Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Husband and Wife filed for divorce. During the dissolution proceeding, a guardian ad litem (GAL), who was appointed for the parties' two daughters, recommended co-parenting with equal visitation by both parents. At the final hearing, the parties stipulated to the district court that they had reached agreement on a final parenting plan. They also agreed that no child support or maintenance would be paid to either party. The district court took judicial notice of the GAL's recommendations. Subsequently, and prior to dissolution, the GAL revised her recommendations and recommended that Husband be the children's primary residential parent with Wife having visitation rights. The court adopted the GAL's custody recommendation and also ordered Wife to pay Husband child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GAL's revised plan constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in relying upon the hearsay evidence in order to determine the matter of child custody. Remanded.

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child.

This appeal arose when the People of California adopted Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. At issue was whether this amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court declined to address the more general questions presented to it concerning the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The court concluded that, through the proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power. Accordingly, the proponents possessed Article III standing to prosecute this appeal from the district court's judgment invalidating Proposition 8. However, the court concluded that the People could not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. By using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without legitimate reasons for doing so, the People violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional on this ground and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion by the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to vacate the judgment entered by former Chief Judge Walker, on the basis of his purported interest in being allowed to marry his same-sex partner.

Raymond Cloutier appealed from a judgment entered in the district court granting Robin Turner's motion to enforce the child support provisions of a 1992 amended divorce judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) Turner had standing to bring the motion even though the children were above the ages of eighteen because, although the obligation to provide future support ends when the child reaches majority, liability for arrearages does not terminate then; (2) where child-support arrearages are considered money judgments and there is no statute of limitations for money judgments, Turner's claim of overdue child support was not time-barred; (3) the court's failure to apply the statute of limitations did not deprive Cloutier of his constitutional right of equal protection because Cloutier was not treated any differently than fathers who are subject to child support enforcement stemming from a paternity action; and (4) Cloutier failed to make the showing necessary to establish the defense of laches.

After Appellant was charged with criminal nonsupport, he filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had been held in criminal contempt for nonpayment of child support, and therefore, the State was precluded from prosecuting him for the same conduct based on double-jeopary grounds. The circuit court found that Appellant had been held in criminal contempt for an arrearage that had accrued through 2003, and therefore, the State was barred from prosecuting Appellant criminally for nonpayment that occurred prior to that date. The State subsequently amended its information charging Appellant with criminal nonsupport by calculating his arrearage from 2003 until 2010. Appellant filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that criminal nonsupport was a continuing offense and that the state was constitutionally prohibited from punishment Appellant multiple times for nonpayment. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that criminal nonsupport was not a continuing offense and that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not not prosecution of Appellant for any arrearage accruing after 2003. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's prior contempt proceedings did not present a double-jeopardy bar to the State's prosecution for criminal nonsupport in this instance.

Plaintiff and his children (plaintiffs) brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against defendants for damages resulting from plaintiff's unlawful arrest. Plaintiff was arrested as he stood outside a fair selling promotional tickets for $5 that he had received for free from a radio station. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court agreed with the district court that there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff and his right to be free from unlawful arrest was violated. The court held, however, that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity for an unlawful arrest was reversed where all reasonably competent officers would have agreed that plaintiff was not committing a crime because there was no scalping law in Nevada; it was simply not a crime to sell tickets to a fair; plaintiff's t-shirt, which had the logo of the radio station, did not suggest fraud; and the ticket buyers were not duped by the sale. The court also held that plaintiffs' substantive due process right to family integrity was not violated where the facts of the case did not come close to rising to the level of conduct that shocked the conscience. Because the court concluded that plaintiffs' right to family integrity was not violated, the court need not reach the question of whether the deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for the violation of the right to family integrity.

Plaintiff Katherine Winters filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of an asserted right to the care and custody of her biological grandchildren. She named the State of Kansas, the state Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, social workers and their supervisors and the state court judge who ruled on the "Child in Need of Care" (CINC) matter relating to all three children and the adoption proceeding of her grandson "C.W.," as well as a prosecutor, guardian ad litem and court-appointed special advocates. Plaintiff requested remedies including declaratory and injunctive relief voiding state-court placement and adoption orders, plus compensatory damages of $67 million and punitive damages. The district court dismissed the action, and Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in its determinations on subject-matter jurisdiction, defendants’ immunity, and the sufficiency of her complaint. Her fundamental argument was that the district court failed to give proper consideration to her claim of a constitutional right to the custody and care of C.W. Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal and the appellate briefs in the light of the governing law, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis of Plaintiff's claims. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court.

A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes's conviction. Subsequently, Barnes petitioned for rehearing, which the Supreme Court granted. At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that Barnes, a suspected spouse abuser, had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter his residence was legally unjustified. The Court continued to affirm Barnes's conviction, holding that the Castle Doctrine, which authorizes a person to use reasonable force against another person to prevent the unlawful entry of his dwelling, is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police officer.

Leslie Todd gave birth to a female child while incarcerated. Lucretia Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian. Approximately two years later, Copeland filed a petition to adopt the child without the consent of Todd pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1202(H). The circuit court granted Copeland's petition, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as required by section 63.2-1202(H), and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests under Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1203 and -1205. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the final decree of adoption, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's consent to the adoption was not necessary under section 36.2-1202(H), but (2) the court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated Todd's constitutional rights under sections 63.2-1203 and -1205 as the circuit court gave adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights and Todd's equal protection rights were not violated.

This case arose out of a dispute between plaintiff and her ex-husband over the education and custody of their three minor children. Plaintiff sued City Defendants, alleging that they unlawfully impeded her access to the children. Plaintiff sued the School District Defendants, asserting that they unlawfully denied her access to the children and their education records. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the City Defendants for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for the School District Defendants. The court held that the fact that plaintiff lived in a different state did not suffice to convert the loss of a single three-hour visit into a deprivation of a fundamental right for purposes of substantive due process and, even if plaintiff could show a deprivation, the City Defendants' alleged conduct would not shock the conscience. The court also held that plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim against the City Defendants, given the relatively minimal deprivation alleged in this case, where the post-deprivation procedures were adequate to protect her rights to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The court further held that plaintiff had no fundamental liberty interest in contacting her children at their schools and the court agreed with the district court that an attendance clerk's one-time refusal to tell plaintiff why one of the children had been absent from school, a coach's referral of plaintiff to her ex-husband for information about the children's swimming activities, and the school's refusal to send plaintiff all of the school's projects she requested did not amount to a deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest. Given the limited nature of any infringement of plaintiff's protected liberty interest, the procedures at issue were sufficient to protect plaintiff's right to procedural due process. The court finally held that plaintiff's right, as a non-custodial parent, under state law and her role in the children's lives vary significantly from the rights and role afforded to the ex-husband or to a typical married parent. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants with respect to her equal protection claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.