Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the involuntary conservatorship action underlying this case, Daniel Gross was placed in the locked ward of Grove Manor Nursing Home. Jonathan Newman was appointed by the probate court to represent Gross in the action, and Kathleen Donovan was appointed as conservator. The superior court granted Gross's petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that the conservatorship was void ab initio. Gross subsequently brought a complaint in U.S. District Court, asserting state and federal civil rights claims. The court dismissed it as to all defendants, finding, in relevant part, that Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor were entitled to immunity because they were serving the judicial process. On appeal, the U.S. court of appeals submitted certified questions regarding Connecticut law to the Supreme Court. The Court held (1) absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to a conservator appointed by the probate court only when the conservator is executing an order of the probate court or the conservator's actions are ratified by the probate court; (2) absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to attorneys appointed to represent respondents in conservatorship proceedings or conservatees; and (3) the function of nursing homes caring for conservatees does not entitle them to quasi-judicial immunity under any circumstances.

Orlando Pecpec was charged in the family court with twenty-five counts of violation of an order for protection in relation to twenty-five voicemails and text messages he allegedly sent to his former spouse. The jury found PecPec guilty on nineteen counts. Pecpec challenged his convictions on eight counts, arguing they were obtained in violation of his right to an unanimous verdict because the jury was not specifically instructed that it was required to unanimously agree to the specific act that supported each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Mundon, the family court was required to give a specific unanimity instruction in the circumstances of the instant case; but (2) the family court's error in this case was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Pecpec was convicted on less than a unanimous verdict.

The issue in this case was whether a trial court constitutionally erred in denying Father's last-minute request to provide his testimony by telephone from Georgia in a Kansas hearing to terminate Father's parental rights. The trial court held that without this testimony, Father failed to rebut the presumption of his parental unfitness established by the State's evidence. Father's parental rights therefore were terminated. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling denied Father of procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the panel majority and affirmed the trial court on slightly different grounds, holding that Father failed to establish that his testimony by telephone was warranted, as Father was given appropriate notice of the time, place, and purpose of his parental rights termination hearing and an opportunity to appear there and be heard in a meaningful manner.

The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging T.N. was a child in need of services (CHINS) and requested that T.N. be removed from Father's care. Father objected to removal. A fact-finding hearing was subsequently held, at which time Mother notified the tribal court that she was prepared to make an admission to the CHINS allegations. Father objected. The tribal court told Father he could offer his objections at a contested dispositional hearing. The trial court then found T.N. to be a CHINS. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court violated Father's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that for the reasons explained in In re K.D., also decided on this day, the trial court erred in not conducting a fact-finding hearing that was requested by Father, and thus, the court violated Father's due process rights.

Mother and Stepfather lived with Mother's two children. The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that K.D. and K.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted the children were CHINS, but Stepfather denied the allegations. After Stepfather requested a fact-finding hearing, the trial court converted the contested fact-finding hearing scheduled for Stepfather into a contested dispositional hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the children were in need of services. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Stepfather was denied due process by not receiving a fact-finding hearing. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and held that a parent who requests a contested fact-finding hearing has a due process right to that hearing, and whenever a trial court is confronted with one parent wishing to make an admission that a child is in need of services and the other parent wishing to deny the same, the trial court shall conduct a fact-finding hearing as to the entire matter. Remanded.

Tennessee law mandates mediation in certain contested divorce proceedings. Now-Judge Martin was appointed and performed mediation in plaintiff's divorce as part of his private legal practice. The divorce was granted, allowing wife to take the children to Japan during vacations but requiring her to live within 100 miles of husband. Husband believed that wife planned to abduct the children to her native Japan, petitioned to modify the parenting plan, and sought a restraining order. The hearing, initially assigned to another, was re-assigned to Judge Martin. The parties agreed to have Judge Martin hear the motion, despite the judge raising the issue. Judge Martin ruled in favor of wife, who subsequently took the children out of the U.S. with no apparent intent to return. Husband was awarded full custody; wife was charged with felony custodial interference. Husband filed suit against Martin as both judge and mediator; the law firm as his employer; and a court-ordered parental coordinator, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law negligence and contract theories. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The parents of a developmentally disabled adult woman appealed a superior court's decision to appoint a public guardian, rather than the parents, as the woman's legal guardian. The superior court found that the parents failed to take advantage of resources available for the daughter's development and did not support the daughter's contact with extended family. On appeal, the parents argued that they should have been appointed as guardians and that the appointment of a public guardian, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to serve as guardians, violated their constitutional right to parent their child. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the public guardian, and because the superior court's action did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects.

The district court terminated Father's parental rights to his three children after finding by clear and convincing evidence that he was incarcerated for a felony conviction and was unfit to have the custody and control of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not plainly err when it allowed a police report and the testimony of the officer who wrote the report into evidence; (2) the district court did not plainly err when it allowed into evidence the officer's testimony regarding the credibility of a victim's statement; and (3) Mother presented clear and convincing evidence that Father was unfit to have the custody and control of his children.

Husband and Wife filed for divorce. During the dissolution proceeding, a guardian ad litem (GAL), who was appointed for the parties' two daughters, recommended co-parenting with equal visitation by both parents. At the final hearing, the parties stipulated to the district court that they had reached agreement on a final parenting plan. They also agreed that no child support or maintenance would be paid to either party. The district court took judicial notice of the GAL's recommendations. Subsequently, and prior to dissolution, the GAL revised her recommendations and recommended that Husband be the children's primary residential parent with Wife having visitation rights. The court adopted the GAL's custody recommendation and also ordered Wife to pay Husband child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GAL's revised plan constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in relying upon the hearsay evidence in order to determine the matter of child custody. Remanded.

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child.