Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant brought her seven-week-old son, John Doe, to a medical center for injuries. A jury later convicted Defendant of assault on a minor and aggravated assault. The district court ordered a change in parenting arrangements for John Doe as part of the criminal sentence despite pending dependency and neglect proceedings. As part of Defendant's sentence, the district court ordered Defendant to pay fees, costs, and surcharges without recording findings regarding Defendant's financial situation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant had regained custody of John Doe through the civil proceeding, her claim regarding the imposition of a condition concerning the temporary custody of John Doe was moot; however, the statement in the court's written judgment that the father should be presumed to have custody of John Doe should not have been included in the criminal sentence; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in imposing fees. View "State v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

After an adjudicatory hearing in this abuse and neglect case, Appellant was found to have neglected her three children. Appellant appealed, arguing that she was denied fundamental due process rights because the trial court declined to grant a motion to dismiss or to strike witnesses after claimed discovery violations by the State and because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of neglect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in dealing with the claimed discovery violations; (2) Appellant received due process; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of neglect. View "DL v. State, Dep't of Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint that her former employer discriminated against her after she became pregnant. At issue was whether direct estoppel barred a claim of pregnancy discrimination under state law when a jury found at trial that plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action regarding her claim of retaliation for exercising her right to maternity leave under federal law. The court concluded that the jury verdict against plaintiff's claim of retaliation estopped plaintiff from relitigating the common issue of whether she suffered an adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against plaintiff's claim of pregnancy discrimination. View "DuChateau v. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc." on Justia Law

After Mother gave birth to an infant alone at home, Boyfriend took Mother and the infant to the hospital. Medical staff noticed puncture wounds on the infant's back and notified the authorities. An ensuing investigation resulted in the removal of the infant from Mother's care. The county prosecutor subsequently petitioned the trial court for subpoenas to compel Mother and Boyfriend to give testimony relating to the home birth of the infant. The trial court issued the subpoenas. Before Mother and Boyfriend testified, their attorney moved to quash the subpoenas pursuant to their rights against self-incrimination. The court granted the motion. The trial court then granted the prosecutor's petition for use immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor was not authorized to request a grant of use immunity; and (2) where, as here, no charges have been filed and no grand jury has been convened, a prosecutor may subpoena witnesses pursuant to Ind. Code 33-39-1-4, but if those witnesses invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor cannot petition the court to grant them use immunity and compel them to testify without first filing charges or convening a grand jury. View "In re Prosecutor's Subpoena re S.H." on Justia Law

This case involved the adoption of a minor child, Sean, by his stepfather. William, the putative father of Sean, filed an objection to the stepparent adoption one day after the expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided by the show cause order issued by the circuit court. The trial court granted Stepfather's motion to strike William's untimely objection and directed that the adoption proceed as an uncontested matter, noting that William did not allege any circumstance to excuse his failure to timely file his objection. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) William's failure to file a timely objection constituted an irrevocable consent to the adoption of Sean; and (2) the deemed consent statutory scheme of the Maryland Family Law Article and the Maryland Rules does not offend due process. View "In re Adoption of Sean M." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and as parents and next friends of C.S., A.S., and J.S., brought suit against the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their procedural due process rights stemming from their child-protection case. Plaintiffs' complaint related to the notice and hearing requirement of an emergency protective custody hearing. The court concluded that the County lacked any policymaking authority regarding the handling and scheduling of the EPC hearing and formal hearing. Plaintiffs' complaint essentially alleged that Minnesota law, and the state court judge's application of that law - not an independent County policy - caused the procedural due process violations. The County could not be liable to plaintiffs under section 1983 for the violation of their procedural due process rights based on the allegations contained in the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slaven, et al v. Engstrom, et al" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced by decree. Husband appealed, claiming that the district court (1) abused its discretion in imputing his monthly income and ordering him to pay child support for several months when he was living in the marital home after Wife filed for divorce and ordering him to pay half the cost of the children's past and future activities as an upward deviation of child support; and (2) deprived him of due process in making the above rulings without evidentiary support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Husband waived his right to assert these claims on appeal. View "Verheydt v. Verheydt" on Justia Law

Wife petitioned the district court for dissolution of her marriage to Husband, who was incarcerated. Husband proceeded as a self-represented litigant, and the district court allowed Husband to appear telephonically at all hearings. When the final pretrial conference was held, Husband did not appear telephonically. Unbeknownst to the district court, Husband was experiencing medical problems that required surgery and hospitalization. After Husband was released from the prison infirmary, he mailed a motion to the district court requesting a sixty-day continuance. The district court received the motion, but after Husband failed to appear at a hearing to consider the motion, the court entered a default decree and declared the parties' marriage dissolved. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under these extraordinary circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Husband's motion for a continuance. Remanded to allow Husband to appear at a final pretrial conference and trial. View "Eslick v. Eslick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former TDCJ employee, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for TDCJ on her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D), claims. Plaintiff's allergic reaction to the use of scented candles and wall plug-ins around her work area was the basis of her ADA claim. The court held that plaintiff did not suffer from a disability within the meaning and coverage of the ADA. Further, there was no dispute that TDCJ did not receive plaintiff's FMLA certification before the deadline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Milton v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice" on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law