Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the enforcement of the County of Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act ("Measure B"), Los Angeles County, Cal. Code tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39, and amending tit. 22, div. 1, ch. 22.56.1925. Measure B imposes a permitting system and additional production obligations on the makers of adult films, such as requiring performers to wear condoms in certain contexts. The court concluded that it need not decide whether Intervenors satisfy the requirements of Article III standing where plaintiffs have standing. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting preliminary injunctive relief to only certain parts of Measure B, while allowing enforcement of other provisions as severable. The purpose of Measure B is twofold: (1) to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted infections among performers within the adult industry, (2) thereby stemming the transmission of sexually transmitted infections to the general population among whom the performers dwell. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the condom requirement would likely survive intermediate scrutiny where the restriction of expression in this case is de minimus; the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest; and the condom requirement leaves alternative channels of expression available. The portions of Measure B's permitting system left in place by the district court also survives constitutional scrutiny where the requirements that adult film producers complete training about blood-borne pathogens and post a permit during shooting still serve the County's interest in preventing sexually transmitted infections. The district court correctly concluded that the remaining permitting provisions leave little, if any, discretion to government officials. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction with respect to the condom and permitting requirement. The court affirmed the judgment.View "Vivid Entertainment v. Fielding" on Justia Law

GLAAD filed a putative class action alleging that CNN violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51 et seq., and California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., by intentionally excluding deaf and hard of hearing visitors from accessing the videos on CNN.com. CNN filed a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16 et seq., arguing that GLAAD's claims arose from conduct in furtherance of CNN's free speech rights and that GLAAD failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court concluded that CNN's conduct was in furtherance of its free speech rights on a matter of public interest; where, as here, an action directly targeted the way a content provider chose to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action was based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California's anti-SLAPP statute; GLAAD failed to establish a probability of success on the merits of its Unruh Act claims because it has not shown intentional discrimination based on disability as required under California law; at this juncture, none of CNN's constitutional challenges posed a barrier to GLAAD's pursuit of its DPA claims; GLAAD's DPA claims were not foreclosed by the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption; GLAAD's DPA claims have the requisite minimal merit to survive CNN's free speech challenge and dormant Commerce Clause challenge; and the court certified to the California Supreme Court the remaining dispositive question of state law regarding GLAAD's DPA claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying CNN's motion to dismiss. View "Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

In 1999, Geraldine Fuhr successfully sued to be instated as varsity boys basketball coach at Hazel Park High School, where she had been employed as varsity girls basketball coach. For five years she coached both teams. In 2006, she was removed from her position coaching varsity girls basketball. She claims that her dismissal as the varsity girls basketball coach and other acts of harassment were a result of her 1999 suit. The district court granted the district summary judgment, rejecting claims of retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)), gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting a substantial time gap between the suit and the complained-of actions and the district’s complained-of actions were not discriminatory. View "Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Covington, a basketball official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for more than 10 years, filed suit, alleging gender employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. 10:5-1, because she has been excluded from officiating at boys’ high school varsity basketball games. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants: the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 (Board 193), which assigns officials to officiate at regular season high school basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (NJSIAA), which controls and supervises post-season tournament games and assigns officials to referee those games; the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials (IAABO), the Colonial Valley Conference (CVC), the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a school at which Covington has officiated, and Dumont, the President of Board 193. The Third Circuit remanded to give Covington an opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the CVC and IAABO. View "Covington v. Int'l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed an order and judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Hofstra and dismissing her suit claiming harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681-88; and corresponding provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. Plaintiff claimed that she experienced harassment and retaliation while employed by Hofstra as a team manager for the university's football program. Because defendants took the needed remedial action in this case, the harassment carried out by some players on the football team could not be imputed to the university or its personnel. The district court erred, however, in its analysis of the McDonnell Douglas factors by holding that plaintiff could not prevail on any of her three retaliation claims based on her supposed failure to demonstrate that she had engaged in protected activity and the requisite causation. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a grant of summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claims, but not as to her sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Summa v. Hofstra University" on Justia Law

This litigation was the latest chapter in the efforts of Plaintiffs, including the commissioner of environmental protection, to close and remediate an area known as the "tire pond," a solid waste disposal area on land owned by Defendants, an individual and various corporate entities he owned or controlled. The nonparty plaintiff in error, Corporation, which conducted its business on land leased from an industrial park that contained a portion of the tire pond, brought this writ of error from the judgment of the trial court ordering it to vacate that land in order to effectuate the environmental remediation that the trial court had ordered in the action underlying this writ of error. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that the trial court properly ordered Corporation to vacate where (1) the trial court had the authority to enforce the injunctions ordered in the underlying action against Corporation; (2) such an order was necessary to effectuate the remediation; and (3) the trial court's enforcement of the injunctive orders rendered in the underlying action against Corporation did not violate Corporation's due process rights. View "Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. Farricielli" on Justia Law