Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Intervenor appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff sued as surviving spouse of a same-sex couple that was married in Canada in 2007 and was resident in New York at the time of her spouse's death in 2009. Plaintiff was denied the benefit of the spousal deduction for federal estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. 2056(A) solely because Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. 7, defined the words "marriage" and "spouse" in federal law in a way that barred the IRS from recognizing plaintiff as a spouse or the couple as married. The court held that plaintiff had standing in this action; plaintiff's suit was not foreclosed by Baker v. Nelson; Section 3 of DOMA was subject to intermediate scrutiny under the factors enumerated in City of Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Center, and other cases; and the statute did not withstand that review because it violated equal protection and was therefore unconstitutional. View "Windsor v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the decree entered by the circuit court granting the petition of Appellees, Appellant's parents, to adopt Appellant's daughter. On appeal, Appellant contended that the circuit court erred in denying her request for the appointment of counsel because, as an indigent, she was entitled to appointed counsel in a private adoption proceeding under both the federal and state Constitutions. She also argued that the circuit court's findings in support of the adoption were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument was not preserved for appeal; (2) the circuit court correctly found that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not necessary; and (3) the circuit court's finding that the adoption was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous. View "Lucas v. Jones" on Justia Law

The district court gave a pro se inmate notice of the court's intent to dismiss the inmate's marital dissolution proceeding but identified two ways of avoiding dismissal. The inmate timely performed one of the court's specified actions. Despite this compliance and without explanation, the court dismissed the inmate's complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because the prison previously had denied the inmate transportation and telephone access to the court, the inmate would be unable to attend any hearing no matter how many motions he made. The Supreme Court reversed where (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's complaint without explanation even though the inmate did what the court instructed, and (2) the court of appeals erred in basing its decision on predictions of future events. Remanded. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appeal involving parental rights, the court previously published an opinion on a related issue in Mueller v. Auker and that opinion has the facts giving rise to this case. Here, the court held that Detective Rogers, along with Officers Snyder and Green, were entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit; the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Fourth Amendment claim; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the proffered testimony of Dr. Peter Rosen pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or in denying the Muellers' motion on this issue for a new trial; and the district court did not err in dismissing the Muellers' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against St. Luke's without leave to amend, because it was clear that amendment would be futile. The court addressed the remaining challenges and subsequently affirmed the judgment. View "Mueller, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Birth mother N.S. (Mother) and birth father K.R. (Father) appealed a district court order that terminated their parental rights to their four-year-old twin daughters, T.R. 1 and T.R. 2. Mother also appealed the District Court’s order denying her a new trial. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights; (2) whether the District Court erred in finding it was in the children’s best interests to terminate those rights; (3) whether the District Court erred in finding the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; (4) whether the District Court adequately addressed the appropriateness of the treatment plans in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Furthermore, Mother asserted that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her a new trial based on new evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence in the record to support the District Court’s findings that the conditions rendering Mother and Father unfit were unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. "It [was] manifest on the face of the briefs and the record that there was not an abuse of discretion."

Father filed for divorce from Mother. In that proceeding, the parties contested physical and legal custody of their daughters. Prior to the merits hearing, a circuit court judge ordered preparation by court-related personnel a custody investigation report to evaluate the custodial abilities of each parent. The report was completed one week before the merits hearing, and Mother's counsel was able to review the report for only ninety minutes. As a consequence, Mother's attorney moved to exclude the report. The circuit court denied the motion. The judge then granted a divorce and awarded custody of the children to Father with visitation to Mother. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court's unwritten policy that limits counsel of record in child custody proceedings to viewing custody investigation reports only in person in the clerk's office during normal business hours was viable. Without affirming or reversing, the Court of Appeals remanded for supplementation of the record as to the full contours of the relevant policy.

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them.

Kathleen Marez sued her former employer, Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc. for unlawful termination. Marez claimed that Saint-Gobain retaliated against her in violation of the family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and that Saint-Gobain committed gender discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). A jury returned a verdict in Marez's favor on the FMLA claim and in Saint-Gobain's favor on the gender discrimination claim. The district court awarded Marez liquidated damages and part of her requested attorneys' fees. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in Marez's favor; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding liquidated damages, as Saint-Gobain was liable for employment discrimination under the cat's-paw theory of liability, and liquidated damages may be awarded in eligible FMLA cases premised on cat's-paw liability; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorneys' fees.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, G4S Youth Services, LLC, and her supervisor, Todd Speight (Appellees), on Appellant's claims that they terminated her employment based on her race, age, and use of family medical leave. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether G4S's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment was merely a pretext for intentional race of age discrimination, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellant's race and age discrimination claims; and (2) because Appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether G4S retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Appellant's Family and Medical Leave Act claims.

The Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota, along with two intervening crisis pregnancy centers and two of their personnel appealed the district court's permanent injunction barring enforcement of a South Dakota statute requiring the disclosure to patients seeking abortions of an "increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide" and the underlying grant of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and its medical director Dr. Carol Ball. The district court found that this advisory would unduly burden abortion rights and would violate physicians' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that on its face, the suicide advisory presented neither an undue burden on abortion rights nor a violation of physicians' free speech rights.