Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Texas abortion providers filed suit against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of amendments to Texas's law regulating abortions. At issue is H.B. 2’s physician admitting privileges requirement as applied to a McAllen and an El Paso abortion facility, as well as H.B. 2’s requirement that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) facially and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso abortion facilities. In regards to the facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement, the district court erred by granting unrequested relief. In doing so, the district court also ran afoul of the holding and mandate in Abbott II, and the principles of res judicata. In regards to the facial challenge of the ASC requirement and the ASC requirement in the context of medication abortions, res judicata bars these claims. On the merits, the ASC requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state interest and have not been shown to have an improper purpose or impose an undue burden.The court affirmed in part and modified in part the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to McAllen, as follows: (1) The State is enjoined from enforcing section 135.51 - .56 and 135.41 of the ASC regulations against the abortion facility in McAllen when that facility is used to provide abortions to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley, until such time as another licensed abortion facility becomes available to provide abortions at a location nearer to the Rio Grande Valley than San Antonio; (2) The State is enjoined from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against Dr. Lynn when he provides abortions at the abortion facility located in McAllen to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley. The remainder of the injunction as to the McAllen facility is vacated. Because H.B. 2 does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of those women seeking an abortion in the El Paso area, the court held that the district court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ as applied challenge in El Paso. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal-protection and unlawful-delegation claims. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey" on Justia Law

In this child neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that it was in the child’s best interest to cease efforts to reunify him with Mother and to change the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and eventually adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) while due process may require an evidentiary hearing when a permanency plan is changed from family reunification to termination of parental rights, Mother failed to establish plain error in the juvenile court’s failure to apply the Wyoming Rules of Evidence during the permanency hearing; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that to find that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. View "In re GC" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought on behalf of ten foster children in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The complaint alleged that DCYF’s failings exposed foster children in its custody to an unreasonable risk of harm and that the State had failed to comply in various respects with the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. After much skirmishing between the parties and delay during discovery, trial commenced. At that point, the claims of all but two of the named plaintiffs had been rendered moot through aging or adoption. The district court concluded (1) Plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to establish that DCYF’s policies and customs had either harmed them or exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to their statutory causes of action. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming myriad errors relating to pretrial proceedings. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it, in two case management orders, denied Plaintiffs’ counsel access to their own clients and prevented Plaintiffs from seeking plainly relevant discovery. View "Danny B. v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The juvenile court entered an order prohibiting Mother from homeschooling her daughter Moira B. and directing that Moira continue to be enrolled in an educational program as arranged or approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) pending further order of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s order was not a temporary order, but rather one that affected Mother’s substantial right to direct the education of her child, and therefore the order was final and appealable; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in prohibiting Mother from homeschooling Moira and ordering that Moira be enrolled in an educational program arranged or approved by DHHS. View "In re Cassandra B." on Justia Law

In 2012, M.C. was born to Mother and Father, who were unmarried. After Mother told Father that she intended to live in Ohio with M.C., Father petitioned the district court for establishment of a parenting plan, proposing that he should become M.C.’s primary caregiver. Mother proposed a parenting plan that would allow her to reside in Ohio as M.C.’s primary caregiver. After a hearing, the district court concluded that if Mother chose to live in Montana, the parties would be directed to submit parenting plans naming Mother as M.C.’s primary caregiver, and that if Mother chose to live in Ohio, the parties would be directed to submit proposed parenting plans naming Father as M.C.’s primary caregiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the parenting plan, holding that the district court did not violate Mother’s fundamental right to travel by ordering that M.C. should reside in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.C." on Justia Law

In 2012, the probate and family court appointed Mother’s grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”) as the permanent guardian of Mother’s minor child. Mother subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of due process because she was not appointed by counsel in the guardianship proceeding. The probate and family court denied the motion. While Mother’s appeal from that denial was pending, the court granted Mother’s petition for removal of the guardian and vacated the guardianship. The child was returned to Mother’s custody. The Court dismissed Mother’s appeal as moot but exercised its discretion to address the issue of whether Mother was entitled to counsel. The Court held that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship proceeding and who cannot afford counsel has a right to have counsel appointed and to be so informed. View "In re Guardianship of V.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were the Governor of Massachusetts, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services, and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF). Six children brought this class action in federal court on behalf of an estimated 8,500 children who are (or will be) committed to Massachusetts foster care custody as a result of their having suffered from abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs asserted that DCF so exposes the plaintiff class to harm or the risk of harm that it is unconstitutional and violates the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Plaintiffs sought a broad injunction preventing Defendants from subjecting the plaintiff children to practices that violate their rights. The district court granted judgment for Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate class-wide constitutional violations, nor a violation of the AACWA, and so injunctive relief was not warranted.View "Connor B. v. Patrick" on Justia Law

By statute and constitutional provision, Mississippi prohibits same-sex couples from marrying and does not recognize those marriages entered into by same-sex couples which have been validly performed and are recognized elsewhere, Miss. Const. art XIV, 263A; Miss. Code. 93-1-1(2). In October 2014, two same sex couples and the Campaign for Southern Equality, a non-profit advocacy group, challenged the bans as violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Mississippi from enforcing the marriage bans, but stayed the effect of its own order for 14 days to permit the state to seek a further stay of the injunction pending an appeal. The Fifth Circuit granted Mississippi’s emergency motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, noting considerations of intra-circuit uniformity and the avoidance of confusion; that it will hear arguments on bans in Texas and Louisiana within one month; and that the Supreme Court granted a similar stay while the issue of Utah’s marriage ban was pending before the Tenth Circuit.View "Campaign for So. Equal. v. Bryant" on Justia Law