Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Respondents, a same-sex couple who were married in Massachusetts, sought a divorce in Texas. The two women settled their differences, and the trial court orally granted an ostensible divorce pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The State filed a petition in intervention seeking to oppose the petition for divorce and to defend the constitutionality of Texas law that limits divorce actions to persons of the opposite sex who are married to one another. The State argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to render a divorce. The trial court ultimately decided not to entertain the State’s petition, concluding that the attempted intervention was untimely. The court of appeals dismissed the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, also ruling that the intervention was untimely. The State sought the Supreme Court’s review, asking the Court to allow the intervention and to vacate the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and denied the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the State failed to secure standing by properly presenting its arguments to the trial court and court of appeals, and consequently, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reach those issues. View "State v. Naylor" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Iowa Board of Medicine passed a rule establishing standards requiring physicians who prescribe or administer abortion-inducing drugs to personally perform a physical examination and to be physically present when the abortion-inducing drug is provided. Planned Parenthood challenged the rule as both improperly enacted and in violation of the Iowa Constitution. The district court denied Planned Parenthood’s claims and upheld the rule addressing each of Planned Parenthood’s challenges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board’s rule violates the controlling “undue burden” test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court as the federal constitutional test; and (2) therefore, the rule violates the Iowa Constitution under the less stringent Iowa constitutional standard advanced by the Board. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med." on Justia Law

Marc Chamberlain was the father of two children who had been the care of their maternal grandmother for several years before and following the death of their mother. The children’s maternal grandmother and their maternal aunt petitioned the probate court for appointment as the children’s co-guardians. Chamberlain opposed the petition. The court entered a judgment appointing the grandmother, but not the aunt, as the children’s guardian. In making its decision, the court applied the plain language of Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 5-204(d) and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the grandmother was the children’s de facto guardian and that Chamberlain had not consistently participated in the children’s lives. Chamberlain appealed, arguing that section 5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional because it, and the statutes defining its terms, are unconstitutionally vague and violate due process. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the appointment of a guardian over a parent’s objection upon proof by the lower standard of a preponderance of the evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Remanded for the court to apply the constitutionally required standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence when applying section 5-204(d). View "In re Guardianship of Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Texas abortion providers filed suit against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of amendments to Texas's law regulating abortions. At issue is H.B. 2’s physician admitting privileges requirement as applied to a McAllen and an El Paso abortion facility, as well as H.B. 2’s requirement that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) facially and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso abortion facilities. In regards to the facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement, the district court erred by granting unrequested relief. In doing so, the district court also ran afoul of the holding and mandate in Abbott II, and the principles of res judicata. In regards to the facial challenge of the ASC requirement and the ASC requirement in the context of medication abortions, res judicata bars these claims. On the merits, the ASC requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state interest and have not been shown to have an improper purpose or impose an undue burden.The court affirmed in part and modified in part the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to McAllen, as follows: (1) The State is enjoined from enforcing section 135.51 - .56 and 135.41 of the ASC regulations against the abortion facility in McAllen when that facility is used to provide abortions to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley, until such time as another licensed abortion facility becomes available to provide abortions at a location nearer to the Rio Grande Valley than San Antonio; (2) The State is enjoined from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against Dr. Lynn when he provides abortions at the abortion facility located in McAllen to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley. The remainder of the injunction as to the McAllen facility is vacated. Because H.B. 2 does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of those women seeking an abortion in the El Paso area, the court held that the district court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ as applied challenge in El Paso. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal-protection and unlawful-delegation claims. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey" on Justia Law

In this child neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that it was in the child’s best interest to cease efforts to reunify him with Mother and to change the permanency plan to termination of parental rights and eventually adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order, holding (1) while due process may require an evidentiary hearing when a permanency plan is changed from family reunification to termination of parental rights, Mother failed to establish plain error in the juvenile court’s failure to apply the Wyoming Rules of Evidence during the permanency hearing; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that to find that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. View "In re GC" on Justia Law

This putative class action was brought on behalf of ten foster children in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The complaint alleged that DCYF’s failings exposed foster children in its custody to an unreasonable risk of harm and that the State had failed to comply in various respects with the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. After much skirmishing between the parties and delay during discovery, trial commenced. At that point, the claims of all but two of the named plaintiffs had been rendered moot through aging or adoption. The district court concluded (1) Plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to establish that DCYF’s policies and customs had either harmed them or exposed them to an unreasonable risk of harm, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to their statutory causes of action. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming myriad errors relating to pretrial proceedings. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it, in two case management orders, denied Plaintiffs’ counsel access to their own clients and prevented Plaintiffs from seeking plainly relevant discovery. View "Danny B. v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The juvenile court entered an order prohibiting Mother from homeschooling her daughter Moira B. and directing that Moira continue to be enrolled in an educational program as arranged or approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) pending further order of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s order was not a temporary order, but rather one that affected Mother’s substantial right to direct the education of her child, and therefore the order was final and appealable; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in prohibiting Mother from homeschooling Moira and ordering that Moira be enrolled in an educational program arranged or approved by DHHS. View "In re Cassandra B." on Justia Law

In 2012, M.C. was born to Mother and Father, who were unmarried. After Mother told Father that she intended to live in Ohio with M.C., Father petitioned the district court for establishment of a parenting plan, proposing that he should become M.C.’s primary caregiver. Mother proposed a parenting plan that would allow her to reside in Ohio as M.C.’s primary caregiver. After a hearing, the district court concluded that if Mother chose to live in Montana, the parties would be directed to submit parenting plans naming Mother as M.C.’s primary caregiver, and that if Mother chose to live in Ohio, the parties would be directed to submit proposed parenting plans naming Father as M.C.’s primary caregiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the parenting plan, holding that the district court did not violate Mother’s fundamental right to travel by ordering that M.C. should reside in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.C." on Justia Law

In 2012, the probate and family court appointed Mother’s grandmother (“Great-Grandmother”) as the permanent guardian of Mother’s minor child. Mother subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of due process because she was not appointed by counsel in the guardianship proceeding. The probate and family court denied the motion. While Mother’s appeal from that denial was pending, the court granted Mother’s petition for removal of the guardian and vacated the guardianship. The child was returned to Mother’s custody. The Court dismissed Mother’s appeal as moot but exercised its discretion to address the issue of whether Mother was entitled to counsel. The Court held that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a guardianship proceeding and who cannot afford counsel has a right to have counsel appointed and to be so informed. View "In re Guardianship of V.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law