Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, W-G, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., after W-G terminated his employment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for W-G on the ADA claim, concluding that plaintiff was "currently engaging" in illegal drug use and was fired "on the basis of such use," and that plaintiff did not qualify for the safe harbor under section 12114(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of W-G on plaintiff's FMLA claim where no reasonable jury could find that he was denied reinstatement for any reason other than his refusal to continue his FMLA leave period for the express purpose for which it was taken, which was completing his drug dependency treatment. View "Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Jena is a 19-year-old with a genetic disorder that causes physical defects and severe mental disability. She apparently communicates at the level of a child between the ages of five and seven and has the social skills of a child between four and eight. She reportedly told a teacher that her mother, Suzanne, “hit me.” The Oakland County Sheriff’s Department and Adult Protective Services (defendants), part of the Michigan Department of Human Services investigated. APS obtained an order appointing a guardian for Jena and authorizing her removal from the family home to a group foster facility. The family alleges that the defendants gave false testimony that Jena’s father made sexual comments about Jena. Following allegedly assaultive behavior, the probate court entered an order temporarily denying the family contact with Jena. Ultimately, Jena’s father was granted full custody and charges against her mother were dropped. The district court dismissed the family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the court was the final decision-maker with respect to Jena’s custody. The court rejected substantive and procedural due process claims and a claim of violation of First Amendment right to family association. View "Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs." on Justia Law

A Juvenile Court standing order provided that social workers had authority to remove and provide temporary emergency care for children at imminent risk of serious physical or emotional harm and to request assistance by law enforcement officers. At a 2002 meeting, social workers determined that exigent circumstances required immediate removal of the children from Nancy’s home. A Temporary Emergency Care Order was completed in consultation with an assistant prosecuting attorney and a supervisor. A social worker, accompanied by police, went to Nancy’s home and took the children into temporary custody, and, the next day, filed a complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody, with a notarized document detailing supporting reasons. A magistrate found that probable cause existed to support removal. In November 2005, Nancy and the children sued the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, the social workers, and others. In 2010, the district court granted in part and denied in part the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, denied the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and granted the children partial summary judgment on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both absolute and qualified immunity. View "Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer alleging violations of her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The employer believed that plaintiff suffered from a serious health condition and placed her on involuntary FMLA leave. After plaintiff submitted certifications of her fitness to return to work, the employer informed her that she had exhausted her FMLA leave and terminated her employment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the employer's motion to dismiss where the statute entitled plaintiff to a certain amount of leave and her employer did not interfere with that entitlement. Further, the court concluded that plaintiff had no right to FMLA benefits where she admitted that she never suffered a serious health condition within the meaning of the Act. The court rejected defendant's claim of equitable estoppel where she did not establish a submissible case of detrimental reliance; and the employer's mistaken belief that plaintiff suffered a serious health condition could not entitle her to FMLA benefits. View "Walker v. Trinity Marine Products, et al." on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned to be appointed permanent guardians of their elderly uncle, Thomas Lankford. The district court dismissed the guardianship petition after finding Petitioners were not qualified to serve as guardians because their potential to inherit from Lankford created a disqualifying conflict of interest. Petitioners appealed, asserting (1) the district court erred in finding a conflict of interest, and (2) in the alternative, the guardianship conflict waiver statute, which allows a court of waive conflicts but limits that authority to conflicts of a spouse, adult child, parent, or sibling of a ward, violated their due process and equal protection rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding a conflict of interest; and (2) Petitioners' constitutional claims were not properly before the Court. View "Utley v. Lankford" on Justia Law

After Father tested positive three times for marijuana use in violation of conditions of probation, the Department of Health and Human Resources removed Father's son, T.B., from Father's care. Father was incarcerated for a third time during a reunification period with T.B., and the Department subsequently filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. Father moved for substitution of court-appointed counsel, which the district court denied on the grounds that the trial was to start in two days. After a three-week continuance, the trial was held, and the court terminated Father's parental rights. Father appealed, contending that he was denied due process when the district court did not, on its own initiative, inform him that he could proceed without counsel after denying his motion to dismiss his current counsel or his implicit motion to appoint new counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "In re T.B." on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Melissa and Heather Gartner were a married lesbian couple. Heather conceived a child using an anonymous sperm donor. The child was born during the spouses' marriage. The Gartners requested a birth certificate recognizing both Heather and Melissa as the child's parents. The Department of Public Health refused to place the name of the nonbirthing spouse in a lesbian marriage on the birth certificate without the spouse first adopting the child. The district court ordered the Department to issue the Gartners a birth certificate listing both spouses as parents but did not require the Department to extend the same practice to other married lesbian couples. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Iowa Code 144.13(2), Iowa's presumption of parentage statute, violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution because it allows for only "the name of the husband" to appear on the birth certificate; and (2) accordingly, the Department must presumptively list on a child's birth certificate the nonbirthing spouse in a lesbian marriage when the child was born to one of the spouses during their marriage. View "Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health" on Justia Law