Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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Several Utah residents and same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in Utah and were denied. They filed suit against the Governor, the Attorney General of Utah and the Clerk of Sale Lake County, all in their official capacities, challenging provisions of Utah law relating to same-sex marriage. Utah Code 30-1-2(5) included among the marriages that were "prohibited and declared void," those "between persons of the same sex." The Legislature referred a proposed constitutional amendment, known as Amendment 3, to Utah's voters (Amendment 3 passed with approximately 66% of the vote and became section 29 of Article I of the Utah Constitution). Plaintiffs alleged that Amendment 3 violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of the fundamental liberty to marry the person of their choosing and to have such a marriage recognized. They also claimed that Amendment 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs raised their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking both a declaratory judgment that Amendment 3 was unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that "[a]ll citizens, regardless of their sexual identity, have a fundamental right to liberty, and this right protects an individual's ability to marry and the intimate choices a person makes about marriage and family." Furthermore, the court held that Amendment 3 denied plaintiffs equal protection because it classified based on sex and sexual orientation without a rational basis. It declared Amendment 3 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined enforcement of the challenged provisions. The Governor and Attorney General filed a timely notice of appeal and moved to stay the district court's decision. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a stay. The Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of the district court's injunction pending final disposition of the appeal by the Tenth Circuit. Having heard and carefully considered the argument of the litigants, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, consistent with the United States Constitution, the State of Utah may not deny a citizen benefit of the laws based solely on the sex of the person the citizen chooses to marry. View "Kitchen, et al v. Herbert, et al" on Justia Law

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After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging that the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, by terminating him based on his diagnoses of alcoholism. The court agreed with the employer that plaintiff was not qualified under DOT regulations to drive a commercial truck because he had a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. Because the court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to drive a commercial truck under the DOT regulations, the court need not address whether the employer's company policy also supported that determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ADA claim. In regards to the FMLA claims, the court agreed with the district court's determination that plaintiff's interference claim failed because the employer would have discharged plaintiff regardless of his FMLA leave, and plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he could not show that the employer's decision to terminate him was causally related to his FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the FMLA claims. View "Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-449.03(E)(6), and its implementing regulation, which restricts the manner in which certain medications may be used to perform abortions. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argued that, under a proper reading of its text, the Arizona law prohibits all medication abortions. The State argued that the law allows medication abortions, but only if they are performed in accordance with the on-label regimen. The court assumed without deciding that the Arizona law passes rational basis review and moved directly to the application of the undue burden test in light of Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. The court concluded that plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence that the Arizona law substantially burdens women's access to abortion services, and Arizona has introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in women's health. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their undue burden claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble" on Justia Law

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The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/607(e), prohibits a non-custodial parent who has been convicted of a sexual offense perpetrated on a victim less than 18 years of age from obtaining court-ordered visitation with his children while serving his sentence and until successfully completing “a treatment program approved by the court.” A child abuse report was made to a hot line, alleging that Donald had sexually abused an unrelated minor. Donald pled guilty and was sentenced to two years’ probation. Donald was required to register as a sex offender, to provide a DNA sample, and to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases, but not required to obtain sex offender treatment. A court subsequently granted Donald’s ex-wife sole custody of their children suspended Donald’s visitation pursuant to section 607(e) Donald argued that a parent’s right to visitation with his child is a fundamental right, which the state may not abridge unless there is a compelling state interest and a finding that denying visitation is in the child’s best interest. The court agreed and found the law unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, finding the matter moot. Donald successfully completed his probation. His cooperative participation in the sex offender evaluation, plus the evaluator’s assessment and recommendation that no further treatment was necessary, were sufficient to show compliance with section 607(e)’s requirement that he “successfully complete a treatment program approved by the court.” The court declined to apply the “public interest" exception.View "In re Marriage of Donald B." on Justia Law

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The State petitioned for an emergency stay of the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order declaring unconstitutional Act 144 of 1997 and Amendment 83, which banned same-sex marriage. The State asserted that an emergency stay was necessary because circuit clerks were uncertain about whether they were required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples while the Supreme Court considered the State’s appeal. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the State’s appeal because there was no final order in this case where the circuit court did not rule on the issue of injunctive relief or on the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. 9-11-208(b). The Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for an emergency stay and granted the motion to dismiss the State’s appeal, holding (1) the court’s order was not final, and therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) the circuit court’s order had no effect on Ark. Code Ann. 9-11-208(b) and its prohibition against circuit and county clerks issuing same-sex marriage licenses. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

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James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

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Following allegations of sexual abuse and failure to protect, the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) brought a child abuse and neglect proceeding against Father and Mother (Petitioners). After an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children were abused and neglected, and, after a dispositional hearing, terminated the parental rights of Petitioners. Petitioners appealed, arguing that their procedural due process rights were violated when the out-of-court statements of two children were admitted to prove allegations of sexual abuse when Petitioners were not given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the children. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Petitioners’ parental rights, holding (1) in a child abuse and neglect civil proceeding held pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-6-2, a party does not have a procedural due process right to confront and cross-examine a child, and the circuit court shall exclude this testimony if it finds the potential psychological harm to the child outweighs the necessity of the child’s testimony; and (2) the circuit court adequately safeguarded Petitioners’ procedural due process rights in this case. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

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Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

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Planned Parenthood filed suit against the State for declaratory judgment and to enjoin provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). H.B. 2 pertains to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion-inducing drugs. Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted, in substantial part, the requested injunctive relief. A motions panel of this court granted a stay pending appeal, and the Supreme Court upheld the stay. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the physician-plaintiffs had standing on behalf of their patients, as well as standing to assert their own rights. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding that the admitting-privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a large fraction of women that it affects. The court also concluded that the district court erred in holding that H.B. 2's rejection of the off-label protocol from fifty to sixty-three days LMP (last menstrual period) facially imposes an undue burden on the abortion rights of certain women. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the State, except that the admitting privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law