Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Mother to her four children. The case was tried to a judge who resigned before reporting recommended findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that, in accord with In re I.P., also decided today, the procedure used in this case violated Mother’s due process rights. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of S.B." on Justia Law

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father to his child. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the magistrate that presided over the hearing resigned her position before reporting recommended factual findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was subsequently transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Father’s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a case is tried to a judge who resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of I.P." on Justia Law

Christopher Carlton, a Pennsylvania resident, was in a relationship with Shalanda Brown, who was pregnant with Carlton’s child. Unbeknownst to Carlton, Brown traveled to Utah, where she gave birth to a baby girl and relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. Because no putative father was registered with respect to the child, Adoption Center commenced and adoption proceedings for the child, which were later finalized. Brown, however, had informed Carlton that the child had died. After Brown subsequently told Carlton that the baby was still alive and had been given up for adoption, Carlton filed an amended petition to establish paternity challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act and the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who wish to contest adoptions in Utah. The district court dismissed Carlton’s petition based on a lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in (1) denying Carlton leave to amend his petition to cure standing defects to assert the constitutional claims, and thereby, in dismissing Carlton's constitutional claims; and (2) dismissing Carlton’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Remanded. View "Carlton v. Brown" on Justia Law

This matter began in a New Hampshire family court (“Family Court”) in 2006 and involved Plaintiff’s support obligations to his former wife and son. Due to Plaintiff’s financial evasiveness, the Family Court appointed a commissioner (“Commissioner”) to investigate and report Plaintiff’s gross income from 2006 forward. The Commissioner found Plaintiff’s income was higher than what Plaintiff had previously represented to the court. Consequently, the Family Court held Plaintiff in contempt for failure to pay past-due child support obligations and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s ex-wife. The New Hampshire Supreme Court (NHSC) denied Plaintiff’s discretionary appeal. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court seeking to enjoin the orders of the Family Court on constitutional grounds and to reverse the NHSC’s denial of his discretionary appeal. Plaintiff also asserted various claims against the Commissioner. The district court’s dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 3, which classifies appeals from child support orders as discretionary, does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) the Commissioner was immune to suit for his acts as Commissioner in the matter. View "D'Angelo v. N.H. Supreme Court" on Justia Law

In an underlying termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court concluded that while Mother, who was indigent, did not qualify for appointed counsel under Iowa Code 600A.6A, payment of the attorney’s fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent Mother in the proceeding, and ultimately, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for the court-appointed counsel, but the Defender denied payment on the ground that the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The appointed attorney sought judicial review, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the Iowa Department of Management to pay the fees. The Defender and Department appealed the juvenile court’s appointment of counsel at public expense. The Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which it granted as to the Department. The Court then annulled the writ, concluding that the juvenile court correctly appointed counsel at public expense to represent Mother in the contested termination proceeding under chapter 600A. View "Crowell v. State Pub. Defender" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, Mother was awarded primary custody of the parties’ child. Father later field a petition for modification of custody and time-sharing. The district court found there had been a substantial change of circumstances and that it was in the child’s best interest for Father to be awarded custody. Mother appealed, claiming (1) the district court did not have jurisdiction over Father’s petition for modification of custody due to Father’s failure to comply with the statutory pleading requirements; (2) her due process right was violated when default was improperly entered against her; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in entering a child support order due to its failure to comply with statutory child support requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Father’s petition; (2) Mother was given the process she was due; and (3) the district court correctly ruled on the child support issue. View "Brush v. Davis" on Justia Law

Two women, DMT and TMH, agreed to jointly conceive and raise a child together. The child was conceived through the use of assisted reproductive technology. TMH provided the egg, and DMT gave birth to the child. The couple participated in raising their child together until their relationship ended and DMT absconded with the child. TMH sought to establish her parental rights to the child and to reassume parental responsibilities. The court of appeal concluded that Florida's assisted reproductive technology statute was unconstitutional as applied to TMH because it automatically deprived TMH of her ability to assert her fundamental right to be a parent. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, based on the circumstances of this case, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to abridge TMH's fundamental right to be a parent and violated state and federal equal protection by denying same-sex couples the statutory protection against the automatic relinquishment of parental rights that it affords to heterosexual unmarried couples seeking to utilize the assistance of reproductive technology. Remanded. View "D.M.T. v. T.M.H." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of two amendments to the laws of Texas concerning abortions (H.B. 2). Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of the legislation were unconstitutional and granted the requested injunctive relief. The State appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's permanent injunction. The court concluded that the State has made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits in regards to the hospital-admitting privileges provision. There was a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail in its argument that Planned Parenthood failed to establish an undue burden on women seeking abortions or that the hospital-admitting-privileges requirement created a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The court also concluded that the State has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, at least in part, as to its appeal of the injunction pertaining to medication abortions. Accordingly, the court stayed the injunction pertaining to medical abortions with certain exceptions. The State has made an adequate showing as to the other factors considered in determining a stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for stay pending appeal. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her three children, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that the removal of the children from plaintiff's home without a court order violated their rights to due process of law and to freedom from unreasonable seizures. The court held that the state official who takes a child into custody without parental consent or court order was entitled to qualified immunity if there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an imminent threat of harm to the child. Based upon the evidence in the record - including the history of domestic violence between plaintiff and the children's father, the violation of the protective order, and the Superior Court's finding that the children were in immediate physical danger - defendants' decision to take the children into state custody was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants based upon qualified immunity. View "Doe v. Whelan" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law