Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed district court decisions invalidating Indiana and Wisconsin laws that did not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, whether contracted in those states or in states (or foreign countries) where they are lawful. The states gave no “reasonable basis” for forbidding same-sex marriage, but more than a reasonable basis was required because the challenged discrimination is “along suspect lines,” being against a minority and based on an immutable characteristic of the members of that minority, against an historical background of discrimination against the persons who have that characteristic. These circumstances create a presumption that the discrimination is a denial of the equal protection. The discrimination does not confer an important offsetting benefit on society as a whole and is not appropriate to its stated objectives. The court stated that: “Formally these cases are about discrimination against the small homosexual minority,” but at a deeper level, they are about the welfare of children. Children adopted by homosexual couples would be better off emotionally and economically if their adoptive parents were married. With respect to the states’ arguments about governmental interest in the welfare of children, the court noted that infertile heterosexual couples are allowed to marry. View "Wolf v. Walker" on Justia Law

Legina and Todd Thomas, parents of M.T., a twelve-year-old girl at the time of the events at issue in this case, placed M.T. in the University of New Mexico Children's Psychiatric Center after she revealed suicidal tendencies during a police investigation of a potential sexual assault. Doctors diagnosed her as exhibiting several serious psychiatric problems and recommended a prescription of psychotropic drugs. The Thomases resisted the doctors' diagnoses and recommendations. M.T. was evaluated for several weeks until Mrs. Thomas decided to remove her from the hospital. Concerned about her safety, M.T.'s doctors and therapist placed M.T. on a medical hold and pursued an involuntary residential treatment petition in state court. After a seven-day hold, M.T. was released before the involuntary commitment proceedings began. The Thomases claimed the doctors and the hospital violated their constitutional right to direct M.T.'s medical care and their right to familial association when they placed a medical hold on M.T. and when they filed the petition for involuntary residential treatment in state court. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting absolute and qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion on qualified immunity grounds, and the Thomases appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the district court that the Thomases did not stated a claim for a violation of their right to direct M.T.'s medical care. But the Court held that the Thomases stated a claim for a violation of the right to familial association for the defendants' placing a medical hold on M.T. and seeking an order for involuntary residential treatment in state court. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas, et al v. Kaven, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 1161 et seq. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her employer's denial of her request to take FMLA leave after the birth of her child. The court held that the district court correctly awarded summary judgment to the employer with respect to plaintiffs' claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and did not abuse its discretion by assessing a statutory COBRA penalty against the employer; the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's FMLA claim and by refusing to consider her additional litigation-related expenses as part of an attorney's fee award; and, therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Evans v. Books-A-Million" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Virginia Code sections 20-45.2 and 20-45.3; the Marshall/Newman Amendment, Va. Const. art. I, 15-A; and any other Virginia law that bars same sex-marriage or prohibits the State's recognition of otherwise-lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws). Plaintiffs argued that these laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and enjoined Virginia from enforcing the laws. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that each of the plaintiffs had standing as to at least one defendant, and the court declined to view Baker v. Nelson as binding precedent. The court concluded that strict scrutiny analysis applied in this case where the Virginia Marriage Laws impede the right to marry by preventing same-sex couples from marrying and nullifying the legal import of their out-of-state marriages. Proponents contend that five interests support the laws: federalism-based interests, history and tradition, protecting the institution of marriage, encouraging responsible procreation, and promoting the optimal childrearing environment. The court concluded, however, that these interests are not compelling interests that justify the Virginia Marriage Laws. Therefore, all of the proponents' justifications for the laws fail and the laws cannot survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia from recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-of-state marriages. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bostic v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

This appeal was brought by the Court Clerk for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, asking the Tenth Circuit to overturn a decision by the district court declaring unenforceable the Oklahoma state constitutional prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The issues presented to the Tenth Circuit in this appeal were: (1) whether plaintiffs could attack state constitutional provisions without simultaneously attacking state statutes to the same effect; and (2) whether the Court Clerk was a proper defendant as to the non-recognition portion of the Oklahoma constitutional prohibition. The Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to directly attack the constitutionality under the United States Constitution of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban even though their claim did not reach Oklahoma's statutory prohibitions on such marriages. Under Oklahoma law, a constitutional amendment "takes the place of all the former laws existing upon the subject with which it deals." Because the statutory prohibitions were subsumed in the challenged constitutional provision, an injunction against the latter's enforcement will redress the claimed injury. An earlier appeal of this same case involving the standing inquiry led to a decision by a panel of the Tenth Circuit that dismissed proceedings brought against the Governor and Attorney General of Oklahoma. That panel ruled that "recognition of marriages is within the administration of the judiciary." ("Bishop I"). The Tenth Circuit concluded that the law of the case doctrine applied to Bishop I, but that the doctrine was overcome by new evidence demonstrating that the Tulsa County Court Clerk could not redress the non-recognition injury, thereby depriving Gay Phillips and Susan Barton of standing to sue. The Court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Bishop, et al v. Smith, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State for violating section 102(a) of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a), and against Judge Gaertner, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for retaliating against her for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech. The court concluded that plaintiff was not an eligible employee covered by the FMLA because she was a member of the personal staff of the judge, who held a public elective office; although plaintiff's blog posts and other speech discussed her own case in detail, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's speech related to a matter of public concern; plaintiff's actions were sufficient evidence of disruption; plaintiff did not cite clearly established law putting the judge on notice that Pickering balancing in a situation such as this would fall in plaintiff's favor, nor did the court identify any such case law; and the district court correctly determined that the judge was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's section 1983 claim where the judge did not have notice that his termination of an insubordinate employee who compromised the propriety and efficiency of his courtroom could violate her right to free speech. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hemminghaus v. State of Missouri, et al." on Justia Law

Several Utah residents and same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in Utah and were denied. They filed suit against the Governor, the Attorney General of Utah and the Clerk of Sale Lake County, all in their official capacities, challenging provisions of Utah law relating to same-sex marriage. Utah Code 30-1-2(5) included among the marriages that were "prohibited and declared void," those "between persons of the same sex." The Legislature referred a proposed constitutional amendment, known as Amendment 3, to Utah's voters (Amendment 3 passed with approximately 66% of the vote and became section 29 of Article I of the Utah Constitution). Plaintiffs alleged that Amendment 3 violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of the fundamental liberty to marry the person of their choosing and to have such a marriage recognized. They also claimed that Amendment 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs raised their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking both a declaratory judgment that Amendment 3 was unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that "[a]ll citizens, regardless of their sexual identity, have a fundamental right to liberty, and this right protects an individual's ability to marry and the intimate choices a person makes about marriage and family." Furthermore, the court held that Amendment 3 denied plaintiffs equal protection because it classified based on sex and sexual orientation without a rational basis. It declared Amendment 3 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined enforcement of the challenged provisions. The Governor and Attorney General filed a timely notice of appeal and moved to stay the district court's decision. Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a stay. The Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of the district court's injunction pending final disposition of the appeal by the Tenth Circuit. Having heard and carefully considered the argument of the litigants, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, consistent with the United States Constitution, the State of Utah may not deny a citizen benefit of the laws based solely on the sex of the person the citizen chooses to marry. View "Kitchen, et al v. Herbert, et al" on Justia Law

After Mother and Father divorced, the parties disputed the custody of their child, A.G. During a court proceeding concerning custody, the juvenile court excluded A.G., who was thirteen years old at the time, from attending the hearing. A.G. had filed a motion to attend the hearing, but the judge denied the motion, concluding that the dispute was between the parents, and therefore, A.G. had not constitutional right to be present. A.G. appealed, claiming that the trial court violated her due process rights by denying her motion to attend the proceeding. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had discretion to exclude A.G., a nonparty, from a hearing in custody litigation ancillary to her parents’ divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude a child from any proceeding if it determines that exclusion is in the best interest of the child; and (2) the juvenile court in this case considered relevant and appropriate factors in making its decision. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging that the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, by terminating him based on his diagnoses of alcoholism. The court agreed with the employer that plaintiff was not qualified under DOT regulations to drive a commercial truck because he had a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. Because the court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to drive a commercial truck under the DOT regulations, the court need not address whether the employer's company policy also supported that determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ADA claim. In regards to the FMLA claims, the court agreed with the district court's determination that plaintiff's interference claim failed because the employer would have discharged plaintiff regardless of his FMLA leave, and plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he could not show that the employer's decision to terminate him was causally related to his FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the FMLA claims. View "Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 36-449.03(E)(6), and its implementing regulation, which restricts the manner in which certain medications may be used to perform abortions. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs argued that, under a proper reading of its text, the Arizona law prohibits all medication abortions. The State argued that the law allows medication abortions, but only if they are performed in accordance with the on-label regimen. The court assumed without deciding that the Arizona law passes rational basis review and moved directly to the application of the undue burden test in light of Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart. The court concluded that plaintiffs have introduced uncontroverted evidence that the Arizona law substantially burdens women's access to abortion services, and Arizona has introduced no evidence that the law advances in any way its interest in women's health. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their undue burden claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the requested preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble" on Justia Law