Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Hickman County, received a referral regarding allegations of abuse concerning the Andrews. A social worker was attempting to make contact when DCS received a second referral concerning the Andrews. Due to references to guns in the home and because the site visit was to be carried out at night, DCSs requested law enforcement to assist. The Sheriff’s Department dispatched two officers. Andrews was outside working when the group arrived and asked the officers to wait outside while he called the sheriff’s office. The Andrews claim that when Mr. Andrews opened the door, he was immediately followed into the house by a “whoosh of presence.” The Andrews claim that they granted permission for interviews of the children because they feared arrest or losing their children. The officers left the house and the Andrews acquiesced to the walk-through. No charges were filed and the assessment was closed as “no services indicated.” The Andrews filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the social workers, but affirmed with respect to an officer. View "Andrews v. Hickman County" on Justia Law

Appellant, the biological father of Baby Girl T., challenged the district court's determination of his rights as a birth father and its grant of a motion in limine preventing his presentation of evidence. The court concluded that Appellant did not comply with the provisions of the Utah Adoption Act and therefore waived the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of Baby Girl T., as well as the right to refuse to consent to her adoption. It also barred Appellant from presenting evidence that the reason he failed to comply with requirements of the Act was because state employees negligently failed to register his notice of paternity proceedings prior to the birth mother's execution of a consent to adoption. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Act was constitutionally defective as applied to Appellant and deprived him of a meaningful chance to preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. View "In re Baby Girl T" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Ann and Greg Elwell were in the process of adopting T.S., a young boy who had been in their care almost his entire life. But approximately one month after a complaint of emotional abuse of another child in the Elwells' care, state officials withdrew the license allowing the Elwells to care for T.S. and removed him from their home without any advance notice. Despite a state court's finding that the agency acted wrongfully in removing the boy, he was never returned to them. The Elwells brought suit against several state officials involved in the removal under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that qualified immunity did not shield the state officials from liability. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the defendants violated the Elwells' Due Process rights when they removed T.S. without notice. However, despite the Court's sympathy for the Elwells' plight, the Court concluded that this violation was not clearly established in the case law at the time of T.S.'s removal. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment. View "Elwell, et al v. Byers, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider how to interpret Kentucky's grandparent-visitation statute consistently with the constitutional principles articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, Troxel v. Granville, and whether the trial court in this case appropriately interceded to grant the grandmother visitation with the child despite the objection of the child's mother. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant, holding (1) a grandparent petitioning for child visitation contrary to the wishes of the child's parent can overcome the presumption that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of the child only with clear and convincing evidence that granting visitation to the grandparent is in the child's best interest; and (2) the trial court here, in granting visitation to the grandmother, relied on pre-Troxel case law that inappropriately placed grandparents on equal footing with parents when determining visitation. Remanded. View "Walker v. Blair" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an indigent parent whose sentence for civil contempt at a previous hearing for failure to pay child support was suspended on condition that he comply with his child-support obligations for a year, has a right to appointed counsel at a subsequent hearing on a motion to impose the suspended sentence due to noncompliance with the conditions. The court of appeals (1) concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply at the hearing, as it was civil in nature, and (2) declined to create a categorical rule that indigent parties previously represented by counsel at a contempt hearing have a due process right to appointed counsel at later purge hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because a purge hearing does not amount to a new contempt proceeding, a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has purged himself of civil contempt is a civil proceeding; and (2) the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions do not guarantee an indigent parent the right to appointed counsel at a civil-contempt purge hearing. View "Liming v. Damos" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Intervenor appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff sued as surviving spouse of a same-sex couple that was married in Canada in 2007 and was resident in New York at the time of her spouse's death in 2009. Plaintiff was denied the benefit of the spousal deduction for federal estate taxes under 26 U.S.C. 2056(A) solely because Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. 7, defined the words "marriage" and "spouse" in federal law in a way that barred the IRS from recognizing plaintiff as a spouse or the couple as married. The court held that plaintiff had standing in this action; plaintiff's suit was not foreclosed by Baker v. Nelson; Section 3 of DOMA was subject to intermediate scrutiny under the factors enumerated in City of Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Center, and other cases; and the statute did not withstand that review because it violated equal protection and was therefore unconstitutional. View "Windsor v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the decree entered by the circuit court granting the petition of Appellees, Appellant's parents, to adopt Appellant's daughter. On appeal, Appellant contended that the circuit court erred in denying her request for the appointment of counsel because, as an indigent, she was entitled to appointed counsel in a private adoption proceeding under both the federal and state Constitutions. She also argued that the circuit court's findings in support of the adoption were clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument was not preserved for appeal; (2) the circuit court correctly found that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not necessary; and (3) the circuit court's finding that the adoption was in the child's best interest was not clearly erroneous. View "Lucas v. Jones" on Justia Law

The district court gave a pro se inmate notice of the court's intent to dismiss the inmate's marital dissolution proceeding but identified two ways of avoiding dismissal. The inmate timely performed one of the court's specified actions. Despite this compliance and without explanation, the court dismissed the inmate's complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because the prison previously had denied the inmate transportation and telephone access to the court, the inmate would be unable to attend any hearing no matter how many motions he made. The Supreme Court reversed where (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the inmate's complaint without explanation even though the inmate did what the court instructed, and (2) the court of appeals erred in basing its decision on predictions of future events. Remanded. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appeal involving parental rights, the court previously published an opinion on a related issue in Mueller v. Auker and that opinion has the facts giving rise to this case. Here, the court held that Detective Rogers, along with Officers Snyder and Green, were entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit; the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Fourth Amendment claim; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the proffered testimony of Dr. Peter Rosen pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or in denying the Muellers' motion on this issue for a new trial; and the district court did not err in dismissing the Muellers' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against St. Luke's without leave to amend, because it was clear that amendment would be futile. The court addressed the remaining challenges and subsequently affirmed the judgment. View "Mueller, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law