Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In an underlying termination of parental rights proceeding, the juvenile court concluded that while Mother, who was indigent, did not qualify for appointed counsel under Iowa Code 600A.6A, payment of the attorney’s fees at public expense was constitutionally required. The court subsequently appointed an attorney to represent Mother in the proceeding, and ultimately, Mother’s parental rights were terminated. The juvenile court ordered the State Public Defender to pay for the court-appointed counsel, but the Defender denied payment on the ground that the fees did not qualify for payment from the indigent defense fund. The appointed attorney sought judicial review, and the juvenile court subsequently ordered the Iowa Department of Management to pay the fees. The Defender and Department appealed the juvenile court’s appointment of counsel at public expense. The Supreme Court treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of certiorari, which it granted as to the Department. The Court then annulled the writ, concluding that the juvenile court correctly appointed counsel at public expense to represent Mother in the contested termination proceeding under chapter 600A. View "Crowell v. State Pub. Defender" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced, Mother was awarded primary custody of the parties’ child. Father later field a petition for modification of custody and time-sharing. The district court found there had been a substantial change of circumstances and that it was in the child’s best interest for Father to be awarded custody. Mother appealed, claiming (1) the district court did not have jurisdiction over Father’s petition for modification of custody due to Father’s failure to comply with the statutory pleading requirements; (2) her due process right was violated when default was improperly entered against her; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in entering a child support order due to its failure to comply with statutory child support requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Father’s petition; (2) Mother was given the process she was due; and (3) the district court correctly ruled on the child support issue. View "Brush v. Davis" on Justia Law

Two women, DMT and TMH, agreed to jointly conceive and raise a child together. The child was conceived through the use of assisted reproductive technology. TMH provided the egg, and DMT gave birth to the child. The couple participated in raising their child together until their relationship ended and DMT absconded with the child. TMH sought to establish her parental rights to the child and to reassume parental responsibilities. The court of appeal concluded that Florida's assisted reproductive technology statute was unconstitutional as applied to TMH because it automatically deprived TMH of her ability to assert her fundamental right to be a parent. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, based on the circumstances of this case, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to abridge TMH's fundamental right to be a parent and violated state and federal equal protection by denying same-sex couples the statutory protection against the automatic relinquishment of parental rights that it affords to heterosexual unmarried couples seeking to utilize the assistance of reproductive technology. Remanded. View "D.M.T. v. T.M.H." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of two amendments to the laws of Texas concerning abortions (H.B. 2). Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of the legislation were unconstitutional and granted the requested injunctive relief. The State appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's permanent injunction. The court concluded that the State has made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits in regards to the hospital-admitting privileges provision. There was a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail in its argument that Planned Parenthood failed to establish an undue burden on women seeking abortions or that the hospital-admitting-privileges requirement created a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The court also concluded that the State has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, at least in part, as to its appeal of the injunction pertaining to medication abortions. Accordingly, the court stayed the injunction pertaining to medical abortions with certain exceptions. The State has made an adequate showing as to the other factors considered in determining a stay pending appeal. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for stay pending appeal. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her three children, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that the removal of the children from plaintiff's home without a court order violated their rights to due process of law and to freedom from unreasonable seizures. The court held that the state official who takes a child into custody without parental consent or court order was entitled to qualified immunity if there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an imminent threat of harm to the child. Based upon the evidence in the record - including the history of domestic violence between plaintiff and the children's father, the violation of the protective order, and the Superior Court's finding that the children were in immediate physical danger - defendants' decision to take the children into state custody was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants based upon qualified immunity. View "Doe v. Whelan" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law

After her child was murdered by his father, the mother sued employees of county and state Child Protective Services (CPS) and others,, alleging negligence; violations of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983); and violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act--Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670, and of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106. The complaint alleged that from 1998-2007, CPS received numerous complaints about the father’s abuse and neglect of the child and his siblings. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contours of the substantive due process right to be free from government action increasing the risk of harm was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that pursuing the father for use of a cattle prod, while failing to immediately remove the child, would violate the child’s substantive due process rights. Given previous cases, it is not clear that a reasonable CPS official would understand that failure to seek termination of parental rights would constitute denial of procedural due process. Without ignoring the father’s role in causing the child’s death, CPS employees’ conduct cannot be said to be the “most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the injury. View "Jasinski v. Tyler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her child, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Family & Children Services (DFCS), Gwinnett County DFCS, and a social worker with Gwinnett County. The social worker brought this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to qualified immunity. At issue was plaintiff's substantive due process claim that the social worker violated her liberty interests in the care, custody, and management of her minor child with respect to the social worker's actions in preparing and implementing a safety plan that allegedly prohibited plaintiff from removing her child from the paternal grandmother's care. The court concluded that, in this circumstance, it could not hold that a reasonable social worker would have been on notice that her actions violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the social worker on plaintiff's substantive due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maddox v. Stephens, et al." on Justia Law

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother in 2005. Six years later, Sherman filed an amended complaint seeking to establish paternity both as an individual and behalf of Child as "next friend." Alternatively, Sherman asserted that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411 denied him due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely and dismissed the amended complaint as to Sherman's filing as the next friend of Child, determining that suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only when the child lacks a guardian. The court made no findings as to Sherman's constitutional claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's dismissal of Sherman's constitutional claims, holding that Sherman's complaint stated plausible due process and equal protection claims, and the factual allegations suggested the existence of the elements required to show both a due process and an equal protection violation; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sherman T. v. Karen N." on Justia Law