Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and as parents and next friends of C.S., A.S., and J.S., brought suit against the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their procedural due process rights stemming from their child-protection case. Plaintiffs' complaint related to the notice and hearing requirement of an emergency protective custody hearing. The court concluded that the County lacked any policymaking authority regarding the handling and scheduling of the EPC hearing and formal hearing. Plaintiffs' complaint essentially alleged that Minnesota law, and the state court judge's application of that law - not an independent County policy - caused the procedural due process violations. The County could not be liable to plaintiffs under section 1983 for the violation of their procedural due process rights based on the allegations contained in the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slaven, et al v. Engstrom, et al" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced by decree. Husband appealed, claiming that the district court (1) abused its discretion in imputing his monthly income and ordering him to pay child support for several months when he was living in the marital home after Wife filed for divorce and ordering him to pay half the cost of the children's past and future activities as an upward deviation of child support; and (2) deprived him of due process in making the above rulings without evidentiary support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Husband waived his right to assert these claims on appeal. View "Verheydt v. Verheydt" on Justia Law

Wife petitioned the district court for dissolution of her marriage to Husband, who was incarcerated. Husband proceeded as a self-represented litigant, and the district court allowed Husband to appear telephonically at all hearings. When the final pretrial conference was held, Husband did not appear telephonically. Unbeknownst to the district court, Husband was experiencing medical problems that required surgery and hospitalization. After Husband was released from the prison infirmary, he mailed a motion to the district court requesting a sixty-day continuance. The district court received the motion, but after Husband failed to appear at a hearing to consider the motion, the court entered a default decree and declared the parties' marriage dissolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under these extraordinary circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Husband's motion for a continuance. Remanded to allow Husband to appear at a final pretrial conference and trial. View "Eslick v. Eslick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former TDCJ employee, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for TDCJ on her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D), claims. Plaintiff's allergic reaction to the use of scented candles and wall plug-ins around her work area was the basis of her ADA claim. The court held that plaintiff did not suffer from a disability within the meaning and coverage of the ADA. Further, there was no dispute that TDCJ did not receive plaintiff's FMLA certification before the deadline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Milton v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice" on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the constitutional rights of a putative biological father who seeks an order of parentage when a court has already issued a parentage order determining the minor child's parents. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Vermont's parentage statute does not authorize a court to allow a second parentage action involving a particular child brought by or against a different putative parent unless constitutional considerations require the court to entertain the second parentage case. In this case, even if plaintiff was the genetic parent of the minor child, he did not have constitutionally-protected parental rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying plaintiff's motion for genetic testing and dismissed his complaint for establishment of parentage. View "Columbia v. Lawton" on Justia Law

Child was conceived in vitro using Father's sperm and Mother's egg. After Child was born, Father voluntarily signed an acknowledgment of paternity jointly with Mother pursuant to Va. Code 20-49.1(B)(2). The couple later separated, and Father filed a petition to determine parentage and establish custody and visitation, arguing that the acknowledgment of paternity created a final and binding parent-child legal status between Father and Child. Mother filed pleas in bar asserting that Father was barred from being Child's legal parent because he and Mother were never married and Child was conceived through assisted conception. The circuit court sustained the pleas in bar and dismissed the remainder of Father's petition seeking custody and visitation. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the assisted conception statute does not operate to divest individuals of the ability to establish parentage solely due to marital status under the circumstances presented in this case; (2) the assisted conception statute does not violate equal protection but, if not harmonized with another statute to allow unmarried fathers parentage of their children, would violate constitutional rights to due process; and (3) acknowledgments of paternity executed pursuant to section 20-49.1(B)(2) are enforceable. View "L.F. v. Breit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for her employer, the UPS, pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court held that plaintiff presented no direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the UPS policy at issue, that did not provide light duty work to pregnant workers but did for certain other employees, treated pregnant and nonpregnant workers alike and therefore complied with the PDA. Plaintiff also failed to offer sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Young v. UPS" on Justia Law

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law