Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/607(e), prohibits a non-custodial parent who has been convicted of a sexual offense perpetrated on a victim less than 18 years of age from obtaining court-ordered visitation with his children while serving his sentence and until successfully completing “a treatment program approved by the court.” A child abuse report was made to a hot line, alleging that Donald had sexually abused an unrelated minor. Donald pled guilty and was sentenced to two years’ probation. Donald was required to register as a sex offender, to provide a DNA sample, and to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases, but not required to obtain sex offender treatment. A court subsequently granted Donald’s ex-wife sole custody of their children suspended Donald’s visitation pursuant to section 607(e) Donald argued that a parent’s right to visitation with his child is a fundamental right, which the state may not abridge unless there is a compelling state interest and a finding that denying visitation is in the child’s best interest. The court agreed and found the law unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated, finding the matter moot. Donald successfully completed his probation. His cooperative participation in the sex offender evaluation, plus the evaluator’s assessment and recommendation that no further treatment was necessary, were sufficient to show compliance with section 607(e)’s requirement that he “successfully complete a treatment program approved by the court.” The court declined to apply the “public interest" exception.View "In re Marriage of Donald B." on Justia Law

The State petitioned for an emergency stay of the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order declaring unconstitutional Act 144 of 1997 and Amendment 83, which banned same-sex marriage. The State asserted that an emergency stay was necessary because circuit clerks were uncertain about whether they were required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples while the Supreme Court considered the State’s appeal. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the State’s appeal because there was no final order in this case where the circuit court did not rule on the issue of injunctive relief or on the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. 9-11-208(b). The Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for an emergency stay and granted the motion to dismiss the State’s appeal, holding (1) the court’s order was not final, and therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) the circuit court’s order had no effect on Ark. Code Ann. 9-11-208(b) and its prohibition against circuit and county clerks issuing same-sex marriage licenses. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

James Bergstrom and Vanessa Rew dissolved their marriage in 2008. In 2002, 2007, and 2008, Rew obtained a series of one-year orders for protection (OFPs) against Bergstrom. In 2010, before the extended expiration date of the 2008 OFP, Rew filed an application under Minn. Stat. 518B.01(6)(a) to extend the terms of the 2008 OFP. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court extended the OFP for up to fifty years in favor of Rew and the couple’s minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) section 518B.01(6)(a) does not require a finding of domestic abuse before a district court may extend the duration of an OFP; (2) the extension of an OFP under section 518B.01(6)(a) does not facially violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Minn. Const. art. I, 3; (3) the record was insufficient to conclude that the extended OFP was constitutional with respect to Bergstrom’s children; and (4) the extension of an OFP for up to fifty years does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause of either the United States of Minnesota Constitutions. Remanded. View "In re Rew" on Justia Law

Following allegations of sexual abuse and failure to protect, the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) brought a child abuse and neglect proceeding against Father and Mother (Petitioners). After an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children were abused and neglected, and, after a dispositional hearing, terminated the parental rights of Petitioners. Petitioners appealed, arguing that their procedural due process rights were violated when the out-of-court statements of two children were admitted to prove allegations of sexual abuse when Petitioners were not given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the children. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Petitioners’ parental rights, holding (1) in a child abuse and neglect civil proceeding held pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-6-2, a party does not have a procedural due process right to confront and cross-examine a child, and the circuit court shall exclude this testimony if it finds the potential psychological harm to the child outweighs the necessity of the child’s testimony; and (2) the circuit court adequately safeguarded Petitioners’ procedural due process rights in this case. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood filed suit against the State for declaratory judgment and to enjoin provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). H.B. 2 pertains to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion-inducing drugs. Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted, in substantial part, the requested injunctive relief. A motions panel of this court granted a stay pending appeal, and the Supreme Court upheld the stay. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the physician-plaintiffs had standing on behalf of their patients, as well as standing to assert their own rights. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding that the admitting-privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a large fraction of women that it affects. The court also concluded that the district court erred in holding that H.B. 2's rejection of the off-label protocol from fifty to sixty-three days LMP (last menstrual period) facially imposes an undue burden on the abortion rights of certain women. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the State, except that the admitting privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Mother to her four children. The case was tried to a judge who resigned before reporting recommended findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that, in accord with In re I.P., also decided today, the procedure used in this case violated Mother’s due process rights. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of S.B." on Justia Law

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father to his child. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the magistrate that presided over the hearing resigned her position before reporting recommended factual findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was subsequently transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Father’s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a case is tried to a judge who resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of I.P." on Justia Law

Christopher Carlton, a Pennsylvania resident, was in a relationship with Shalanda Brown, who was pregnant with Carlton’s child. Unbeknownst to Carlton, Brown traveled to Utah, where she gave birth to a baby girl and relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. Because no putative father was registered with respect to the child, Adoption Center commenced and adoption proceedings for the child, which were later finalized. Brown, however, had informed Carlton that the child had died. After Brown subsequently told Carlton that the baby was still alive and had been given up for adoption, Carlton filed an amended petition to establish paternity challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act and the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who wish to contest adoptions in Utah. The district court dismissed Carlton’s petition based on a lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in (1) denying Carlton leave to amend his petition to cure standing defects to assert the constitutional claims, and thereby, in dismissing Carlton's constitutional claims; and (2) dismissing Carlton’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Remanded. View "Carlton v. Brown" on Justia Law

This matter began in a New Hampshire family court (“Family Court”) in 2006 and involved Plaintiff’s support obligations to his former wife and son. Due to Plaintiff’s financial evasiveness, the Family Court appointed a commissioner (“Commissioner”) to investigate and report Plaintiff’s gross income from 2006 forward. The Commissioner found Plaintiff’s income was higher than what Plaintiff had previously represented to the court. Consequently, the Family Court held Plaintiff in contempt for failure to pay past-due child support obligations and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff’s ex-wife. The New Hampshire Supreme Court (NHSC) denied Plaintiff’s discretionary appeal. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court seeking to enjoin the orders of the Family Court on constitutional grounds and to reverse the NHSC’s denial of his discretionary appeal. Plaintiff also asserted various claims against the Commissioner. The district court’s dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 3, which classifies appeals from child support orders as discretionary, does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) the Commissioner was immune to suit for his acts as Commissioner in the matter. View "D'Angelo v. N.H. Supreme Court" on Justia Law