Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and her minor child filed suit against officers and employees of the Child Protective Services (CPS) division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), alleging violations of plaintiff's constitutuional rights to familial association. In this case, CPS removed the child from plaintiff's custody following the child's hospitalization for depression and suicidal ideation. The panel held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. In this case, a reasonable official in defendant's position would know that the available information did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the child was in imminent danger of attempting to commit suicide, or that it was necessary to separate her from her mother, transfer her to another hospital and continue to detain her after medical professionals at the hospital concluded she was a low suicide risk. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the familial association claim against defendants Koile and Pender on the basis of qualified immunity. However, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that defendants violated plaintiff and her child's due process right to be free from deliberately false statements during juvenile court proceedings. Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing claims against the remaining defendants. View "Keates v. Koile" on Justia Law

Medical personnel treated three infants, between 19-days old and six-months-old, in the emergency room of Nationwide Children’s Hospital for serious injuries, including skull fractures and a broken leg. Nationwide’s physicians suspected child abuse. They conducted testing to identify additional injuries, then alerted Franklin County Children Services of their concerns. One family did not appeal the finding that the suspicion of child abuse was “substantiated’ or the designation of their case for “ongoing supportive services.” In another case, the county found no evidence of abuse. The parents of the infants filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Nationwide and the County, alleging that the medical testing violated their children’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and their own right to familial association. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. State action did not prompt Nationwide, a private hospital, to perform the diagnostic tests, and the county had nothing to do with the tests. The court noted that the parents consented to the tests. View "Thomas v. Nationwide Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

A trial court that wishes to us the McDonnell Douglas framework, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973), as part of its jury instructions should translate it into everyday parlance and fit it to the facts and circumstances of a particular case.In this case alleging violations of federal and state law, including the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering a take-nothing verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred in employing the McDonnell Douglas framework in its jury instructions. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court’s jury instructions as a whole were satisfactory. View "Teixeira v. Town of Coventry" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that social workers violated their constitutional rights to family unity and companionship, and as well as their small children's rights, by removing the children from home without a warrant or court order. Plaintiffs were the subject of a criminal investigation after they tried to print nude photos of their three children. Determining that the appeal was timely, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to seal the summary judgment order where the district court protected the privacy of the children, Arizona law prohibits the Department of Economic Security from releasing the files, the district court order employed clinical, anatomically correct language to briefly describe the nudity depicted in the photographs, plaintiffs did not file their complaint under seal, and plaintiffs gave public interviews where they described the photos at issue. The panel reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the social workers based on qualified immunity, holding that the social workers did not have reasonable cause to believe the children were at risk of serious bodily harm or molestation when they removed the children from their home without judicial authorization. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Demaree v. Pederson" on Justia Law

Iowa may constitutionally deny an inheritance tax exemption for bequests to stepchildren when the marriage between parent and stepparent was dissolved before the stepparent’s death, while granting an exemption when the marriage was not dissolved.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the administrative ruling of the Iowa Department of Revenue denying an estate’s request for a tax refund. An administrative law judge rejected the decedent’s stepchildren’s protest challenging the denial of the tax refund on the ground that Iowa Code 450.1(1)(e)’s classification of stepchildren violated their equal protection rights under Iowa Const. art. I, 6. The district court affirmed the Department’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 450.1(1)(e) does not violate article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution because a rational basis exists for the legislature to exclude stepchildren postdivorce from the inheritance tax exemption for surviving spouses lineal descendants, lineal ascendants, and other stepchildren. View "Tyler v. Iowa Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Plaintiff inmates and grant of injunctive relief enjoining state officials and their agents from denying the inmates a marriage ceremony via videoconference or enforcing the Department of Correctional Services’ policy that interfered with Plaintiffs’ ability to marry. The Department denied Plaintiffs’ request to marry under an internal policy that it does not transport an inmate to another facility for a marriage ceremony. The inmates were also denied a marriage ceremony via videoconferencing because the Department interpreted Neb. Rev. Stat. 42-109 to require Plaintiffs to both appear physically before an officiant. Plaintiffs sued Defendants - state officials - in their individual capacities for interfering with the inmates’ request to marry. The district court concluded that the Department’s policy impermissibly burdened the inmates’ right to marry and that its interpretation of section 42-109 was constitutionally flawed and granted an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting the inmates juncture relief because Defendants could only be sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities. View "Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine" on Justia Law

The money that a homosexual man paid to father children through in vitro fertilization—and in particular, to identify, retain, compensate, and care for the women who served as an egg donor and a gestational surrogate—was not spent "for the purpose of affecting" his body's reproductive "function" within the meaning of I.R.C. 213. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was constrained by I.R.C. 213's plain language where taxpayer's own function within the human reproductive process was to produce and provide healthy sperm, and because taxpayer was and remained capable of performing that function without the aid of IVF-related treatments, those treatments did not affect any function of his body and did not qualify as deductible "medical care" within the meaning of Section 213(a). The court also held that the IRS's disallowance of taxpayer's claimed deduction neither violated any fundamental right nor discriminated on the basis of any suspect (or quasi-suspect) characteristic. View "Morrissey v. United States" on Justia Law

The statutory presumption set forth in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-814(A)(1) that a man is presumed to be a legal parent if his wife gives birth to a child during the marriage applies to couples in same-sex marriages.After Kimberly McLaughlin and Suzan McLaughlin were married in California, Kimberly gave birth to a baby boy, E. When E. was almost two years old, Kimberly moved out of the parties’ home, taking E. with her. Thereafter, Suzan filed petitions for dissolution and for legal decision-making and parenting time in loco parentis. Suzan also challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s refusal to recognize lawful same-sex marriages performed in other states. Based on Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the trial court concluded that Kimberly could not rebut Suzan’s presumptive parentage under section 25-814(C). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Suzan was a presumed parent under section 25-814(A)(1) and that Kimberly was equitably estopped from rebutting Suzan’s presumptive parentage of their son. View "McLaughlin v. Honorable Lori B. Jones" on Justia Law

The plain reading of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) covers discrimination against breastfeeding mothers. Plaintiff filed suit against the police department under the PDA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after her reassignment and constructive discharge. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and held that there was sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination when plaintiff was reassigned from the narcotics task force to the patrol division; the denial of accommodations for a breastfeeding employee violated the PDA when it amounted to a constructive discharge; a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have felt compelled to resign; and the City's remaining arguments were unavailing. View "Hicks v. Tuscaloosa, Alabama" on Justia Law