox-Caselis v. Donohue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice a complaint for protection from abuse that Plaintiff brought on behalf of her three minor children against the children's father (Father), holding that due process did not require that the court dismiss this matter with prejudice.After Plaintiff filed her complaint for protection from abuse on behalf of her children, Father was arrested. Father's bail conditions prohibited contact between Father and the children. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice given that Father's bail conditions protected the children. The court denied Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that it did not have the discretion to grant Plaintiff's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred as a matter of law when it determined that due process and Me. Rev. Stat. 4006(1) required it to either hold the hearing as scheduled or dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that, pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the court had the authority and discretion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. View "Doe v. Hills-Pettitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 is unconstitutionally underinclusive as applied to indigent parents facing the loss of their parental rights in probate court and that indigent parents are entitled to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court as a matter of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio Const. art. I, 2.Petitioners filed petitions in the probate court to adopt Mother's two children. Mother filed a request for appointed counsel, which the probate court denied. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Mother's request for appointed counsel, concluding that equal protection and due process guarantees are inapplicable to requests for appointed counsel in adoption causes brought by private petitioners. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disparate treatment between indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in a custody proceeding in juvenile court, who are entitled to appointed counsel, and indigent parents faced with losing parental rights in an adoption proceeding in probate court, who are not entitled to appointed counsel, violates equal protection guarantees. View "In re Adoption of Y.E.F." on Justia Law

In November 1999, the SSA filed a dependency petition on behalf of plaintiff and her sister against their parents. The juvenile dependency court assumed jurisdiction over the children, but permitted them to remain in their mother's custody and to have supervised visitation with their father. In February 2000, the dependency court ordered that the children be removed from mother's custody. In 2001, mother filed an action in California superior court alleging that Orange County social workers violated her constitutional right to familial association. The jury returned verdicts in favor of mother against all defendants except one. Plaintiff filed this 2013 federal action alleging that defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association and her Fourth Amendment right against wrongful seizure.The Ninth Circuit held that where constitutional familial rights are at stake, there are identical companionship rights between a parent and child that could allow a plaintiff to invoke issue preclusion to bar relitigation of issues previously decided. However, in this case, plaintiff cannot assert issue preclusion because mother litigated more than just the overlapping companionship rights in her state court case and the panel cannot determine the basis for the jury's verdict. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish that the issues litigated in the prior state proceeding were identical to the issues raised in her federal case. View "Hardwick v. County of Orange" on Justia Law