Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

WCDSS took B.W. into protective custody when she was two-days old and placed her with a foster parent without obtaining prior judicial authorization. Plaintiff, B.W.'s biological father, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and three social workers, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff lacked a cognizable liberty interest in his relationship with B.W. and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants because he could not prove a violation of his constitutional rights. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in deciding that the complaint did not provide adequate notice that B.W. asserted a Fourth Amendment claim on her own behalf and, therefore, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. The court further concluded that Defendants Wilcox and Kennedy are not entitled to qualified immunity on B.W.'s Fourth Amendment claim where a reasonable juror might find that a reasonable social worker could not have determined that B.W. would be in imminent danger of serious bodily injury in the time that it would have taken to obtain a warrant. Thus, the court reversed and remanded on this issue. Because the evidence presented here creates at least an inference of an unconstitutional, unofficial custom in Washoe County, the County is not entitled to summary judgment. The court reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Reynolds because plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that she was involved with the decision to take custody of B.W. View "Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe" on Justia Law

After an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child. Mother appealed, alleging ten claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding her counsel’s performance in the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings. The district court of appeal applied the Washington v. Strickland standard to Mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and affirmed the order terminating Mother’s parental rights. The district court subsequently certified two questions regarding the right to effective counsel in TPR proceedings and vindication of that right. In its opinion, the Supreme Court established the appropriate standard for determining whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in termination of parental rights proceedings and directing the development of rules providing the procedure for vindicating a parent’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in TPR proceedings. The Court then affirmed in this case, holding that Mother failed to present any basis for setting aside the order terminating her parental rights. View "J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two same-sex couples who seek to marry in Texas or to have their marriage in another state recognized in Texas. The district court subsequently issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing any laws or regulations prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying or prohibiting the recognition of marriages between same-sex couples lawfully solemnized elsewhere. While the appeal was under submission, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, which held in part that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. Because, as both sides now agree, the injunction appealed from is correct in light of Obergefell, the preliminary injunction is affirmed and the matter remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "DeLeon v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven same-sex couples and an organization whose membership includes same-sex couples and their families, seek to marry in Louisiana or to have their marriage in another state recognized in Louisiana. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. While this appeal was under submission, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, which held in part that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "Robicheaux v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Respondents, a same-sex couple who were married in Massachusetts, sought a divorce in Texas. The two women settled their differences, and the trial court orally granted an ostensible divorce pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The State filed a petition in intervention seeking to oppose the petition for divorce and to defend the constitutionality of Texas law that limits divorce actions to persons of the opposite sex who are married to one another. The State argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to render a divorce. The trial court ultimately decided not to entertain the State’s petition, concluding that the attempted intervention was untimely. The court of appeals dismissed the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, also ruling that the intervention was untimely. The State sought the Supreme Court’s review, asking the Court to allow the intervention and to vacate the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and denied the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the State failed to secure standing by properly presenting its arguments to the trial court and court of appeals, and consequently, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reach those issues. View "State v. Naylor" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Iowa Board of Medicine passed a rule establishing standards requiring physicians who prescribe or administer abortion-inducing drugs to personally perform a physical examination and to be physically present when the abortion-inducing drug is provided. Planned Parenthood challenged the rule as both improperly enacted and in violation of the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied Planned Parenthood’s claims and upheld the rule addressing each of Planned Parenthood’s challenges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board’s rule violates the controlling “undue burden” test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court as the federal constitutional test; and (2) therefore, the rule violates the Iowa Constitution under the less stringent Iowa constitutional standard advanced by the Board. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med." on Justia Law

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Texas abortion providers filed suit against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of amendments to Texas's law regulating abortions. At issue is H.B. 2’s physician admitting privileges requirement as applied to a McAllen and an El Paso abortion facility, as well as H.B. 2’s requirement that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) facially and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso abortion facilities. In regards to the facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement, the district court erred by granting unrequested relief. In doing so, the district court also ran afoul of the holding and mandate in Abbott II, and the principles of res judicata. In regards to the facial challenge of the ASC requirement and the ASC requirement in the context of medication abortions, res judicata bars these claims. On the merits, the ASC requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state interest and have not been shown to have an improper purpose or impose an undue burden.The court affirmed in part and modified in part the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to McAllen, as follows: (1) The State is enjoined from enforcing section 135.51 - .56 and 135.41 of the ASC regulations against the abortion facility in McAllen when that facility is used to provide abortions to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley, until such time as another licensed abortion facility becomes available to provide abortions at a location nearer to the Rio Grande Valley than San Antonio; (2) The State is enjoined from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against Dr. Lynn when he provides abortions at the abortion facility located in McAllen to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley. The remainder of the injunction as to the McAllen facility is vacated. Because H.B. 2 does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of those women seeking an abortion in the El Paso area, the court held that the district court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ as applied challenge in El Paso. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal-protection and unlawful-delegation claims. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey" on Justia Law

In this child neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that it was in the child’s best interest to cease efforts to reunify him with Mother and to change the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and eventually adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) while due process may require an evidentiary hearing when a permanency plan is changed from family reunification to termination of parental rights, Mother failed to establish plain error in the juvenile court’s failure to apply the Wyoming Rules of Evidence during the permanency hearing; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that to find that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. View "In re GC" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought on behalf of ten foster children in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The complaint alleged that DCYF’s failings exposed foster children in its custody to an unreasonable risk of harm and that the State had failed to comply in various respects with the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. After much skirmishing between the parties and delay during discovery, trial commenced. At that point, the claims of all but two of the named plaintiffs had been rendered moot through aging or adoption. The district court concluded (1) Plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to establish that DCYF’s policies and customs had either harmed them or exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to their statutory causes of action. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming myriad errors relating to pretrial proceedings. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it, in two case management orders, denied Plaintiffs’ counsel access to their own clients and prevented Plaintiffs from seeking plainly relevant discovery. View "Danny B. v. Raimondo" on Justia Law